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Note
The Minnesota Supreme Court
1964-1965
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively
surveys significant decisions of the 1964-1965 term. The
decisions selected were thought to represent new developments in Minnesota law or otherwise to be of interest to
members of the Minnesota Bar. The results reached by
the court have been analyzed and evaluated in terms of
their effect upon Minnesota law and are frequently compared with the law of other jurisdictions. While the decisons are discussed individually, they are arranged
according to the general legal issue involved; this arrangement, however, is merely one of convenience, since many
of the cases involve issues from several areas of the law.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

WivER: CoURT WnL NOT CoNsIDER AmIssIBmTY oF
DEFENDANT'S ADmIssIoNs WH
PRocEDURAL FoRFEIiTEs
WERE MADE IN THE TIAL PROCEEDING.

In a prosecution for receiving the earnings of a prostitute,'
admissions made by defendant to police officers during detention
and prior to representation by counsel were received in evidence
without objection by defendant's court appointed attorney. No
special instruction on the question of voluntariness was requested
nor was exception taken to the charge as givenY On appeal the
defendant contended that he was deprived of a fair trial because
the admissions did not meet the federal standard of voluntariness
and should not have been received in evidence.3 The Minnesota
1. Mlnmu.
STAT. § 617.82 (1961) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to knowingly accept or receive, in whole or in part, his or her
support or maintenance from the proceeds or earnings of any woman engaged
in prostitution."
2. For a statement of the charge, see Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, State v.
Taylor, 133 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1965).
3. Factors that the United States Supreme Court has considered relevant
in determining whether a confession is voluntary as a matter of law have
been summed up recently as follows:
[W]hether the police were guilty of physical or psychological coercion;
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Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the federal constitutional

issue of the admissibility of the admissions could not be determined on appeal when defendant had neither objected to their

reception at trial nor requested cautionary instructions as to their
voluntariness. State v. Taylor, 133 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1965).
Minnesota applies the rule that the appellate court will not
review matters which the defendant failed to raise below by
objecting to the introduction of evidence, 4 by requesting cautionary instructions with respect to the evaluation of the evidence,
or by excepting to the charge as given It should be noted, however, that the Minnesota court has modified the traditional rule
in exceptional cases where the defendant has claimed a violation
of fundamental law that substantially and materially prejudices
his rights. It has been recognized that a mere failure to assert
these rights at the proper time should not result in forfeiture.6
Federal decisions indicate that the conventional notions of
state procedural forfeiture will no longer bar collateral review of
a constitutional issue not raised at the trial level; where post
conviction relief based on constitutional claims has been sought,
the federal courts have inquired into the facts and have made
whether the defendant was denied access to counsel or friends; whether
the defendant was held for an unreasonable period before arraignment;
whether defendant was informed of his right to retain counsel and remain silent; and whether defendant's age, intelligence, and experience
were less than normal.
Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-1963, 48 MmN. L. REv. 119, 163-61
(1963).
4. See State v. Armstrong, 257 Minn. 295, 101 N.W.2d 398 (1960); State
v. Rosenswieg, 168 Minn. 459, 210 N.W. 403 (1926); State v. Pearson, 153
Minn. 32, 189 N.W. 404 (1922); State v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296, 75 N.W. 235
(1898); State v. Mims, 26 Mlnn. 183, 2 N.W. 683 (1879).
5. See State v. Rasmussen, 241 Ainn. 310, 63 N.W.2d 1 (1954); State v.
DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 41 N.W.2d 313 (1950); State v. Soltau, 212 Minn. 20,
2 N.W.2d 155 (1942); State v. Jenkins, 171 Minn. 173, 213 N.W. 923 (1927);
State v. Sailor, 130 Minn. 84, 153 N.W. 271 (1915); State v. Newman, 127
Minn. 445, 149 N.W. 945 (1914). See generally 5 Am. JuR. 2D Appeal and
Error § 601 (1962); Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved,7 Wis. L. Rzv. 91 (1932);
Note,54 HARv. L. Rnv. 1204, 1212 (1941).
6. See State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 365, 104 N.Wed 650, 655 (1960);
State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 52-53, 99 N.W.2d 902, 907 (1959); Note, 54
IL3av. L. Rav. 1204, 1209-10 (1941). The federal courts apply this standard.
'Tlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. Cnmm. P. 59b.
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their own determination of forfeiture. 7 In Fay v. No s the United
States Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the federal
district court in a habeas corpus proceeding is not foreclosed by
the defendant's failure to raise the constitutional issue in the state
proceedings unless the defendant has "deliberately bypassed"
state procedureY In Henry v. Mississippi" the Supreme Court
strongly suggested that the state courts should abandon their
contemporaneous objection rule and determine both whether a
constitutional claim has been waived and whether, in the absence
of waiver, the claim has substantive merit. The Court pointed out
that since the state determination of forefeiture does not preclude consideration of defendant's constitutional claim in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding, the state courts should modify their
make resort to a federal habeas corpus proceeding
rules so as to
11
unnecessary.
The Minnesota court, in Taylor, adhered to the requirement
of contemporaneous objection without refering to Noia and
Henry. Thus, an examination of the policies underlying both the
traditional rule and the suggested approach in Henry clearly
appears to be warranted.
The rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence allows the trial court a fair opportunity to
rule on its admissibility. If the objection is well taken, the inadmissible evidence will be excluded from jury consideration and a
reversal and new trial causing unnecessary proceedings will be
avoided.' The requirement of contemporaneous objections prevents the defendant's attorney from using inadmissible evidence
as part of trial strategy to insure grounds for reversal in the event
7. See United States v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Harpole, 263 Fad 71 (5th Cir. 1959). In both cases, the court found that
there had been no waiver and ordered a retrial.
8. 872 U.S. 891 (1963).
9. [T]he federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an
applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the
state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies....
[This may be done] only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by
holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon
the applicant's default. ... [And a finding of deliberate by-passing may
be based only] on the considered choice of the petitioner ....

A choice

made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief.
372 U.S. at 438-39.
10. 879 U.S. 443 (1965).
11. Id. at 452-58.
12. See State v. Pearson, 153 Minn. 82, 189 N.W. 404 (1922).
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of an adverse verdict.' 3 The rule requiring counsel to request
particular instructions or to take exception to the court's failure
to do so discourages defendants from offering erroneous instruc-

tions in order to get reversible error in the record. 14 Orderly administration of justice by forcing discussion of instructions when
offered is thus encouraged. 5
There is a definite state interest in effecting orderly and less

costly court proceedings by enforcing procedural forfeitures. 1
However, the possibility that the defendant may obtain a hearing
on his constitutionAl claims in a habeas corpus proceeding suggests that it would be more efficient to determine such questions
on direct appeal. If the state hopes to terminate a substantial
portion of its criminal litigation in its own courts, the state court
cannot invoke a more stringent standard of forefiture upon direct
appeal than the federal courts would apply in a habeas corpus
proceeding.'8 An alignment of state and federal standards would
13. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); State v. Pearson, supra
note 12; Note, 54 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1204 n.2 (1941). But see State v. Pearson,
supra (dissenting opinion). The dissenters felt that "if criticism is to be indulged it should be against the state in offering to put the erroneous testimony
before the jury." Id. at 39, 189 N.W. at 406.
14., Cf. Estun v. People, 104 Colo. 302, 91 P.2d 487 (1939).
15. See Russell v. State, 17 Okla. Crim. 164, 194 Pac. 242 (1920).
16. Had objection been made in Taylor during the officer's testimony about
the defendant's admissions, the objection would have called forth the single
question of admissibility. The issue, in short, would have been expressly faced
by the trial judge and the likelihood of achieving a correct result would have
been maximized.
17. It can be argued that a determination on direct appeal is less efficient.
Due to the defendant's failure to raise the matter at the trial court, there is
no evidence on record upon which the appellate court can adequately determine whether defendant's constitutional rights have been violated.
18. See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal
Posiconvietioan Review, 50 A.BA.J. 928 (1964); Note, 16 ALA. L. Rzv. 117,
123 (1963); Comment, 24 MVD. L. REv. 46, 64-66 (1964). A resolution adopted
at the 1965 National Association of Attorneys General convention indicates
that there is an increased awareness at the state level of the value of aligning
the state standard of procedural forfeiture with that applied by the federal
courts.
[The association] which had previously been highly critical of the
Court's rulings in this area, rejected all "states' rights" resolutions and
adopted a resolution noting that release of state prisoners by federal
courts could be avoided if the states adopted better procedures for
reviewing convictions themselves.
CoMMIssIoN ON LAW AND SociAL AcTION OF THE AMERICAN JEnSH CoxGREss, THE CivIL RIGHTs AND CivIm LiBERTrEs DEcISIoNs OF THE UmuN=
STATEs SuPRnum COURT FOR THE 1964-1965 TERM 3 (1965).
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eliminate the need to proceed with the case through federal courts
already laboring under congested dockets. 19 Abandonment of the
contemporaneous objection rule would avoid the friction occasioned by a federal district court reversal of a state conviction 2
The danger that the procedural rules will be disregarded solely
for strategical purposes is largely eliminated since the defendant
will be bound by his waiver if he deliberately bypasses state procedure. 1
The necessity of affording the defendant a genuinely fair trial
seems more important than the state's interest in an orderly criminal procedure. 2 Only in those cases where the defendant deliberately bypasses a state procedural rule should he be prevented
from raising his constitutional claim on direct appeal. = Several
state courts have adopted the Court's suggestion in Henry and
have reviewed a defendant's constitutional claim on direct appeal
even though there was no objection below 2 4 It may be suggested
that the defendant should be entitled to a direct state review only
where the violation of his constitutional rights goes to the trustworthiness of the evidence and not where the federal rights are
aimed at preventing improper police tactics. This distinction,
however, would create difficult interpretive problems in deciding
the proper effect that should be given constitutional rights.
Assuming arguendo that the Minnesota Supreme Court will
ultimately adopt the Supreme Court's suggestion in Henry, it
appears that the defendant's claim that the receipt of his ad19. Habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal district

courts increased from 1,903 to 3,501 (up 85.5%) from fiscal year 1963 to the
1964 fiscal year. 1964 AnAimsTmRAv OFFic OF THE UNmr:D STAT Es CouRTs,
AwN. REP. oF = DMECToR 46.
20. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965).
21. The requirement of finding a deliberate bypassing of a state procedure

in order to have an effective waiver promises to be a difficult interpretive
problem. Although the facts of Noia fell within the Court's own definition of
waiver, relief was granted. See Comment, 24 MID. L. REV. 46, 63-64 (1964).
22. Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1204, 1213 (1941).
23. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963); People v. Maes, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (waiver of jury trial in a criminal case must
be by the personal consent of defendant). "[I]n the absence of express authority, an attorney generally has no power, by stipulation, agreement, or
otherwise, to waive or surrender the substantial legal rights of his client .... "
7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 100, at 922 (1937); cf. 5 A.r. Jun. Attorneys at

Law § 70 (1936).
24. See People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50, 56 (RI. 1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82,
88 (R.I. 1965) (concurring opinion); State v. Kilday, 206 A.2d 537 (R.I. 1965).
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missions into evidence constituted a violation of due process has
substantial merit. A confession obtained from a defendant after
he has been denied counsel, directly 25 or indirectly,26 cannot be
the basis of his conviction once the appointment of counsel has
become required by the sixth amendment. In Escobedo v. Illinois, -7 the point of necessary protection was reached when the
investigation began to focus on the particular suspect then in
police custody. This was unquestionably the situation of defendant in Taylor since his admissions were made at the time he was
handed a copy of the warrant charging him with the offense.
Because under some circumstances admissions may be treated as
confessions," the fact that the admissions attributed to the defendant in the instant case were made prior to the appointment
of counsel indicate that the admissions were inadmissible and that
the defendant had been deprived of his constitutional rights 9
25. Escobedo v. IlAnois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

26. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); People v. Dorado, 394
P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In Dorado, as in Taylor, the defendant failed to request counsel but the court was of the opinion that this
did not distinguish the case from Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 25. "We find
no strength in an artificial requirement that a defendant must specifically
request counsel; the test must be a substantive one: whether or not the point
of necessary protection for guidance of counsel has been reached." People v.
Dorado, supra, at 956. But see State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, No. 141,
Minn., December 10, 1965, where the court indicated that defendant's constitutional rights are not violated unless the denial of his constitutional right
to counsel was the result of affirmative conduct on the part of law enforcement officials.
27. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
28. See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 732, at 1046; LOCEXART, KAMSAR &
CHoPrE, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 747 (1964); 3 McCoRxncx, EviDENCE § 113 (1954); Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 FORDHAA. L. REV.
96 (1959); Note, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 485 (1946).
In Escobedo, the Court referred throughout the case to defendant's utterances as a statement even though it was obviously an admission. The Court
refused to draw such a meaningless distinction even though it had the opportunity. All incriminating statements elicited by police during interrogation
after the right to counsel has been denied were held to be inadmissible. See
State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R1.. 1965).
29. The effectiveness of counsel after the two week period had elapsed
was, at the least, materially damaged. "A person accused of crime needs a
lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at any other time." CnHA&Fr,
DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAwmNTAL RUMAN :RIGHTS, Pamphlet 2, at 541 (19511952). It is implicit in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that defendant's right to counsel at least begins at the time when he should be
brought before a magistrate: "[Defendant] requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence." Id. at 845.
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Though recognizing this possibility, the court justified its result
on the ground that no miscarriage of justice resulted since there
was other evidence of defendant's guilt and the admissions did
not relate to a crucial issue.2 0
The court, in so holding, ignored the well established principle
that allowing an invalid, incriminating statement in evidence is
never harmless error.3 1 Absent a special finding by the jury, there
is no way of knowing precisely
what part such evidence played in
32
securing the conviction.
In conclusion, it is suggested that in the future the Minnesota
Supreme Court should consider the federal court decisions as a
basis for affording the opportunity to provide state procedures
for a full airing of constitutional claims s An alignment of the
state court's concept of waiver with that set out in Noia, thereby
enabling defendants to assert their constitutional claim for the
first time on appeal, is preferable to forcing unsuccessful defendants into the federal courts on habeas corpus. The obvious result
will be a federal decision overturning decisions of the state court
with a consequent adverse effect on federal-state relations.
30. The court's conclusion that the admissions did not relate to the
contested issue of whether, in receiving the money, defendant was acting as
agent for the woman to redeem articles she had pawned or receiving the
earnings of a prostitute seems to be inaccurate. The statement by the
defendant upon receipt of the warrant charging him with receiving the earnings of a prostitute-"It looks like you have got me cold this time," 133
N.W.2d at 829- does go to the contested issue.
31. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
32. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958); People v. Parham,
384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1963); State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d

50, 55 (R.I. 1965).
33. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965).
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected an opportunity to adjust their concept of waiver concerning defendant's constitutional claims in
State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, No. 141, Minn., December 10, 1965. The
court, in determining the question of the necessity of objection at trial relied
on State v. Taylor, stating:
In the absence of unusual circumstances, the admission of evidence
even though prejudicial does not entitle the defendant to a new trial
as a matter of right where no proper objection was made at trial, and
this is the case even though valid objection to the evidence might have
been made upon constitutional grounds.
Id. at 14.
Although this case was decided too late for full analysis in this note, it
would seem that all the arguments advanced concerning Minnesota's standard
for direct review of a defendant's constitutional claim where no proper objection was made at trial apply equally as well to the state court's collateral
review of habeas corpus petitions.
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II. CRIMINAL LAW
TAI&COURT REQUIRED TO ALLOW D)EmNDArxT RIGHT TO
ALLOCTON

During arraignment and on the advice of his court appointed
defense counsel, the indigent accused pleaded guilty to a charge
of burglary.1 No presentence investigation had been conducted,
and the district court did not hold a presentence hearing to determine if possible mitigating circumstances existed. The accused
refused to testify, invoking his constitutional right against self
incrimination. Rather than speaking on behalf of the accused
before sentence was imposed by the court, defense counsel simply
replied that the accused had asked him to request an immediate
sentencing without further investigation. The accused was then
sentenced to imprisonment for the maximum term. His subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the writ and
remanded for resentencing, holding that the accused had been
denied his right of "allocution." Minnesota ex rel. Searles v.
Tahash, 136 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1965).
Under early English common law allocution consisted of the
unqualified right of the accused to be asked, prior to sentencing,
if he had anything to say as to why judgment of death should not
be pronounced against him.2 Failure of the record to indicate that
allocution had been afforded was sufficient to warrant reversal of
the attainders In the early stages of English legal development,
1. MRNw. STAT. ANN. § 611.07 (1968) provides the method for appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants. In this case the county attorney nominated
the counsel appointed by the trial court. The court disapproved of such a
nominating procedure because it could suggest to the indigent defendant the
possibility of collusion between defense and prosecution. Minnesota ez rel.
Searles v. Tahash, 136 N.W.2d 70, 73, n.2 (Minn. 1965).
2. 1 Cur=, CRumNrA LAw 699-700 (1847).
Early cases indicate the importance and nature of allocution. In The King
v. Speke, 8 Salk. 358, 91 Eng. Rep. 872 (K.B. 1689-1712), the court reversed
the attainder of a high treason conviction because the defendant was not
asked what he had to say for himself and why sentence of death should not
be pronounced against him. Accord, Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 87 Eng. Rep.
175 (K.B. 1669-1732); Rex & Regina v. Geary, 2 Salk. 630, 91 Eng. Rep. 532
(K.B. 1689-1712). Reversal of the attainder restored all of the defendant's
civil rights. See 1 CHiTY, CRunruiL, LAw 756 (1847).
For a comprehensive study of common law allocution and its origins see
Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rv. 115 (1944).
3. 1 CHiTTY, CRmnwAL LAW 699-700 (1847). Attainder referred to the
status of a convicted criminal after sentence was pronounced for a capital
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allocution was deemed essential because the accused was not represented by counsel4 and had no right to appeal.5 Moreover, if the
accused were denied allocution, he would lose his chance to move
in arrest of judgment6 or to plead a pardon.7 However, these traditional common law reasons for allocution are inapplicable to
modern criminal procedure since right to counsel is guaranteed,8
and all states provide for some form of appeal.9 Furthermore, an
executive pardon can be obtained at any time after conviction if
the circumstances warrant such a remedy'
The United States Supreme Court early adopted the English
rationale that allocution was essential prior to pronouncing
sentence; however, this right was afforded only in capital cases.",
Rule 82(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
superseded the federal common law right, extended allocution to
noncapital cases: "[T]he court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment." This statutory
rule expanded the common law right by granting the defendant
not only the right to speak, but also the right to present evidence
in his behalf. In interpreting Rule 32(a), the United States Supreme Court has required the defendant to be asked directly
whether he has anything to say before being sentenced. 2
offense. The effect of attainder was to take away most of the convicted's rights
in realty and all of his legal remedies. Id. at 723-26.
4. Not only was the defendant without counsel, but he was not allowed
to call witnesses on his own behalf, to prepare his defense outside of the prison,
or to be notified of the evidence to be presented against him. 1 STEPHEN, HisTORY oF THE CRImNAL LAw oF ENGLo..n 850 (1883).
5. See id. at 809-11.
6. Rex & Regina v. Geary, 2 Salk. 630, 91 Eng. Rep. 532 (KB. 1689-1712).
The only time a defendant could move in arrest of judgment was between the
conviction and sentence. 1 Cmr , Cam nrAx LAw 661 (1847).
7. Rex & Regina v. Geary, suupra note 6. See also 1 Cn=x, CRMINAL
LAw 466-67 (1847).

8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Amb . STAT. § 632.01 (1961).
10. MAM.

CONST. Art. 5,

§ 4.

11. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1891). Ball is also cited as
authority for the common law rule requiring the presence of the accused at
the time of sentencing. Id. at 129-30.
Later cases clarified the right of allocution under federal common law.
See Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892) (allocution not required on
appeal); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.
1929) (L. Hand, J., allocution not required in noncapital cases).
12. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961), 35 Tum. L. REv. 831
(1962). Green is significant because it clearly indicates the defendant has two
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Notwithstanding the federal requirement, states have attached
varying degrees of importance to allocution.' 3 The majority afford
some form of allocution, either through common law1 4 or by
statute. 5 While some states make it mandatory in all felony convictions,

others grant the right only in capital cases.' 7 It is gen-

erally held that failure to grant the right of allocution does not
invalidate the judgment, but is only cause for resentencing.'8
Unlike early common law, in some states the right is not absolute.
Courts in these states require some evidence of prejudice before
they will consider the merits of a contention that the formal
requirements of allocution were not complied with at trial. 9
unqualified rights: (1) to make a statement on his own behalf; and (2) to
present any information in mitigation of punishment. Green also states that
the defendant has the burden of showing he was denied his right of allocution.
The record indicated that the trial judge asked, "did you want to say something?" The Court held allocution had been afforded, since the question could
have been directly addressed to the defendant and the defendant failed to
show it was not.
The holding in Green has been embodied in the proposed federal rules
which require that defendant's counsel must have an opportunity to speak on
behalf of the defendant. Also, the court is required to address the defendant
personally and ask if he wishes to make a statement. Second Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32,
1964.
13. See cases collected in Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1317 (1964).
14. E.g., Perry v. State, 43 Ala. 21 (1869); Keech v. State, 15 Fla. 591
(1876); Dutton v. State, 19.3 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914); James v. State, 45
Miss. 572 (1871); State v. Ybarra, 24 N.M. 413, 174 Pac. 212 (1918); McCue
v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 185 (1875).
15. E.g., CAL. PENi. CODE § 1200; IND. A~w. STAT. § 9-2205 (1956); IowA
CoDE § 789.6 (1962); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.09 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRUIe. PROC. §
480; WAsH. REV. CODE § 10.64.040 (1961).
16. E.g., Perry v. State, 43 Ala. 21 (1869); Cole v. State, 10 Ark. 318
(1850).
17. E.g., Farrell v. State, 213 Md. 348, 131 A.2d 863 (1957); State v. Bell,
215 S.C. 311, 54 S.E.2d 900 (1949) (dictum).
18. E.g., Smith v. State, 28 Ala. App. 506, 189 So. 86 (1939); State v. Hoyt,
47 Conn. 518 (1880).
19. In Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 391 Pa. 141, 145, 137 A.2d 236, 238
(1958), the court reasoned that even in capital cases the common law rule of
allocution no longer is as inflexible as it once was; for under English common
law the defendant could take no appeal and was not allowed the benefit of
counsel. Failure to allow allocution is not error, even in a capital case, without
some evidence of prejudice. Further, in Gannon v. People, 127 Ill. 507, 21
N.E. 525 (1889), the court pointed out that the accused always has counsel
at trial; motions for a new trial or writ of error are made before sentencing
and not at sentencing as at common law. Thus, omission of allocution is not
as serious as it once was.
The change of position by the American Law Institute is indicative of the
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Searles is the first case holding that the right of allocution
exists in Minnesota, although it is the customary practice in the
district courts to allow the accused an opportunity to speak prior
to sentencing ° When the court speaks of allocution, it endorses
and relies on the federal cases interpreting Rule 32(a). Accordingly
in Minnesota the right of allocution is twofold: (1) to make a
statement in his own behalf; and (2) to present any information
in mitigation of punishmentY1
Besides relying on common law development and the embodiment of allocution in the federal rules, the court states that section
631.20 of the Minnesota Statutes (1961) codifies this rightY2 This
statute provides that the trial court may, in its discretion, and
upon the suggestion of either party, hear any circumstances which
are properly relevant to mitigation of punishment.' Basing the
right to allocution on this statute seems rather tenuous, however,
since the wording of the statute indicates that this procedure is
entirely discretionary with the trial judge. Indeed the statute has
been so interpreted 2 4 The most reasonable interpretation of the
instant case is that the court has taken the procedure in section
631.20, which is somewhat similar to common law allocution, and
has expanded it into a mandatory right of allocution.
In order to protect society and properly rehabilitate the
trend toward placing less emphasis on the necessity of allocution. In the
Model Code of Criminal Procedure § 389 (1930), allocution was required in
all criminal cases. In a comment to the more recent Model Penal Code § 7.07
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954), the authors place great reliance on a presentence
investigation report, presumably in place of allocution, which is not mentioned.
They state that use of this device will provide the best method for the improvement of sentencing. They also consider a hearing with respect to mitigating circumstances is not well adapted to supply the needed information.
20. See State v. Larson, 171 Minn. 246, 213 N.W. 900 (1927), in which
the court held a statement made prior to sentencing cannot be made the
basis for a perjury conviction, since the defendant is not under oath when he
makes such a statement.
21. 136 N.W.2d at 73; see note 12, supra.
22. 136 N.W.2d at 73.
23.
[T]he court, upon the suggestion of either party that there are
circumstances which may be properly taken into view, either in aggravation or mitigation of punishment, may, in its discretion, hear the
same summarily, at a specified time, and upon such notice to the adverse party as it may direct. Such circumstances shall be presented by
the testimony of witnesses examined in open court.
M'N. STAT. § 631.20 (1961).
24. State v. Ranier, 258 Minn. 168, 175-76, 103 N.W.2d 389, 394-95
(1960); State v. Larson, 171 Minn. 246, 248, 213 N.W. 900, 901 (1997). See
also 22 Mum. L. REv. 733 (1938).
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offender, the objective of the sentencing process is to fit the punishment to the individual rather than to the particular offense 5
To do this it is of utmost importance that all available information be presented to the judge to enable him to effectively perform
his sentencing function.2 6 The existing procedures in Minnesota
to present this information to the court include questions asked
by the clerk of court concerning the background of the accused,2 7
presentence investigation, 8 and the courtroom hearing provided
for in section 631.20. If these procedural devices are employed,
the accused has had an ample opportunity to present any mitigating circumstances to the court.29 However, none of these procedures is mandatory: the accused may refuse to answer the
questions of the clerk of court; the presentence investigation is
discretionary with the trial judge;30 and the hearing under section
631.20 requires initiative from the accused or his attorney.
In Searles none of the customary procedures for the presentation of mitigating circumstances was utilized by either the trial
court or counsel for the accused. More significantly, although
given the opportunity defense counsel made no statement in
behalf of the accused. 1 From these facts the court determined
the accused had been deprived of his "right to have presented to
the court all of the mitigating factors which might reasonably
justify a sentence less than the maximum,"3 2 i.e., he had been
25. Sentencing Institute Program, 35 F.R.D. 381, 388 (1964).
26. Except in cases requiring life imprisonment, Minnesota trial judges are
given wide latitude, within the maximum provided for a particular offense, in
fixing the terms of imprisonment. Aliw. STAT. § 609.10 (1961).
27. MIuri. STAT. § 243.49 (1961). The procedure under this statute is
mandatory, although the defendant may constitutionally refuse to answer the
questions. The information revealed is not only useful to the judge at the
time of sentencing, but the papers also serve as a warden's warrant to hold
the prisoner.
28. Mn . STAT. ANx. § 609.115 (1963).
29. In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961), however, the Court
stated that none of the innovations in criminal procedure lessened the importance of the defendant speaking personally. The Court said that "the most
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant
might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Id. at 304.
30. Although discretionary, this procedure is utilized in the majority of
cases. The drafters of the proposed criminal code suggested that a presentence
investigation be a mandatory requirement, but the legislature failed to adopt
this proposal. Anvisoay Co NzrrrEr ON RPmoN OF CPumAI, LAw, PoPOSED imN.CRnm. CODE § 609.115 (1963).
Under the Youth Conservation Act, however, a report similar to a presentence investigation is required. Minw. STAT. ANN. § 242.18 (Supp. 1964).
31. See 136 N.W.2d at 72.
32. Id. at 74.
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denied his right of allocution. The court made no distinction
between felonies and misdemeanors, and so allocution is apparently required in all criminal cases.
Since the court is primarily concerned with the right to mitigate, it does not indicate whether a "direct question" must be
asked the accused- a requirement which exists in common law
allocution and in federal practice. Apparently the rationale of this
formal requirement is that it assures the "presence" of the accused
at the time of sentencing and thereby enables the court to impress
upon the accused and the public the serious nature of criminal
law.ca This rationale seems illogical, however, since the presence
of the accused can be readily ensured notwithstanding the right
of allocution. If the defendant refuses to answer, as in the instant
case, the requirement of a direct question alone would not seem
to meet the standard required by the Searles court. The court
apparently requires some form of a hearing such as section 631.20
provides, in which defense counsel has sincerely attempted to
present mitigating circumstances3 4
Notably, in Searles denial of allocution was a sufficient basis
for a writ of habeas corpus. In contrast, the failure to afford allocution in a federal criminal trial is subject to direct attack but
not to collateral attack.a 5
If available procedures for informing the court of possible mitigating circumstances were always utilized, there would be no
need for the holding in the instant case. When these procedures
are not voluntarily used by either the court or defense counsel,
however, a mandatory right of allocution affords a necessary
safeguard to the criminally convicted.
88. See Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 131 (1891).
84.
[I]t was relator's right to have presented to the court all of the mitigating factors which might reasonably justify a sentence less than the
maximum. Here there was no presentence hearing to permit favorable
consideration of relator's background, relator was given no opportunity
to be heard, and counsel failed to speak on his behalf.
186 N.W.2d at 74.
85. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962), the majority
stated that failure to grant allocution is "not a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." This was not
a case in which the defendant was affirmatively denied the opportunity to
speak, nor was there any claim that the defendant would have had anything
at all to say if he had been formally invited. For a discussion of the Hill
case, see 62 CoLum. L. R.v. 884 (1962); 76 HEnv. L. REv. 83 (1962); 48
IowA L. REv. 172 (1962).
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III. DISCOVERY - EVIDENCE
N.Av
OF EXPERT MUST BE DISCLOSED AS TO SPEED HELD INm ssmia

EXPERT

TESTIMONY

In a suit arising out of an automobile collision, defendant's pretrial interrogatory requested the "names of any witnesses to the
accident or to the facts pertinent to the above lawsuit." Plaintiff's answer to this interrogatory did not include the name of the
expert witness he called at trial Defendant asserted that since
the expert had not been disclosed he should not be allowed to
testify.2 During a weekend recess defendant was allowed to
examine the expert. Following this, the expert was permitted to
state his opinion, in answer to hypothetical questions and based
on scientific calculations, that plaintiff was not speeding. The
jury found for plaintiff and on appeal the Minnesota court granted
a new trial, holding that without a reliable foundation an expert's
calculation of speed is inadmissible, and that the name of an
expert witness should be disclosed in the answer to a proper
pretrial interrogatory. Sanchez v. Waldrop, 136 N.W.2d 61 (Minn.
1965).s
Estimates of speed have generally been viewed as matters of
common observation rather than expert opinion; 4 it is settled in
Minnesota that any person with reasonable intelligence and ordinary experience in life may express an opinion on speed How1. Normally an expert's name is not given in response to an interrogatory
requesting the names of persons with knowledge of relevant facts. Miller v.
United States, 192 F. Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1961). In Sanchez, the Minnesota
court ignored this fact in analogizing experts to factual witnesses.
2. In Minnesota, a party has a continuing duty to answer interrogatories,
Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963), 48 Mnx.
L. R v. 174, and must supply all information he knows or that is known by
his attorney, Lundin v. Stratmoen, 250 Minn. 555, 85 N.W.2d 828 (1957). The
exclusion of a witness whose name was not disclosed has been sustained.
Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, supra.
3. The new trial was granted on the first of these grounds. However, the
court's discovery statements also have the force of holding. Since the trial
court has broad discretion to impose sanctions to enforce discovery rules,
compare Sanchez v. Waldrop, 136 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Minn. 1965) with Gebhard
v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Mfinn. 471, 480, 22 N.W.2d 110, 116 (1963), the failure to
exclude the expert's testimony was not reversible error.
4. Moeller v. St. Paul Ry., 218 Mifnn. 353, 16 N.W.2d 289 (1944), 156
A.L.R. 371.
5. Greenberg v. Holfeltz, 244 Minn. 175, 69 N.W.2d 369 (1955); Hatley v.
Kllngsheim, 236 Minn. 370, 53 N.W.2d 123 (1952); Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn.
1, 36 N.W.2d 27 (1949); Daly v. Curry, 128 Minn. 449, 151 N.W. 274 (1915).

1966]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

493

ever, expert calculations of speed were also held admissible by the
Minnesota court in the leading case of Moeller v. St. Paul Ry.'
Expert calculations are based on either the "conservation of
momentum" theory 7 or the "coefficient of friction" theory.8 Each
theory utilizes a formula with several variables;9 lack of precision
in measuring any of them will distort the estimate of speed. In
Storbakken v. Soderberg,0 the Minnesota court questioned the
accuracy of results predicated upon conservation of momentum
principles."1 In Grapentinv. Harvey, 2 and again in Sanchez, the
court ruled inadmissible an expert's calculations using the "coefficient of friction" method. Both decisions emphasized the insufficient foundation for the opinion; in Grapentinthe evidence failed
to establish the amount of gravel on the road, and in Sanchez the
amount of snow on the road was in dispute. However, the court in
Sanchez also "demonstrated" the inherent unreliability of
coefficient of friction calculations, commented on the potentially
6. 218 Minn. 353, 363, 16 N.W.2d 289, 295 (1944). Expert testimony on
speed is admissible "not as an exception to the opinion evidence rule made in
cases calling for expert evidence, but under the exception existing when it is
impossible to reproduce data." Id. at 295. For the rule in other jurisdictions,
see Annot., 156 A.LR. 382 (1945); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 540 (1931). See also Cook,
Speed Calculations and the Expert Witness, 42 NEB. L. REV. 100 (1963) (scientific theory and foundation for such testimony); Schoone & Schapiro, Reconstruction of Automobile Accidents Through Lay and ScientifIc Testimony, 47
AAnQ. L. REv. 490 (1964) (excellent discussion focusing primarily on Wis-

consin law).
7. The conservation of momentum theory is used to estimate speed by
applying Newton's Laws to measurements of distance and direction traveled
after a collision. Cook, supra note 6, at 117.
The theory has also been used to determine the point of impact. However,
the Minnesota court has prohibited this use. Carmody v. Aho, 251 Minn. 19,
27, 86 N.W.2d 692, 697 (1957); Beckman v. Schroeder, 224 MIinn. 370, 28
N.W.2d 629 (1947).
8. The coefficient of friction theory utilizes measurements of skid marks
to calculate the speed of an automobile before the skid. Cook, supra note 6,
at 108.
9. At least six variables are utilized in the coefficient of friction formula.
Id. at 110.
1O. 246 :Nifnn. 484, 75 N.W.2d 496 (1956).
11. Id. at 439, 75 N.W.2d at 500. The court pointed to defects in the
foundation for the expert's opinion, but concluded that -the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury to give the evidence such
weight as it was entitled to under proper instructions. Two justices, concurring specially, argued that where an expert's opinion rests on inadequate
or uncertain facts, it should not be admitted into evidence since its basic
inaccuracy is likely to mislead the jury.
12. 262 Minn. 222, 114 N.W.2d 578 (1962).
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prejudicial effect of scientific testimony, 18 and expressed a clear
preference for eyewitness estimates of speed.' 4 Thus, although
Moeller was not explicitly overruled, it would appear that expert
calculations will be admissible in Minnesota only in the rare case
where exact measurements are made immediately following the
accident and no eyewitnesses are present to testify.
The expert calculations in Sanchez were erroneous for an additional reason. Even with an accurate foundation, coefficient of
friction calculations yield only a minimum figure.' 5 Therefore,
expert analysis in this field is normally used offensively to show
that defendant was going at least a certain rate. The defensive
use put forward in Sanchez to prove that plaintiff could not have
been speeding was scientifically inaccurate.
The question of whether names of expert witnesses are discoverable was considered for the first time by the Minnesota

court in Sanchez. Rule 26.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, which defines the scope of discovery, 16 permits examination regarding the "identity and location of persons having
IS. "In view of the importance normally accorded scientific training and
knowledge, the jury could well have been misled into disbelieving all the
witnesses who were present at the scene." 136 N.W.2d at 68. Accord,
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 114 N.W.2d 578 (1962); Carmody v.
Aho, 251 Minn. 19, 86 N.W.2d 692 (1957); Storbakken v. Soderberg, 246
Minn. 434, 75 N.W.2d 496 (1956); Beckman v. Schroeder, 224 Minn. 870, 28
N.W.2d 629 (1947).
14. 136 N.W.2d at 66.
15. Cook, supra note 6, at 105.
16. Discovery is restricted to materials which are relevant to the subject
matter of the suit, see Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Ainn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649
(1955); WRi.GHT, MInmSOTA RULEs, 158 (1954, Supp. 1956); 2 YOUNGQUIST
& BLcm, AnNESOTA Rums PPAcTicE 24 (1953), nonprivileged, see Snyker

v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 72 N.W.2d 357 (1955); Brown v. St. Paul Ry., 241
Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954); WRiGHT, M mNESOTA RuLEs 157 (1954, Supp.
1956); 2 YouGQuIsT & BrLAcIm, AlNESOTA RULES PAcTimc 24 (1953), and
which do not invade the "work product" of the lawyer, see Note, 48 MIN. L.
REv. 977 (1964). Further restrictions are that experts' conclusions are not
discoverable, MNur. R. Civ. P. 26.02, and that insurance coverage need not be
disclosed, Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955). Mmm.
R. Civ. P. 26.02 has been liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose
of fact disclosure, thereby eliminating surprise and narrowing issues. Jeppesen
v. Swanson, 243 finn. 547, 550, 68 N.W.2d 649, 651 (1955); see, e.g., Gebhard
v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963) (continuing duty to
disclose information); Boldt v. Sanders, 261 Mfinn. 160, 111 N.W.2d 225 (1961)
(impeachment evidence discoverable). See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 501 (1947); WRiGHT, MnoNESOTA RuLES, 156 (1954, Supp 1956);
Note, Developments in the Law -Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Ruv. 940, 944
(1961).
For a discussion of the relation between MnqN. R. Civ. P. 26.02 and FEn.
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knowledge of relevant facts." Prior to Sanchez the court had
held that the names of persons with first-hand knowledge of
the occurrence must be disclosed. 17 However it had not considered
whether the names of persons to be called at trial were discoverable. Courts deciding this question have held that the decision to
use a particular witness at trial need not be divulged.'
In Millerv. United States'9 a federal district court held that an
exception to this rule is required when the potential trial witness is
an expert. Knowledge of the expert's name before trial was found
to be necessary so that impeachment of his testimony, which
usually consists of an attack upon his qualifications and experience,2 0 could be prepared. 21 This reasoning was adopted by the
Minnesota court in Sanchez. Discovery of an expert's name will
unquestionably facilitate investigation of his qualifications. Nonetheless, an expert may be impeached on other grounds, and few
cases are likely to turn on his qualifications.
R. Civ. P. 26(b), see Note, 48 Mmw. L. REv. 977 (1964). Since discovery
rulings in MNfinnesota are not subject to interlocutory appeal, Brown v. St.
Paul Ry., 241 MNfinn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954), there is a dearth of Minnesota cases on discovery. As a result of this, and because the Minnesota rules
are generally patterned after the federal rules, the Minnesota court tends to
examine and follow the extensive federal case law where applicable, although
the court is not strictly bound by it. See, e.g., Boldt v. Sanders, 261 Minn.
160, 111 N.W.2d 225 (1961); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d
649 (1955).
17. Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki, 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963), 48
Mni. L. REV. 174; Lundin v. Stratmoen, 250 Minn. 555, 85 N.W.2d 828
(1957). See also Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963) (information
available as a matter of right); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1954); Annot., 27
26.19 (1963, Supp. 1964);
A.L.R.2d 737 (1953); 4 MooRs, mEDERAL PRACTICE
WRIGHT, M n-ESOTA RULES 158 (1954, Supp. 1956). Disclosure of those with
personal knowledge is necessary as a preliminary step to further discovery and
to insure against fact concealment.
18. Minnesota district courts have so held. Rosenow v. Machiln, Minn.
Rules Comm. Op. No. 36 (12th Jud. Dist. 1952); Seaton v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.; Minn. Rules Comm. Op. No. 167; WRIGHT, MINESOTA
RULES, 161. Federal cases are in accord. Wirtz v. B. A. C. Steel Prod., Inc.,
312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962); Richards v. Maine Cent. R.R., 21 F.R.D. 595 (D.
Mle. 1957); Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. v. Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
2 NEB.L. REv. 495 (1953); Cogdill v. TVA, 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947);
26.19(4) (1963, Supp. 1964); WRIGHT,
see 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
MnINSOTA RUIS 159 (1954, Supp. 1956). See also Frankel v. Sussex Poultry
Co., 45 Terry. 264, 71 A.2d 754 (Del. 1950).
19. 192 F. Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1961).
20. See Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 238 Minn. 472, 57 N.W.2d 572
(1953); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (1948).
21. For a dramatic example of the need for thorough pretrial preparation
for an expert witness, see NIZER, M LimE IN COURT 274-84 (1961).
22. 136 N.W.2d at 65.
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The Sanchez court also reasoned that, since the names of all
factual witnesses must be disclosed, the name of an expert should
be disclosed to avoid placing him in a preferred position as a surprise witness.23 However, for discovery purposes, expert and
factual witnesses should not be equated. Since the expert usually
has no personal knowledge of facts relevant to the suit, disclosure
of his identity is not necessary to prevent fact concealment. If the
expert's opinion is based upon first-hand knowledge - for
example, personal observations -his name should be discoverable under the ordinary rule applying to "persons having knowledge of relevant facts." 24 Further, although discovery is normally
used as a preliminary to future interrogation, Rule 26.02 limits
future interrogation of an expert by denying discovery of his
conclusions?5 While the rule may permit discovery of the factual"8
or technical2 7 bases of his opinion, these could be available through
independent sources.
23. 136 N.W.2d at 66.

24. M-Iq. R. Civ. P. 26.02.
25. It has been argued that the privilege should extend only to documents
containing written conclusions and should not prevent discovery of experts'
conclusions through oral and written interrogatories. See 2 YOUNGQUIST &
BL.crx, MIMESOTA RULES PRACTICE 8 (Supp. 1965). However, if only written
conclusions were to be protected, the provision would more appropriately be
included in rule 34 or 45.02, governing production of documents, instead of
in rule 26.02, which applies to all discovery devices. Of. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STA. L. Rnv.
455, 476 (1962). Moreover, the distinction makes little sense. It would be
sheer hypocrisy to deny production of the document containing the expert's
conclusions and allow oral discovery during which the deponent would read
the same forbidden document. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours &Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D. Del. 1959); Note, Develoapments in the Law
-Discovery, 74 Hanv. L. RLv. 940, 1034 (1961).
26. There is authority in the federal courts that factual bases of an
opinion are discoverable. See United States v. 48 Jars, More or Less, 23 F.R.D.
192 (D.D.C. 1958); Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17
F.R.D. 386 (D. Colo. 1955); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15
F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376
(D.N.J. 1954). Presumably this position would be sustained in Minnesota.
See Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 72 N.W.2d 357 (1955) (nonprivileged
portion of privileged report discoverable).
27. Cf. United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 23 F.R.D. 287 (N.D. Ohio
1959) (means of calculation but not opinion discoverable). Contra, Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.I-.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
Arguably calculations and variables-for example, the coefficient of friction
-would be more properly classified as an expert's conclusions since they
involve his training and professional skill. See Cook, Speed Calculations and
the Expert Witness, 42 NEB. L. Ruv. 100 (1963); Note, 48 MwNx. L. REv. 977,

988 (1964).

28. For example, in Minnesota accident reports must be filed and made
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Introduction of an undisclosed expert witness is likely to disrupt opposing counsel's planned trial strategy. To the extent that
his disruptive element is permitted, one of the purposes of discovery - the elimination of surprise and "sharp practices"29 may be defeated.
Finally, counsel has an interest in the disclosure of experts who
may be called at trial as a means of ascertaining whether expert
analysis may be relevant to the action. In addition to preparing
impeachment, counsel might seek independent expert analysis
which could be used to combat the opposing expert or as an aid
to settlement.
However, disclosure of the expert's name may be objectionable
because it reveals counsel's opinion that expert analysis is relevant. To the extent that the work product doctrine3 ° prohibits
any incursion into counsel's thought processes in anticipation of
trial, discovery of the names of experts who may be called should
not be permitted. It has been suggested, however, that the primary purpose of the work product doctrine is to "promote the
effectiveness of the adversary system by safeguarding the vigorous representation of a client's case from the possibly debilitative
effects of susceptibility to discovery." 31 This purpose would be
frustrated by a rule compelling disclosure of all experts who had
expressed an opinion on the case. Counsel's efforts to obtain
expert testimony might be deterred by the fear that he would be
uncovering ammunition for his opponent. On the other hand,
counsel's efforts would not be deterred by a rule compelling disclosure only of those witnesses expressing opinions favorable to
his client's position.
available to parties to the accident. Mnuq. STAT. § 169.09 (1961). Presumably
these reports will include measurements of skid marks. There is authority that
discovery will be denied if other avenues are open for obtaining the desired
information. Goldner v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 13 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. ]Il. 1952).
29. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Gebhard v. Niedzwieckl,
265 Nlinn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1963); Lundin v. Stratmoen, 250 Minn. 555,
85 N.W.2d 828 (1957). For discussions of the problem of surprise, compare
Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 84: What's So Wrong About Surprise, 89
A.B.AJ. 1075 (1953), with Chandler, Discovery and Pre-trialProcedure in
Federal Courts, 12 On-IA. L. Rzv. 321 (1959). Sharp practices include the
various forms of gamesmanship at trial.
30. For a discussion of the specific problems of "work product" in Minesota, see Note, 48 AMnw. L. REv. 977 (1964). See generally Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 24 F.R D. 416 (D. Del. 1959); 4 MooRn, FEEtAT PRACTICE
26.23, at
1315 (2d ed. 1963); Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L.
Rnv. 940, 1027-46 (1961).

81. Id. at 1028.
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The Sanchez opinion does not clearly state which of these rules
the court adopted, but the case should be read as adopting the
latter rule. First, the court's reference to experts who "may or
may not be called" 32 as witnesses cannot reasonably include
experts who expressed opinions unfavorable to the client's case,
since counsel would have no reason to call them. Second, if the
trial court's only effective sanction for nondisclosure is limiting or
excluding the expert's testimony, a rule compelling disclosure of
adverse experts could not be enforced. Limited to disclosure of
"friendly" experts, the Sanchez case does not unreasonably infringe upon work product principles. So long as counsel's vigorous
representation is not deterred, such a justified incursion into his
thought processes in anticipation of trial should be permitted.
It has been suggested that premature disclosure of an expert's
name will lead to his harassment by opposing counsel, thereby
compromising the policy of encouraging expert testimony s However, the argument that his name should therefore not be discoverable assumes that disclosure can serve no other purpose
than harassment 4 Legitimate interests in discovery appear to
outweigh the interest in protecting experts from potential harassment.
One possibility appears to have been overlooked by the court
in Sanchez. As an alternative to use of discovery tools, disclosure
of expert witnesses could be required at a pretrial conference
where the court could exercise some discretion in the matter3 5
32. 136 N.W.2d at 64.
33.
It is different in the case of witnesses as to fact, but in the case of
a witness as to opinion, if you are not going to permit the probing of
his opinion by discovery process, I see no reason why his name and
address should be made available and simply subject him to whatever pressure may be brought upon him by a party who wishes as
much as possible to weaken the positiveness of the expert's opinion
when it comes to trial.
Pepper, Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403, 406 (1946).
84. Ibid.

35. Since rule 16(4) (both Minnesota and federal) allows the court to
limit the number of expert witnesses, the rule presumably permits the court
to request the names of the experts. Although a pretrial conference is within
the court's discretion, there is authority that upon a party's request it will be
called. Cf. Bradford Novelty Co. v. Samuel Eppy & Co., 164 F. Supp. 798
(E.D.N.Y.1958); Bowles v. Economy Util. Co., 9 FED. RULEs SEav. 34.41,
Case 3 (W.D. Mo. 1946); 3 MoonE, FEai. PAcTIcE
16.07 (Supp. 1964).
In rejecting a proposed amendment to permit discovery of the names of
expert witnesses, the advisory committee on the federal rules stated that the
problem was, taken care of with pretrial conferences. 3A BARRoN & HOLTZOFF,
FnnDu PRACTIcE mmD PRocEDuRE 550 (1958).
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This would provide a more flexible procedure than discovery for
resolving competing interests and avoid the work product
problems.
IV.
EQUiTABLE ADOPTION MUST

ESTATES
BE BASED ON CONTRACT

Appellant claimed to be the adopted daughter of deceased
entitled to a share of deceased's estate as a pretermitted heir,1
even though the deceased had never legally adopted her. The
alleged adoption took place when deceased and his wife took
appellant into their home with the consent of appellant's natural
parents. Appellant was baptized as deceased's daughter, used his
family name, and was announced as his daughter when married.
After appellant's marriage, deceased was confined to a state
mental hospital, and appellant took care of deceased's wife until
her death. In 1951 appellant recovered over 4,000 dollars from
deceased for services rendered to his wife. In that suit appellant
declared that she was not deceased's daughter. In the present
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the facts were
insufficient to establish a contract to adopt. Therefore, appellant
was not entitled to the status of a pretermitted heir. In re Estate
of Rowe, 269 Minn. 557, 132 N.W.2d 180 (1964).
Although adoption was unknown at English common law,2
Minnesota established statutory adoption procedures giving the
adopted child all the rights of a natural child.' Problems arose,
however, when parties failed to comply with the statutory procedures. Occasionally a family, although intending to adopt,
accepted a child into their home and raised him as their own
without obtaining an official adoption decree. When the "adopting" parents died, courts were required to determine the foster
child's rights in their estates. In order to avoid the harsh result of
denying such a child a share in the estate after he had been
considered a member of the family, courts developed the theory
of equitable adoption.4
Though such relief has been variously termed equitable adoption,' contract to adopt,' and adoption by estoppel,7 the courts
1. MUn.
STAT. § 525.201 (1961).
2. In re Adoption of Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656 (1947).
3. lMwN. STAT. §§ 259.21-.29 (1961). See generally Note, Adoption.in Minnesota, 36 IINN. L. REv. 383 (1952).
4. E.g., Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 NJ. Eq. 370 (1857).
5. Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957).
6. In re Estate of Firle, 197 Minn. 1, 265 N.W. 818 (1936).
7. In re Estate of Painter, 246 Iowa 307, 67 N.W.2d 617 (1954).
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have conditioned the grant of equitable relief on an underlying
contractual obligation." The contract is not established unless
the adopting parents promise to adopt the child and the natural
parents agree to relinquish custody. The mutual promises provide
sufficient consideration. The adopting parents must then accept
and provide for the child as their own, and the child must assume
the duties of a natural childY Upon the death of the adopting
parents, the child is granted a share in the estate because "equity
would treat as done what ought to have been done."'0
Unfortunately, the contractual justification breaks down when
the status of the child is in question. If the remedy is viewed as
an enforcement of a contractual 6bligation, the court should give
the child the same status and rights he would have enjoyed had
the contract been performed. Thus, the child would be treated as
if legally adopted and entitled to all of the rights of a natural
child." However, it is clear that under Minnesota law the unperformed contract to adopt does not create a legal adoption.' 2
Consequently, the equitably adopted child has no interest in the
estates of the adopting parents' collaterals 3 and retains all of his
natural birthrights. 14 Secondly, the court's recognition of and
8. See 45 IowA L. IEv. 159 (1959).
9. In re Estate of Firle, 197 Minn. 1, 265 N.W. 818 (1936). See also Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption, 9 Sw. LJ.90, 94-99 (1955).
10. Fisk v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 90, 144 N.W. 455, 457 (1918).
11. Mfmx. STAT. § 259.29 (1961) provides:
Upon adoption, such child shall become the legal child of the persons
adopting him, and they shall become his legal parents with all the rights
and duties between them of the natural parents and legitimate child.
By virtue of such adoption he shall inherit from his adoptive parents
and relatives the same as though he were the legitimate child of such
parents, and in the case of his death intestate the adoptive parents and
their relatives shall inherit his estate as if they had been his natural
parents and relatives.
12. In re Estate of Olson, 244 Minn. 449, 70 N.W.2d 107 (1955).
13. Ibid. In the Olson case the court refused to enforce the contract against
collaterals because the child had no equities against their estates. However,
it is difficult to determine what equities a statutory proceeding would have
added to the child's case. Probably, the policy behind the Olson case is that
collaterals may have planned that their estate should pass by intestate succession under the assumption that the foster child would not share in it. If
recovery were then allowed, some estate plans might be frustrated.
14. The Olson case held that an equitable adoption did not create the
parent-child relationship between the adopting parents and child and that
only the statutory proceeding could accomplish that result. Conversely, only
the adoption proceeding can destroy the child's relationship with the natural
parents and his blood relatives. Thus, a child adopted by contract should
retain all rights against his natural parents and relatives while possessing
contract rights against the adopting parents.
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insistence upon a contract to adopt may conflict with the formal
program of child custody. Usually, the true subject matter of a
private contract is the custody of the child. However, in their
attempts to meet the equities of the child, the courts will ignore
the true subject matter.' 5 Vinnesota statutes require court approval for all statutory adoptions 6 and for all assumptions of
care and custody of young children by anyone other than the
natural parents or relatives.17 Also, any person, including a relative, who accepts permanent custody of a child must notify the
commissioner of public welfare within thirty days.' 8 Any person
who violates any provisions of the child custody statutes is guilty
of a misdemeanor.' 9 Thus, it seems inappropriate for the court to
rely upon, and thereby encourage, illegal private adoption "contracts" as a basis for equitable relief. Finally, although the child
is said to occupy the position of a third party beneficiary to the
contract between both sets of parents,20 under normal contract
law, third party beneficiaries have rights but not obligations;2 1
yet, the courts state that the adoption contract will not be enforced unless the child has performed the normal obligations of
a natural child.F2 Even if the child is deemed to have assented to
15. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fredrick, 241 M~inn. 55, 62 N.W.2d 361 (1964).
But see Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 29 S.W. 1114 (1921), where the
true nature of the contract (custody of the child) was recognized and the
contract declared invalid.
16. Alum. STAT. §§ 259.21-.29 (1961).
17. AIuN. STAT. § 257.02 (1961) provides:
No person other than the parents or relatives may assume the
permanent care and custody of a child under 14 years of age unless
authorized to do so by an order or decree of court. Except in proceedings for adoption, no parent may assign or otherwise transfer to another his rights or duties with respect to the permanent care and custody of his child under 14 years of age. Any such transfer shall be void.
Under Mmr. STAT. § 256.01 subd. 2. (2) (1961), the commissioner of public
welfare is directed to "supervise the care of children in boarding and foster

homes .... "
18. MINN. STAT. § 257.03 (1061).
19. AMmw. STAT. § 257.123 (1961). A court may, however, allow a transfer
made in violation of the statute. See State ex rel. Hanson v. Phelps, 166 MAnn.

423, 208 N.W. 131 (1926), in which a child was transferred in apparent violation of MiNw. STAT. § 257.02 (1961), but the court allowed the transfer because it was in the best interest of the child.
20. Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption, 9 Sw. LJ. 90, 94
(1955).
21. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 347 (3d ed. 1959).
22. See In re Estate of Hack, 166 Minn. 35, 207 N.W. 17 (1926), where

the court refused to find a contract because, inter alia, the child had left home
at an early age.
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his obligations, such assent may necessarily have to be con23
structed over a time prior to his attainment of the age of reason.
These problems lead to the conclusion that the court, in affording equitable relief, is motivated by factors other than strict contractual requirements.2 4 Though the contract rubric provides
definite standards for avoiding an inequitable result while allowing enough latitude to decide each case on its merits, the real
basis for relief should be identified so that the court may be
presented with the proper equities.
Though the contract appears to be a legal fiction, 3 the
decedent's intent that the child shall inherit is essential. Absence
of such intent will prevent relief to a foster child even though it
would not prevent a natural child's inheritance. 2 The distinction
may be explained on the basis of the parties' relationship. Society
expects that natural parents will provide care and protection for
their children, 27 and there is a normal presumption that a parent
23. Of. In re Estate of Norman, 209 Minn. 19, 295 N.W. 63 (1940), where
the court said the petitioner could not have been a party to such a contract
when she was a mere babe in arms.
24. An example of the importance of other factors may be found in comparing In re Estate of Fredrick, 241 Minn. 55, 62 N.W.2d 361 (1954), to Rowe.
In both cases the child was referred to as a son or daughter, went to live with
the foster parents at an early age, and assisted the foster parents after leaving
home - in Fredrick by harvesting and paying for the mother's last illness,
in the instant case by taking care of the mother through several sicknesses.
Finally, both children disavowed the parent-child relationship. In Fredrick
the child referred to his natural brothers and sisters as next of kin in his war
risk insurance policy and had his natural brother give the necessary parental
consent when entering the Navy. However, in Rowe appellant claimed she
was not an adopted daughter in her suit for recovery of services performed.
In Fredrick a contract was found, and in Rowe no contract was found.
Moreover, the Fredrick court went so far as .to say that the evidence was
even stronger than previous cases where recovery was granted. Therefore, it
seems that in Rowe appellant asked for too much, whereas in Fredrick plaintiff asserted inheritance rights but did not seek payment for services rendered.
Although Fredrick was decided under South Dakota law the Minnesota
court stated that the evidentiary requirements were the same as in lnnesota.
25. There is no case in Minnesota in which a contract was introduced
into evidence. All contracts have been inferred from fact. Brief for Appellant,
p. 1, In re Estate of Rowe, 269 Minn. 557, 132 N.W.2d 180 (1964).
26. Compare MmiN. STAT. § 525.201 (1961). Since the unperformed contract to adopt does not confer a new legal status on the child, he should not
be entitled to the benefits of the omitted child statute.
27. Any person who contributes to the neglect of a child is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Mi~n. STAT. § 260.27 (1961). Under this section a parent is
obligated to provide proper care and protection. Annot., Mnw. STAT. ANN. §
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intends his natural children to inherit. A foster child, however, is
cared for only because the foster parents voluntarily agreed to
accept the responsibility. Since their specific agreement was only
to provide care and protection, it is difficult to presume that the
foster parents intended to give inheritance rights also. Since28the
foster child is already an object of the parents' generosity, it
seems preferable to require something more than the mere parentchild relationship before allowing him to share as a natural child.
The additional requirement is the intent, which generally must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.2 9 Consequently, if
the deceased died testate and did not mention the foster child in
the will, recovery will be denied 0° The mere fact that a will was
made detracts from the argument that the deceased would have
intended the child to share. Even when there is direct evidence
of a contract, the inheritance principle that a parent can specifically disinherit his children may preclude recovery 1 Conversely, relief is granted when the evidence indicates that the
adopting parents intended to have the child take from the
estate 2 2 Thus, when an invalid will designated the child as beneficiary, the court found a contract and awarded the child an
intestate share of the estate.s When the parents die intestate,
260.27 (1961), citing 133-B-1 Ops. Anum. ATT'Y Gm., Feb. 5, 1945. Also a
court may order parents to support or contribute to the support of their children if they are able. MNN. STAT. § 260.25 (1961).
28. See In re Estate of Hack, 166 Minn. 35, 37, 207 N.W. 17, 18 (1926).
29. E.g., In re Estate of Berge, 234 Minn. 31, 47 N.W.2d 428 (1951);
Odenbreit v. Utheim, 131 Minn. 56, 154 N.W. 741 (1915).
30. No Minnesota case has allowed recovery when a will of the deceased
limited the child's recovery or did not mention the child. See, In re Estate of
Rowe, 269 Minn. 557, 1392 N.W.2d 180 (1964); In re Estate of Berge, supra
note 29; Holter v. Laugen, 157 Minn. 90, 195 N.W. 639 (1923); Odenbreit v.
Utheim, supra note 29.
31. In Holter v. Laugen, supra note 30, the child was willed $300.00 of a
$7,000 estate. The court found no contract in spite of evidence that decedent
specifically said he would give all he had to the child if she survived him. The
court merely argued that such statements may have been misunderstood.
32. Some states tax strangers to an estate at a higher rate than blood relatives. Arguably, if the adopting parents intended the child to inherit as a
natural child, they would intend to have him receive the lower tax. However,
most states deny this right because no legal parent-child relationship was
created by the contract. E.g., Wooster v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 230 Iowa
797, 298 N.W. 922 (1941). At least one state has held for the lower tax rate.
See Estate of lRadovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1957).
Miflnnesota probably denies the lower tax benefit since the statute specifically provides that foster children have a lower tax exemption than natural
or legally adopted children. MwN. STAT. § 291.05 subd. 1. (4), (5) (1961).
33. Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913).
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continuous statements by the adopting parents of intent to leave
4
property to the child may persuade the court to find a contract.
If it could be shown that the adopting parents were aware of the
intestacy provisions, their death without a will would be evidence
of intent to give the child an intestate share in their estates. Other
important factors bearing on intent include the mutual love and
affection between parents and child and the existence of a normal
parent-child relationship3 5 Evidence may include school records,
baptismal certificates, references to the child as a son or daughter,
use of the adopting parent's surname, and community recognition
that the child was part of the family."'
Just as the court is influenced by factors that tend to justify
granting relief, proof of an absence of the normal parental relationship will compel the court to deny recovery. Thus, if the child
leaves home at an early age,s7 or the parents or child disavow the
relationship, or, as in the instant case, the child sues for services
rendered to the parents, there is little reason to allow the child an
equitable share08 Since the foster child is requesting equitable
relief, a theory similar to "unclean hands" should apply3 9 If the
child has repudiated the parent-child relationship, it would be
unconscionable to allow him to later assert the relationship to
34. E.g., In re Estate of Fredrick, 241 Minn. 55, 62 N.W.2d 361 (1954);
In re Estate of Firle, 197 Mlinn. 1, 265 N.W. 818 (1986).
85. In re Estate of Fredrick, supra note 31, is an example of a case in
which the court emphasized the devotion between parents and child.
36. In In re Estate of Firle, 197 Minn. 1, 265 N.W. 818 (1936), an insurance policy on the "son"' with the "father" as beneficiary, and a baptismal
record were introduced. In Rowe appellant was attempting to prove a family
relationship by introducing the baptismal record, wedding invitations and
school records.
37. See In re Estate of Hack, 166 Minn. 35, 207 N.W. 17 (1926), where the
child left home at age sixteen.
38. In Soelzer v. Soelzer, 382 IDI. 393, 47 N.W.2d 458 (1943), the court
considered scattered evidence of misconduct but held that it was not sufficient to refute direct evidence of the contract and performance thereof. Arguably, in Rowe appellant's suite for services rendered was such misconduct, or
at least could have estopped her from claiming on the contract. But see Lang
v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1965), where plaintiff previously instituted
an unsuccessful similar suit and the court argued that it indicated plaintiff
believed there was an adoption contract.
39. Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 90, 144 N.W. 455, 457 (1913), allowed
enforcement of the contract because "equity regards that as done what ought
to be done." However, in the context of equitable adoption, specific performance of the contract is only employed in a very narrow sense. The court will
not enforce the adoption or grant recovery against collaterals as a statutory
adoption allows. Specific performance is only granted to enforce the property
rights that would have been conferred in the adopting parent's estate under
the contract.
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share in the estate. The fact that a natural child may recover
regardless of his repudiations may speak for changing the intestacy statutes; but it does not necessarily follow that similar rights
should be granted to unadopted children.
In the Rowe case it appears that the appellant failed to establish the requisite intent of the parties. First, the deceased's intent
to adopt was not supported by evidence of any intent at the time
of originally accepting appellant. Also, the existence of a will
which failed to mention appellant supports an intent to exclude
appellant from the estate. Finally, appellant's previous suit for
services rendered approaches a repudiation of any parent-child
relationship. Therefore, the Minnesota court properly found no
contract of adoption.

V. INSURANCE
A.

EFEcTs oF ComPuLsoRY
IwsURER's POL CY DmmNSES

LIABILITY

INSuRANCE

UPON

Plaintiff, operator of a one-car taxi business, was required by
a municipal licensing ordinance1 to file a copy of an automobile
liability policy with the city. The policy procured from defendant
specifically described a Plymouth automobile as the insured vehicle. A "Temporary Substitute Automobile" clause extended coverage to operation of an automobile not owned by the plaintiff or
her husband while used as a temporary replacement for the described automobile. When the insured vehicle became disabled,
plaintiff borrowed an automobile owned by her husband but registered in the name of his used car business.F While being driven by
plaintiff's employee, the borrowed vehicle was involved in an
accident in which a passenger was 'injured. In a declaratory
judgment action, the trial court determined that the policy covered operation of the borrowed vehicle. On appeal, a divided
Minnesota court reversed, holding that the borrowed vehicle was
owned by plaintiff's husband regardless of the form of registration,
and hence excluded from coverage by the express terms of the
policy. Gabreleik v. National Indem. Co., 269 Minn. 445, 131
N.W.2d 534 (1964).
A majority of the court regarded the policy as unambiguous
and would go no further than to give effect to the plain meaning
1. FRmE-Y, Mn~R., CODE § 73.01-.02 (1963).
2. The insured vehicle was similarly owned by plaintiff's husband and in
the name of Frank's Used Cars. However, it was used exclusively by plaintiff
in her taxi business until disabled.
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of its language. Justice Murphy, in a strong dissent,3 argued that
an apparent ambiguity resulted from the insurer's use of a form
policy designed to cover "pleasure and business" purposes to
insure a commercial risk. The purpose of an exclusion from substitute automobile coverage is to prevent a family from insuring two
vehicles for the price of one by claiming that a nondescribed
vehicle involved in an accident was being used as a temporary
substitute for the insured automobile. 4 Such an exclusion was inappropriate to plaintiff's situation, since the dominant purpose of
the contract was to insure against risks involved in the operation
of her licensed taxi business, and only one car could be used for
that purpose at a time. Accordingly, the limiting language should
have been construed to give effect to the general insurance purpose of the agreement. Furthermore, the dissent argued, coverage
should not be denied where the policy is secured to comply with a
licensing ordinance requiring liability insurance for the protection
of the public.
In response to the last argument, the majority suggested that
public policy might dictate a contrary result in a suit against the
insurer by an injured party with an unsatisfied judgment.3 This
dictum is a significant pronouncement, since the Minnesota court
has not previously considered the effect of compulsory liability
insurance upon the availability of policy defenses against injured
parties.
The rights of an injured party against a liability insurer ordinarily are derivative, arising only after judgment has been obtained against the insured.6 As a corollary, policy defenses avail3. Joined by Justices Nelson and Gallagher.
4. 269 Minn. at 450, 131 N.W.2d at 538 (dissenting opinion); see Rodenkirk ex rel. Deitenbach v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421,
60 N.E.2d 269 (1945).

5.
As between actions by the insured and the injured person, different
considerations are present when the policy of insurance is required as a
condition for obtaining a municipal license to operate a vehicle for hire.
In such a situation, as here, there is considerable authority holding that
after the injured party has obtained a judgment against the insured, if
it remains unsatisfied, he may collect it from the insurer and is not
subject to policy defenses that the insured would be.
269 Minn. 445, 448 n.7, 131 N.W.2d 536 n.7.
6. Elliott v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 250 Y.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1957);
Home Indem. Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919, 929 (9th Cir.
1948); see 7 Am. JuR. 2d Automobile Isurance § 210 (1963); 8 A.PPLnuAw,
INSMUNCE § 4811 (1962).

The injured party need not obtain a judgment against insured to bring an
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able against the insured may be asserted by the insurer in an
action brought by the injured party.7 However, when the insurance contract is pursuant to an ordinance or a statute requiring
liability insurance as a condition to issuance of a license,8 an
injured party's claim may not be subject to policy defenses which
would bar an action for indemnity by the insured. The courts
justify this exception on the ground that permitting policy defenses to be asserted would defeat the objective of requiring insurance to protect members of the public injured by the negligence
of the insuredV Additionally it might be argued that, as between
the insurer and the injured party, the former is in a better position to control conduct of the insured giving rise to a policy
defense1 0
Cases in other jurisdictions appear to deny all policy defenses
in such a situation. The insurer may not assert that the insured
action against insurer if the state has a direct action or optional joinder
statute. 8 APpimiAI, INsuR~wcE § 4812 (1962).
7. See Weiby v. Marfell, 172 F. Supp. 397 (D. Minn. 1958), af'd 273
F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1960); Curran v. Connecticut Indem. Co., 127 Conn. 692,
20 A.2d 87 (1941); White v. Boulton, 259 Min. 325, 107 N.W.2d 370 (1961);
Bassi v. Bassi, 165 Minn. 100, 205 N.W. 947 (1925); Utilities Ins. Co. v.
Wilson, 207 Okla. 574, 251 P.2d 175 (1952). But see Stippich v. Morrison, 12
Wis. 2d 381, 107 N.W.2d 125 (1961) (if prejudiced, insurer may assert defenses after third party's intervention).
8. See, e.g., Thompson v. Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co., 207 F.2d 214
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951),
L. REV. 979 (car rental business); Kruger v. California Highway
36 M I.
Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 258 Pac. 602 (1927) (jitney bus); Milwaukee Ins.
Co. v. Morrill, 100 N.H. 239, 123 A.2d 163 (1956) (Safety Responsibility Act);
Farm Bureau Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84 A.2d 823 (1951) (Safety
Responsibility Act); Pan-American Cas. Co. v. Basso, 150 Tex. 690, 252
S.W.2d 505 (1952) (taxicab); see generally 12 CoucH, INsURANcE 2d §§ 45.658.762 (1965); 7 Am. Jun. 2d Automobile Insurance §§ 140-43 (1963).
Such statutes and ordinances were held constitutional in Hodge Drive-ItYourself -Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S.
140 (1924); Kruger v. California Highway Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 258 Pac.
602 (1927); Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 310 Ky. 470, 220 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1224 (1935); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 230 (1923).
9. Lloyds America v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1941); Travelers
Mlut. Cas. Co. v. Herman, 116 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1941); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Jacks, 231 Ala. 394, 398, 165 So. 242, 246 (1936); Kruger v. California Highway Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 676, 258 Pac. 602, 606 (1927); Gillard v.
Ianufacturers Ins. Co., 93 N.JL. 215, 107 AUt. 446 (1919); Utilities Ins. Co. v.
Potter, 188 Okla. 145, 105 P.2d 259 (1940); Ott v. American Fid. & Cas. Co.,
161 S.C. 314, 315, 159 S.E. 635, 636 (1931).
10. See, e.g., Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bigham, 10 N.J. 460, 92 A.2d 1
(1952).
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procured the policy by fraud," that an improper party was
driving," that the accident was outside the geographic limits of
the ordinance,'8 that the vehicle was not being used for carrier
purposes, 4 or that insured failed to give notice or cooperate."
Courts have conceptualized these results by incorporating the
licensing ordinance into the required liability policy.'" The intent
of the licensing authority rather than that of the parties is regarded as controlling, 17 and the ordinance determines the extent
of insurer's defenses.
11. The rationale is that insurer is in a better position to protect against
fraud than is the injured party. Other courts have said that the liability
becomes absolute when the damage is done. See Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Bigham, 10 N.J. 460, 92 A.2d 1 (1952); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Connor,
8 N.Y.2d 359, 207 N.Y.S.2d 679, 170 N.E.2d 681 (1960); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d
1104 (1962).
12. Lloyds America v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1941) (two vehicles substituted instead of one); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Jacks, 231 Ala. 394,
165 So. 242 (1936). Contra, Downs v. Georgia Cas. Co., 271 Fed. 310 (D.

NJ. 1921).
13. Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951); Car &
Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Novodoczky, 101 Ind. App. 509, 200 N.E. 83 (1936).
14. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thornsbury, 276 Ky. 762, 125 S.W.2d 229
(1939) (plaintiff struck by taxicab while not being used as such); Sordelett v.
Mercer, 185 Va. 823, 40 S.E.2d 289 (1946) (truck driver using truck for own
purpose); Rusch v. Mielke, 234 Wis. 380, 291 N.W. 300 (1940).
15. Kruger v. California Highway Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 258 Pac.
602 (1927); Roberts v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ill. App. 408, 2 N.E.2d 132
(1936); Gillard v. Manufacturers Ins. Co., 93 NJ.L. 215, 107 AtI. 446 (1919);
Delwin v. New York Mut. Cas. Taxicab Ins. Co., 123 Misc. 784, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 365 (1924); Ott v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 161 S.C. 314, 159 S.E. 635
(1931); see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 645 (1953). Contra, Warren v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Co., 219 Ark. 744, 244 S.W.2d 488 (1951).
Other defenses of an insurer have also been denied. See Butler v. Sequeira,
100 Cal. App. 2d 143, 223 P.2d 48 (1950) (injuries resulted from assault by
driver rather than operation of taxicab); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304
Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947); Royal Indem. Co. v. Granite Trucking Co.,
296 Mass. 149, 4 N.E.2d 809 (1936) (dated-back policy issued after accident);
City of Detroit v. Blue Ribbon Auto Drivers' Ass'n, 254 Mich. 263, 237
N.W. 61 (1931) (expiration of the insured's license).
16. See, e.g., Thompson v. Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co., 207 Fad 214 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Marriott v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 195 F.2d 462, 466 (10th Cir.
1952); Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952);
Utilities Ins. Co. v. Potter, 188 Okla. 145, 105 P.2d 259 (1940); Pan-American
Cas. Co. v. Basso, 150 Tex. 690, 252 S.W2d 505 (1952); see generally 12
CoucH, INSURANCE 2d § 45.673 (1964).
However, the ordinance does not limit the effect of the policy. Board of
Trade Livery Co. v. Georgia Cas. Co., 160 Mlnn. 490, 200 N.W. 633 (1924);
Prisuda v. General Cas. Co., 272 Wis. 41, 74 N.W.2d 777 (1956).
17. City of Detroit v. Blue Ribbon Auto Drivers' Ass'n, 254 Mich. 263,

237 N.W. 61 (1931).
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Although the Gabreleik court spoke only of insurance policies
required by municipal licensing provisions, its reasoning is equally
applicable to state statutes requiring liability insurance for the
protection of the public. For example, the Motor Carriers Act'
requires carriers to file a copy of an insurance policy with the
Railroad and Warehouse Commission covering "injuries and
damage to persons or property occurring on the highways, other
than the employees of such motor carrier or the property being
transported .... " The carrier's permit or certificate is void unless
insurance or other security is maintained in an amount set by the
commission. The policy may be cancelled by the insurance company only if the carrier has failed to pay premiums or the vehicle
has been withdrawn from service, and the company gives fifteen
days notice to the insured and the commission. The provisions
regarding the necessary coverage and the method of cancellation
indicate that insurance is required for the benefit of the public
rather than to protect the carrier. 9 Thus, the rationale of the
Gabrelcik dictum would compel denial of an insurer's policy defenses against a third party injured by the negligence of the
carrier.
The Safety Responsibility Act 0 requires proof of financial
responsibility for reinstatement of a driver's license suspended for
failure to satisfy a judgment resulting from a previous accident 2 '
failure to report an accident, or violation of any other law of
the state.3 One means of establishing financial responsibility is by
filing an insurance company's certificate that a motor vehicle
liability policy is in effect. 4 The policy must provide that the
liability of the insurer is absolute when injury occurs, and that no
violation of the policy by the insured shall void the policy. 5
These conditions placed on the policy seem to indicate that the
STAT. ANN. § 221.141 (Supp. 1965).
19. An endorsement submitted to the commission by the insurance company must state:
Nothing contained in the policy or any other endorsement thereon,
nor the violation of any of the provisions of the policy or of any
endorsement thereon by the insured, shall relieve the company from
liability hereunder or from payment of any such final judgment.
Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission Form TMfRC 125 (effective
July 1, 1965).
20. MnTK. STAT. §§ 170.21-.58 (1961).
21. Mnu . STAT. § 170.33(4) (1961).
22. Mnn. STAT. § 170.24 (1961).
23. M n. STAT. § 170.36 (1961).
24. Mm. STAT. § 170.38 (1961).
25. AMnw. STAT. § 170.40(6) (1961).
18. :ANI.
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insurance company cannot assert its policy defenses against an
injured third party.2 6 However, there is evidence that the statute
has not been so administered. 7 Thus, the effect of the Gabrelcik
dictum should be to compel an administration of the statute which
conforms with its purpose and provisions.
In stating that an insurer's policy defenses might be denied in
an action by an injured party after execution of a judgment
against insured has been returned unsatisfied, the Gabrelcik
dictum indicated that the court would follow the established
Minnesota rule denying a direct action against the insurer2 8
Generally, it is said that the injured party is neither privy to, nor
a third party beneficiary of, an insurance contract intended as
protection for the insured. 29 However, since the primary objective
of compulsory liability insurance is compensation of the injured
party, several jurisdictions have regarded statutes or ordinances
26. A few cases under the Safety Responsibility Acts have held that if
insurer's defenses are otherwise available, the injured party's recovery is
limited to the statutory amount. Behaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 121 Fad
838 (3d Cir. 1941); Shapiro v. Republic Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 594 (Dist. Ct.
App. Calif. 1959); Farm Bureau Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N.H. 196, 84
A.2d 823 (1951).
A policy provision that the policy shall be deemed to conform to any
financial responsibility act means only that the insurance afforded by the
policy shall comply with the provision of the act if the law applied to the
insured. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d
568 (1951); Havlik v. Bittner, 272 Wis. 71, 74 N.W.2d 798 (1956). Contra,
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Ledesma, 214 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954). The Safety
Responsibility Act specifically preserves two defenses of the insurer: an insurer
is free from liability if the vehicle was not designated in the policy, see Mmix.
STAT. § 170.40 subd. 2(1) (1961); and the policy may be cancelled if ten days
notice is given to the commissioner of insurance, see MurN. STAT. § 170.41
(1961).
27. In Holland American Ins. Co. v. Baker, 139 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1966),
insured was required to file evidence of financial responsibility before his
driver's license would be issued to him. After procuring a liability policy from
the insurer containing the usual substitute vehicle clause, insured was involved in an accident while driving the car of another. In a declaratory
judgment action brought by the insurer against insured and an injured
party, the trial court found that the car was a proper substitute within the
policy provisions. The Minnesota court affirmed without mentioning the compulsory insurance factor, although the Gabreleik dictum would appear to
deny policy defenses in this situation as between this insurer and the injured
party.
28. Miller v. Market Men's Mut. Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 509, 115 N.W.2d
266 (1962); Gjovik v. Bemidji Local Bus Line, 223 Minn. 522, 27 N.W.2d
273 (1947).
29. Ibid.
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requiring insurance as authorizing direct actions against the insurer 5 0 Adoption of this rule in Minnesota would provide an
expedient remedy in keeping with the policy underlying the
Gabrelcik dictum.
B.

OmvIVNBus CLAUSE "Usn" OF AUTO BY SIGNALwAN
REQumES NECESSAY RELIANCE ON SIGNALs BY Dmvmz
Plaintiff, operator of a drive-in theatre, stationed an employee
with a flashlight near a public highway to indicate to passing
motorists the location of the theatre entrance. A prospective
patron turning off the highway into the theater was struck by
another car. The injured motorist and injured members of his
family sued both plaintiff and the employee signalman. Plaintiff
then brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy
issued to the injured motorist by the defendant insurance company would obligate the latter to pay any sum recovered in the
principal suit against plaintiff, and that the liability of plaintiff's
business insurer be limited to recovery in excess of the policy
issued by defendant insurance company. The Supreme Court held
that the employee signalman was not using the automobile of the
injured motorist within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the
motorist's auto insurance policy. Therefore, the employers liability
policy of the drive-in would provide primary rather than excess
coverage' if the signalman were found to be responsible for the
accident.F Nicollet Properties,Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
135 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1965).
30. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1097 (1951).
1. For a discussion of problems relating to primary and excess coverage,
see Note, 38 MINN. L. REv. 838 (1954); 43 IIN. L. REv. 153 (1958); 32
MINN. L. REv. 510 (1948).
2. Questions of liability for an accident and insurance coverage are distinct. The former is governed by tort principles, the latter by contract construction. See Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 Minn. 86, 94
n.3, 89 N.W.2d 412, 418 n.3 (1958).
It is to be noted that the court implicitly assumed that omnibus coverage
of an additional insured extends to the latter's liability for injuries to the
named insured. This is in accord with the majority rule, 7 APPLEmAN, IWsURANCE LAW AN PRACTICE § 4409, at 380-81 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 7
APILEArurx]; 12 COUCH, INsuRAcN § 45:483 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as 12 COUCH]. For authority to the contrary, see cases cited in 7 APrLEVAaN
§ 4409, at 378-80; 12 COUCH § 45:484. This is to be distinguished from the
rule that in the absence of an omnibus clause there is no coverage for injuries
to an insured through his permittee's negligence since only the insured's
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Evidently as a result of keen competition in the insurance business s an omnibus clause which extends coyerage to "any person
while using the automobile and any person or organization legally
responsible for the use thereof"4 is commonly included in automobile policies. The courts have indicated that such omnibus clauses
should be liberally construed.5 It is well settled that omnibus
clause "use" goes well beyond the actual driving of a motor
vehicle0 It has been held to include sitting in the back seat of a
parked automobile,7 closing a car door on plaintiff, and even
loading and unloading a vehicleY Similarly, many courts have
liability is then covered, 12 Couch § 45:482, and the rule that an insurance
policy may effectively exclude from coverage injuries to the named insured,
7 APPLm" § 4409, at 377; 12 Couch §§ 45:485-88, or to members of his
family or household, see Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 182 F. Supp. 881 (D. Minn. 1960); Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239
Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953); Pearson v. Johnson, 215 1Ninn. 480, 10
N.W.2d 357 (1943); 7 APPL mAw § 4411, at 392; 12 CoucH § 45:509.
S. Wolf v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. 1un.
1941); Ashlock, Automobile Liability Insurance: The Omnibus Clause, 46
IowA L. REv.84, 86 (1960).
4. Superficially it could be argued that the term "legally responsible for
the use" of the automobile is broader than the term "using," so that a signalman who was not "using" the auto might yet be found "legally responsible for
the use" of it by the driver. For example, if the driver justifiably relied upon
the signalman's gestures the signalman might be found legally liable for the
accident. However, the clause has been construed only to provide coverage
for persons who are liable on the basis of traditional or statutory agency.
See 7 AP urAI § 4355; cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steenberg Constr. Co.,
225 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1955); Nicollet Properties, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 135 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Mlinn. 1965); Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 Mlnn. 86, 93-94, 89 N.W.2d 412, 418 (1958). Thus a signalman's coverage could be only under the "using" term; the "legally responsible
for the use" term would confer coverage upon the signalman's employer.
Often omnibus clauses add a requirement that the "use" be with the
permission of the named insured. For treatment of the problem incident to
such provisions, see authorities cited note 12 infra.
5. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steenberg Constr. Co., 225 F.2d 294, 296
(8th Cir. 1955) ("social fairness" demands the clause be construed "as liberally
as possible"); 7 APPL
" § 4354; 9 BAYLOR L. REv.210, 213 (1957).
6. See 7 APPi ~w_
§ 4354, at 239; 6 BLASHFiELD, AUTOMOBME LA W AD
PRACTICE § 3943, at 610 (1945); 19, CoucH § 45:322; Note, 32 N.D.L. Rnv.

255, 256 (1956).
7. See Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1958);
12 CoucH § 45:323.
8. See Coletrain v. Coletrain, 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d 89 (1961).
9. See R.H. Macy & Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 4 isc.
2d 89, 148 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 7 APpEieA_ § 4354, at 237, 239; 12
CoucH § 45:324. Often truck and commercial vehicle insurance policies spe-

1966]

6 MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

avoided the "sub permittee" permission problem by holding that
the initial permittee, by riding in the automobile, continued
"using" it with the permission of the named insured.'
Whether the directing of a vehicle's movement by hand signals is a "use" of the vehicle within the meaning of an omnibus
clause has seldom been considered. However, two cases decided
under Minnesota law have considered the question. In each, the
signalman directed the backward movement of a truck when the
driver had an obstructed view. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steenberg Constr. Co.," the Eighth Circuit found the signalman to be
"using" the truck, and in Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Idemnity Ins.
Co.,

12

the Minnesota Supreme Court reached the same result.

Other jurisdictions have also decided the question. New Jersey
has held that a signalman directing the movement of a crane when
the operator could not see the work area was "using" the crane."
The court reasoned that the operator was acting as a mere automaton; the signalman was actually governing the crane's movement. 4 A New York decision reached a contrary result when a
cifically provide that loading and unloading is a "use." Id. § 45:193. See,
e.g., State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 266
Minn. 536, 124 N.W.2d 185 (1963), 49 Mum. L. REv. 132 (1964).
10. See 7 APPLEuN § 4854, at 237; Cohen & Cohen, Automobile Liability
Insurance:Public Policy and the Omnibus Clause in New Jersey, 15 RUTGERS
L. REv. 155, 161-64 (1961); 6 Am. U.L. REv. 47 (1957); 11 IC". L. REv. 407,
408 (1963). However, a number of cases which do determine the question are
cited in Cohen & Cohen, supra, at 163-64 and Note, 32 N.D.L. REV. 255, 25860 (1956).
11. 225 F.2d 294 (1955).
12. 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d 412 (1958).
13. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. Super.
17, 99 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. 1953).
14. Id. at 20, 99 A.2d at 816. Less in point is an Illinois case holding a
named insured sitting beside the driver of the former's automobile to be
"operating" the car. See Snyder for use of Brooks v. United States Mut. Ins.
Co., 312 Ill. App. 337, 38 N.E.2d 540 (1941). That case is distinguishable
because there the owner had the "right to control the car and was still the
director of the enterprise in which he and [the driver] . . . were jointly engaged." Probably also significant is the fact that it was the named insured's
coverage which was at issue, since in such a case the policy of construction
in favor of the insured is fully called into play as it is not when the person
seeking to be favored is a stranger. See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
An example of liberality of construction in favor of the named insured is
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1960), where it was held
that the named insured's employment of his car as a gun rest was a "use" of
it within his auto policy, so that liability for gunshot death of a passenger
was covered.
In Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co., 214 Cal. 529, 6 P.2d 943 (1931),
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foreman indicated to a truck driver the amount of clearance
between the truck and some overhead sprinklers while a driver's
helper directed backing into a garage.-" The court held that the
foreman was not "using" the truck, for his "commonplace act of
accommodation" in indicating the sprinkler clearance "did not
take the control of the truck out of the hands" of the driver and
the driver's helper or make him a participant in that control."
The court in the instant case considered both Steenberg and
Woodrich but found them distinguishable in that in the instant
case the driver had full visibility and did not need or require directions such as those given in the two earlier cases; rather, the
signalman, not being on the highway or stopping traffic, served
only the same function as would a sign." In both prior cases the
signalman had actually controlled the movement of the vehicle.
The court held it was "too remote" to find the instant signalman
8
was "using" anything other than his flashlight.'
The case appears to distinguish between signalling so as to
actually control the direction and movement of the vehicle when
the operator has an obstructed view, and signalling so as to give
information as a convenience, exemplified by the sprinkler-clearance signalman in the New York case1" and the entrance-indicating signalman in Nicollet Properties.This interpretation requires
a finding that the court's reference to the signalman's not being
on the highway directing traffic is surplusage. However, it seems
clear that the court has established the test of signalman "use"
to be whether the driver must rely on the signals because he
cannot effectively maneuver the vehicle unaided. Thus, the fact
that the signalman in Nicollet Propertiesmay in some sense be
said to have controlled the movement of the car if the driver
relied upon his signal does not make the signalman a user of
the car.
involving an owner insured sitting beside the driving permittee, the finding
that the owner was in control of the car did not prevent a holding that the
driver was nevertheless "operating" it.
15. J.Scheer & Sons Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 35 Misc. 2d 262,
29 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
16. Id. at 265, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
17. 135 N.W.2d at 133.
18. Id. at 132-38.
19. Although the sprinkler-clearance signalman directed the movement of
the truck, the driver would doubtless have stopped had the former indicated
there was no clearance. The reliance was not necessary since the driver's
helper could probably have watched the clearance as he guided the driver's
backward movement.
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The test proposed in Nicollet Propertiesdoes not conflict with
the policies underlying a liberal construction of the omnibus
clause. The interest in protecting injured parties who would
otherwise go uncompensated is not frustrated, for the accident
will normally be within the coverage of an employer's liability
policy. In the absence of such a policy, the principle of respondeat
superior would still allow recovery against a financially responsible employer. It has been argued that since the named insured
purchased omnibus clause protection to bring permittees within
his coverage, and the insurer has no control over the identity of
the permittees,20 protection should extend to all parties within
the probable intent of the policy holder."' Even assuming that
probable intent is more than a post hoe rationalization, however,
that intent would certainly not extend to including stranger signalmen as additional insureds.
22
The canon requiring strict construction against the insurer
is not inconsistent with the result in Nicollet Properties. The
canon is designed to deter the issuance of ambiguous policies
which actually provide less than anticipated coverage; 23 it should
have application to the definition of "use" only when the prospective additional insured belongs to a class the insured would have
wanted to receive the protection. Even courts firmly espousing
this canon have stated that a strained or unwarranted construc4
tion of insurance provisions should be avoided.
The terms of an insurance policy should normally be given
their natural and ordinary meaning, 5 so that the insured may
20. See Schultz v. Krosch, 204 Minn. 585, 588, 284 N.W. 782, 784 (1939); 6
, op. cit. supra note 6, at 616.

BLAsHmirIT

21. See 11 KXA.

L. Rzv. 407, 409 (1963).

22. See Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 368, 378, 125 Ati. 866,
869 (1924); Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 440, 232 N.W. 790, 791
(1930); Ashlock, supra note 3, at 122.
23. See, e.g., Struble v. Occidental Life Ins. .Co., 265 Minn. 26, 35, 120
N.W.2d 609, 615-16 (1963); Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Smith, 247 Minn.
151, 156-57, 76 N.W.2d 486, 490-91 (1956).
24. See, e.g., Cain v. American Policy-Holders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645,
183 AtI. 408 (1936); Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Smith, 247 Minn. 151, 157, 76

N.W.2d 486, 491 (1956). See generally 11 MERCE L. REV. 391, 393 (1960). It
should be noted that the Woodrch court observed that its result was compelled
by "the broad and common meaning of the word use." Woodrich Constr. Co. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 Minn. 86, 93, 89 N.W.2d 412, 418 (1958).
25. Fuel Economy Eng'r Co. v. National Life Ins. Co., 218 F. Supp. 226,
228 (D. Minn. 1963); LoWry v. Kneeland, 263 Minn. 537, 540, 117 N.W.2d
207, 210 (1962); Rauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354,
357, 65 N.W.2d 122, 125 (1954).
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accurately determine the extent of his coverage and refrain from
paying premiums for the protection of the few who might come
within exotic interpretations of the terms of the policy. Granting
that omnibus clause "use" is to be liberally construed, it need
not be extended to cover such casual connections with a vehicle
as occurred in the instant case. The case does, however, limit the
earlier authority defining "use" in terms of control by defining
control in terms of necessary reliance.
VI.
A.

MVfUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

CITY ORDINANCE RESTRICTING PUBLIC WoRns EMPLOYMENT
TO COUNTY RESIDENTS FoUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Plaintiffs, residents of Pine and Anoka Counties, were employed by a contractor who was constructing a high school building in the City of St. Paul. They were discharged from their jobs
pursuant to a city ordinance which required that all contractors
performing work for the city must employ only residents of
Ramsey County, the county in which St. Paul is located. This
county also includes other municipalities and rural areas. In an
action brought by the plaintiffs against the City of St. Paul, this
ordinance was declared unconstitutional and void. On appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Construction & Gen. Laborers Union v. City of St. Paul, 134 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1965).
The equal protection and the privileges and immunities clauses
of both federal and state constitutions require that legislative
classifications embrace and uniformly affect all persons "similarly
situated, ' 2 and that distinctions separating those persons included
from those excluded from such a classification must bear a "reasonable relationship" to legitimate objectives of the classification.
Distinctions not based on such a relationship are capricious or
arbitrary, and thus unconstitutionalY3
1. St. Paul is the largest of eighteen municipalities in Ramsey County.
2. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Mayor of Savannah v.
Savannah Distrib. Co., 202 Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704 (1947); St. Paul v. Dalsin,
245 Minn. 325, 71 N.W.2d 855 (1955); State ex rel. Greenwood v. Nolan, 108
Minn. 170, 122 N.W. 255 (1909); Thompson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
334 Mo. 958, 69 S.W.2d 936 (1934); ANTiEAU, Muxicn'AL CORPORATiON LAW
§ 24.04, at 367-68 (1965).
3. E.g., Warner v. Gabb, 139 Conn. 310, 93 A.2d 487 (1952); O'Brien v.
Rantenbush, 10 Ill. 2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1957); City of St. Paul v. Dalsin,
supra note 2; Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154 Neb. 537, 48 N.W2d 643 (1951);
Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 Pad 199 (1957); ANTiEAU, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 24.04, at 367-68.

1966]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

In the instant case the court could find no justification for
classifying persons entitled to work on St. Paul public projects on
the basis of Ramsey County residence. The court, however, implicitly recognized the validity of a similar hypothetical classification based solely on St. Paul residence, but considered such a
classification distinguishable from that in the instant case. This
distinction was illustrated by a discussion of Ebbeson v. Board of
Public Education,4 a Delaware decision which approved state
specifications that restricted public bidding on a particular contract to citizens of Delaware. Such a restriction in favor of Delaware citizens was held valid on the theory that a state may prefer
for employment purposes its own citizens, since they are owners
in common of the public funds. As opposed to noncitizens, citizens
should reasonably be able to benefit from the expenditure of such
funds.' In contrast to Ebbeson, the court reasoned the ordinance
in the instant case not only favored residents from St. Paul, but
also favored non-St. Paul residents living in Ramsey County, who
are not common owners of the public funds of St. Paul Accordingly, the court concluded there was no reasonable relationship
4. 18 Del. Ch. 37, 156 At. 286 (1931).
5. In reaching its result the Ebbeson court relied heavily on MeCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), and People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427,
aff'd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
In Mc~ready the United States Supreme Court held that a Virginia law
was not unconstitutional which restricted the planting of oysters in its tidal
waters to Virginia citizens. The Court reasoned that the right the people of
Virginia enjoyed in the tidal beds was "a property right, and not a mere
privilege or immunity of citizenship," and that the privileges and immunities
clause does not invest "the citizen of one State . . . with any interest in the
common property of the citizens of another State." 94 U.S. at 395.
In Crane the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute that made it a
crime for a contractor of any public work to employ aliens, and which required
preference to be given to citizens of the State of New York. The Crane court
applied the doctrine enunciated in McCready to the expenditure of public
funds in the construction of public works. The court reasoned that the public
funds were the common property of the citizens of the state and "in any
distribution of that property, the citizen may be preferred." 214 N.Y. at 162,
108 N.E. at 429.
6. The court said:
[T]hose citizens who are residents of Ramsey County but not residents
of St. Paul pay property taxes to the respective villages . .. in which
they reside ....
Thus, when the city limits contractors who are performing work under a contract with the city to employment of citizens
of Ramsey County, it is ... conferring a benefit upon citizens of separate jurisdictions from the city ....
134 N.W.2d at 29.
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from which to draw a distinction between residents of Ramsey
County who live outside St. Paul and people, such as plaintiffs,
who live outside Ramsey County. If, as in Ebbeson, the objective
of an ordinance such as that in the instant case is to confer benefits
upon St. Paul residents who are owners in common of the city's
public funds, then non-St. Paul residents of Ramsey County are
no more entitled to benefits of these funds than are residents of
any other county. Both of these groups are "similarly situated"
and thus must be uniformly treated in order for such an ordinance
to be valid.
As stated above, the opinion in the instant case is entirely
reasonable and consistent with previous authority. The closing
sentence of the opinion, however, creates some confusion. This
sentence - "We reach the conclusion that the ordinance involved
on this appeal is, insofar as it discriminates between residents and
non-resident citizens, unconstitutional and void ' 7 - suggests that
the basis of the court's holding rests not on the arbitrary discrimination against non-St. Paul residents living outside of Ramsey
County, but rather on a distinction between St. Paul and non-St.
Paul residents. Such an interpretation of the court's holding would
contradict a well-known doctrine that municipalities can prefer
for employment purposes their own residents.8 Such a residency
requirement will provide an "incentive for better performance in
office or employment and as well advance the economy of the
locality which yields tax revenue." 9
The court's last sentence, however, need not be given so startling an interpretation if it is noted that early in the opinion the
court pointed out that the St. Paul ordinance involved defined
"resident" to mean a resident of Ramsey County.1 0 It would seem
that the court's concluding sentence was meant to be consistent
with this interpretation of "resident." It follows that the court
was merely reiterating its holding that a classification which ineludes Ramsey County residents and at the same time excludes
residents of other counties is invalid when it does not uniformly
affect all such persons similarly situated. Moreover, the fact that
7. 134 N.W.2d at 32.
8. See, e.g., Marabuto v. Town of Emeryville, 183 Cal. App. 2d 406, 6 Cal.

Rptr. 690 (1960); Attorney General v. MacDonald, 164 Mich. 590, 129 N.W.
1056 (1911); Kirby v. Nolte, 349 Mo. 1015, 164 S.W.2d 1 (1942); Kennedy v.

City of Newark, 29 NJ. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Surry v. City of Seattle,
14 Wash. 2d 350, 128 P.2d 322 (1942); CL,
THE LAw OF CrvM SERVICE
49 (1958).
9. Kennedy v. City of Newark, supra note 8, at 184, 148 A.2d at 476.
10. 134 N.W.2d at 28.
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the court distinguished Ebbeson rather than disagreed with it
suggests that it had no intention of refuting the doctrine that a
governmental unit such as St. Paul may favor its own constituents
in an ordinance similar to that of the instant case.
B. RESTRICTION UPON CITY'S POWER To ALmNATE EASEMNT
ACQUIRED BY CONDEMNATION

A municipality contracted to sell land previously condemned
for park and parkway purposes to a private party for development
as a motel and filling station facility. Plaintiffs, as taxpayers,
brought suit to enjoin the sale on grounds that a zoning ordinance
reclassifying the property for the purchaser's use was invalid, and
also that the interest taken by condemnation fifty years earlier
was an easement for public purposes and therefore not alienable.
The trial court found the rezoning ordinance valid and held that
although the interest taken was an easement, it was alienable
under the city's general power to sell real estate. On appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that an easement
acquired by a municipality for park and parkway purposes can
not be conveyed to a private person.' Buck v. City of Winona,
135 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 1965).
In holding that the city's interest was limited to an easement,
the court followed the decision in Reed v. Board of Park
Conm'rs,2 where it was held that only an easement was needed
for park purposes. It is a general rule that the interest taken by a
condemnor is determined by the statute authorizing the condemnation,3 and, in the absence of an express right to take a fee, only
that interest is taken which is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the condemnation.4 This rule is intended to protect the
condemnee by assuring that he will not be compelled to relinquish
a greater interest in his property than is necessary.5 However, the
rule has been criticized as tending to hamper public agencies by
1. Since this issue was decisive, the court did not consider the validity of
the rezoning ordinance, attacked by appellants in the trial court as illegal
"spot zoning." For a discussion of spot zoning and its relationship to a comprehensive plan, see RATBxOPF, THE LAw oF ZONMG ch. 26-3 to -23 (3d
ed. 1962).
2. 100 Minn. 167, 110 N.W. 1119 (1907).

3. Fairchild v. City of St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 543, 49 N.W. 325 (1891).
4. See Reed v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 100 Minn. 167, 169, 110 N.W.

1119 (1907); Fairchild v. City of St. Paul, supra note 3 at 543, 49 N.W. at
326.
5. See generally 1 NICHOLS, EM-ENT DomrAN § 3.213 (3d rev. ed. 1964).
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restricting them to acquisition by condemnation of only the
interest required by the exigencies of the moment.6 Arguably,
where the statutory provision is unclear as to the interest to be
taken, a fee rather than an easement should be allowed 1
After finding that only an easement was acquired, the court
held the city's interest inalienable. In Minnesota, legislative authority is required for the sale of any municipally held land.8
However, the Buck opinion stated that the limitation upon the
city's authority to sell stemmed not from the absence of a legislative grant of power, but from the nature of the interest condemned. The court reasoned that the city had nothing more to
convey than a right to use the land for a public purpose, and that
such a right could not conceivably be conveyed to a private
personY Such an alienation would be inconsistent with the rights
reserved to the underlying fee holder. However, in Buck the contemplated vendee of the easement was the underlying fee holder.
In such cases, release of the city's interest poses no conceptual
6.
But what is more disturbing is [plaintiffs'] . . . argument that, at
the precise time that the state begins to condemn property, it must
know exactly what use is to be made of all the land in a given tract;
that it can take no greater interest in that land than the exigencies of
the moment require; and that, if it acquires any larger interest, then it
does so at its peril. Such an interpretation would unduly hamper public
agencies.
Volden v. Selke, 251 Minn. 349, 353, 87 N.W.2d 696, 700 (1958). In Volden,
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the state, in condemning their
land for water storage and flood control purposes, had acquired only an easement of flowage and consequently could not validly authorize the removal
of gravel from the land. The court rejected their contention, holding that the
statutory language authorizing the taking was broad enough to cover acquisition of a fee interest. See generally 3 NICHOLS, EmNENT DoAniN § 9.2(1)
(3d rev. ed. 1964).
7. See 10 U. Cma. L. REv. 91 (1942).
8. See Monaghan v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 113, 15 N.W.2d 241, 244
11944); accord, Worchester Elee. Co. v. Hancock, 151 Md. 670, 677, 135 A.
832, 834 (1927); Board of Trustees of Phil. Museums v. Trustees of University
of Pa., 251 Pa. 115, 124, 96 A. 123, 125 (1915).
Another theory concerning the power of a municipality to dispose of its
real property distinguishes between lands held in proprietary and governmental capacities. A municipality may exercise general powers, without authority from the legislature, over property held in a proprietary capacity.
Property held in a governmental capacity is held by the municipality as an
agent of the state, and cannot be sold without specific legislative authority.
See 3 ANTIEAU, MI ImnAL CoRpoRATioN LAW § 20.19 (1965); Annot., 141
A.L.R. 1449 (1942).
9. 135 N.W.2d at 194.
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difficulties, since the effect of the release is only to restore to the
fee holder an unencumbered title to the land. 10
The court suggested that the only method for the city to relinquish its easement is by a vacation proceeding authorized in
the city charter."' This proceeding requires an initiating petition,
notice and hearing, and passage of an ordinance by the city council.1 2 Therefore, the city could not be permitted to relinquish its
interest without observing these procedural safeguards which
assure vacation will be exercised only for the general welfare2
Furthermore, to permit the city to receive payment for relinquishing its interest to the fee holder would be repugnant to the nature
of vacation proceedings. 4
This suggestion raises two problems. First, a Winona charter
provision permits a majority of abutting landowners to block
vacation proceedings,"" thereby effectively preventing the city
from disposing of unneeded property and returning it to productive use and to the tax rolls." Second, the city's inability to
10. For a demonstration of a court's willingness to disregard the restricted nature of a city's interest where there is no possibility of prejudice to
the reversioner vendee or to the general taxpayers, see East Chicago Co. v.
City of East Chicago, 171 Ind. 654, 87 N.E. 17 (1909).
11. WiNONA, M -N. CiTY CHaRTER 1924, c. 4, § 11 (Minn. Special Laws
1887, c. 5, c. IV, § 11).
12. Ibid.
13. It is a general rule that vacation of municipal property -must be exercised for the public good and not solely to serve private interest. Pederson
v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa 166, 169, 284 N.W. 145, 147 (1939); In re
Spears, 227 Mich. 525, 527, 198 N.W. 952, 953 (1924); 1 ANTmAU, op. cit.
aupra note 8, § 9.10. Commercial advantage to the city has been held an
insufficient motive for vacation. Lerch v. Short, 192 Iowa 576, 577, 185 N.W.
129, 130 (1921); 1 ANTmAU, ap. cit. supra at 582. Contra,People ex rel. Alexander v. City of Mt. Vernon, 404 Ill. 58, 88 N.E.2d 45 (1949).
14. 135 N.W.2d at 194.
15. "[N]o vacation of any street, alley, road or public ground or part
thereof shall be ordered except upon written petition from a majority of the
owners of the property fronting or abutting on such... public ground. .. "
WiNONA, MiNN. CITy CHARTER 1924, c. 4 § 11 (Minn. Special Laws 1887,
c. 5, c. IV, § 11). Minnesota follows the position that abutting owners acquire
special rights in land devoted to use as a public park. See Kray v. Muggli, 84
Minn. 90, 86 N.W. 882 (1901).
16. Municipally held easements may revert to the underlying fee owner
by abandonment when the land is no longer needed for a public purpose. See
Skelly Oil Co. v. Kelly, 134 Kan. 176, 180, 5 P.2d 823, 825 (1931); 8 ANTITEAU,
op. cit. supra note 8, § 20.15. Most courts hold mere nonuse insufficient to
constitute abandonment of park property, requiring unequivocal acts evidencing intent to abandon or inconsistent with continued public use. See Ford
v. City of Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 452, 263 N.W. 425, 426 (1935); Village of
Newport v. Taylor, 225 Minn. 299, 305-07, 30 N.W.2d 588, 592-93 (1948).
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receive payment for relinquishing its interest may cause it to
retain unsound enterprises when its investment in those enterprises could be more profitably diverted to new projects. 7
Underlying the Buck decision is an obvious desire to protect

the interests of the condemnee. Yet it is difficult to see how his
interests would be prejudiced by a contrary rule. Where the condemnor acquires only an easement or a qualified fee, it is clear
that the remaining estate is of little value. It is virtually impossible to predict when the public use will be abandoned, and in
the meantime the condemnee can not make use of the land. Therefore the condemnee is likely to be compensated as fully as if an
absolute fee had been taken. He can only receive a windfall if,
upon cessation of the public use, the condemnor's interest must
be released to him without payment1 5 Furthermore, there is little
danger that public agencies would abuse permission to condemn
an alienable estate by reselling land to private developers for a
profit 9 First, the original purpose justifying the condemnation
Other courts have based a finding of abandonment upon the practical impossibility of using the property for its devoted purpose. See Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N.Y. 234, 249-50, 93 N.E. 716, 720 (1910); 3 ANTIEAu,
op. cit. supra note 8, § 20.15.
In Buck, the trial court found that the tract in question was not useful for
park purposes because the city already had sufficient park facilities, a highway had severed it from the main park area, and the marshy condition of the
land made it impractical for use as a park. See Record, Buck v. Winona, 135
N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 1965), findings of fact no. 7, 30, 31, 40, pp. 45-55. The
attempted sale by the city would seem to fulfill the requirement of an act
inconsistent with continued public use.
However, abandonment is not the answer to the municipality's dilemma.
First, since the easement may only revert to the underlying fee holder, the
issue of abandonment is most often litigated in an action brought by him to
quiet title to the property. An efficient program of relinquishing the city's
interest in unneeded property is therefore impossible when the city must rely
upon holders of remote interests to take the initiative. Furthermore, the vacation procedure and the policies it reflects may be held to have preempted this
area and precluded relinquishment of the city's interest by abandonment. See
Rny-, MuNicIPAL LAw § 21-9 (1957); of. 3 ANTTiAu, op. cit. supra note 8,

§ 20.15.
17. See 10 U. CHm. L. Rzv. 91, 92 (1942).
18. See ibid.
19. Neither party questioned the power of the legislature to authorize the
resale of condemned land, no longer needed by the city, to private third
parties. Whereas most courts recognize this prerogative of the legislature, see
Skelly Oil Co. v. Kelly, 134 Kan. 176, 5 P.2d 823 (1931); Matter of City of
Rochester, 137 N.Y. 243, 33 N.E. 320 (1893), the issue often arises as to the
good faith of the condemnation. A municipality may not condemn land with
the intent to resell it to a private party even if full compensation is paid.

1966]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

is subject to careful scrutiny by the courts; and second, any
danger of abuse can be averted by requiring that the condemnee
be given a right of first refusal if the land is subsequently offered
for sale to private parties.2 °
It appears, therefore, that one of three solutions would be preferable to the result in Buck. As a minimum, repeal of the charter
provision requiring consent of abutting landowners for vacation is
advisable. This would assure the municipality of one method of
restoring unneeded property to the tax rolls. A better solution
would be to permit the city to receive payment for release of its
interest to the underlying fee owner. Receipt of payment is not
necessarily inconsistent with the procedure for vacation, since
the procedural safeguards embodied in the charter provisions
could be construed as applying only where the city is attempting
to release its interest for nothing. The preferred solution, however,
would be to permit condemnation of a fee simple, subject to
careful court scrutiny and a right of first refusal for the condemnee
if the property is later offered for sale.
VII.
A.

SURVMNG

DRIVER's

PROCEDURE
SuIT AGAInST

DECEDENT'S ESTATE

COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY ADVERSE JUDG\MENT IN PRIOR

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
Following a fatal head-on collision a wrongful death action
was brought against the surviving driver, who moved to consolidate this suit with her own action against the decedent's estate.
Her motion was denied, and trial of the wrongful death action
resulted in a jury verdict for the decedent's trustee. In the subsequent trial of the survivor's action the administrator of decedent's estate moved for summary judgment. He asserted that the
issue of the survivor's contributory negligence had been necessarily determined against her in the wrongful death suit. Summary judgment for the administrator was granted and a divided
supreme court affirmed, holding that the verdict against the surviving driver in the wrongful death action established that her
Matter of City of Rochester, supra at 247, 33 N.E. at 521; see U.S. CONST.
CONST. art. I, § 13; Coo=aw, CONSTITUTIONAL
amend's V, XIV; Mn.
LnntTATioNs 769 (7th ed. 1903). For clarification of the distinction between
taking private property for private use and the procedures followed in the
redevelopment and low cost housing projects, see Housing and Redevelopment
Authority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959). See generally
Annot., 44 A.LR.2d 1442 (1955).
20. See 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 91, 92 (1942).
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negligence caused the accident and collaterally estopped her from
suing decedent's estate.1 Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131
N.W.2d 741 (1964).
Under the traditional rule of collateral estoppel, the determination of a litigated issue of fact essential to the verdict is conclusive between the parties and their privies in a subsequent
actionY The rule is intended to prevent relitigation3 and inconsistent results on identical fact issues. Historically, the requisites
for its application were that the estoppel be mutual," that the
party to be bound be a party or in privity with a party to the
first suit,' and that the issue -be identical to one necessarily decided by the first verdict. More recently courts have abandoned
strict adherence to the requirement of mutuality. In certain situations they have permitted a stranger to an action to assert a
verdict against a party or his privy. Where the defendants in
1. Minnesota law separates a wrongful death fund from a decedent's
estate; hence, the wrongful death trustee and the administrator are not in
privity, although both litigate the conduct of the decedent. Olson v. Linster,
259 Minn. 189, 107 N.W.2d 49 (1960) (semble); Philips v. Aretz, 215 Minn.
325, 329, 10 N.W.2d 226, 228 (1943); Fehland v. St. Paul, 215 Minn. 94, 102,
9 N.W.2d 349, 853 (1943). See 5 DuNNwz, MIr soTA DIGEST (3d ed.) § 2609
(1952). If they were in privity the case would call for application of ordinary
principles of res judicata.
2. See Gollner v. Cram, 258 Minn. 8, 10, 102 N.W.2d 521, 523, (1960);
Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co., 257 Minn. 487, 491, 102 N.W.2d 293, 297
(1960); Hierl v. McClure, 238 Minn. 335, 340, 56 N.W.2d 721, 723-24 (1953);
10 DUNNELL, MnmESOTA DIGEST (3d ed.) § 5162 (1952); see generally Collins,
Collateral Estoppel in Favor of Nonparties: A Defendant's "Fringe Benefit,"
41 OnE. LJ. 80 (1961); Currie, Civil Procedure:The Tempest Brews, 53 CALF.
L. RFv. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
BernhardDoctrine, 9 STAN. L. RFv. 281 (1957); Moore & Currier, Mutuality
and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 801 (1961); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. Rav. 217 (1954);
Developments in the Law -Res Judicata,65 IIARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
8. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 86 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 133, 172 Atl.
260, 263 (Super. Ct. 1934); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 257,
72 N.W.2d 364, 869 (1955).
4. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812-13, 122 P.2d 892,
894 (1942) (semble).
5. In re Trusteeship Under Will of Melgaard, 200 Minn. 493, 503, 274
N.W. 641, 646 (1937); Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 226 N.W. 412
(1929); Thompson v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 71 Minn. 89, 97, 73 N.W.
707, 709 (1898); see 10 DurNw m, iNNEsoTA DIGEST (3d ed.) § 5165 (1953).
6. Twin City Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Radio Service Labs., 242
Minn. 10, 11, 61 N.W.2d 32, 33 (1954).
7. For a state by state analysis, see Currie, Civil Procedure:The Tempest
Brews, 53 CA IF. L. Ruv. 25, 38-46 (1965).
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successive actions are not in privity, but are in a derivative
liability relationship, most courts apply collateral estoppel to a
plaintiff who was unsuccessful in the first action.8 Several courts
permit defensive use of a judgment against the plaintiff in a prior
action when he seeks to litigate the same issue against another
partyY The Minnesota court has applied collateral estoppel in
both situations. ° In Lustik the court went one step further to
permit defensive use of a judgment against the defendant in the
prior action."
Estoppel of an unsuccessful defendant has been criticized on
the ground that he may not have put forth his best case in the
first suit. Lacking the initiative, a defendant may be prejudiced
by the plaintiff's choice of forum. 2 Also, a defendant may not
have an opportunity to present affirmative claims, arguments for
8. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 710 (1952), supplementing 133 A.L.. 181
(1941); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 404 (1938); RESTATEMENT, JUDGIENTS § 99 (1942);
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HAnv. L. REv. 818, 862-63 (1952).
New York extended this rule to allow defensive assertion of a prior verdict
against the defendant in the first action. Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
9. E.g., Riordan v. Ferguson, 80 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); CocaCola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 172 Atl. 260 (Super. Ct.
1934).
10. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955) (judgment for corporation in derivative suit alleging fraud of accountants hired by
corporation bars fraud action against accountants); Christianson v. Hager,
242 Minn. 41, 64 N.W.2d 35 (1954) (judgment for defendant in assault and
battery action bars suit against park for negligent supervision); Myhra v.
Park, 193 Minn. 290, 258 N.W. 515 (1935) (judgment adverse to plaintiff in
action against master based upon act of servant bars subsequent action against
servant).
11. 269 Minn. at 522, 131 N.W.2d at 746. In support of this step, the
court cited San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.92d 785 (1958), and Abbott v. Western
Nat'l Indem. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 302, 331 P.2d 997 (1958). These cases held
that a judgment against defendant in a tort action precludes him from contending that he was not a tortfeasor in a subsequent action for indemnity.
The court might have looked for additional support from cases holding that a
criminal conviction may be asserted against the defendant in a subsequent
action in which his commission of the crime is at issue. See, e.g., Teitelbaum
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561,
375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (Traynor, C.J.) (conviction of arson bars action to
recover fire insurance); Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller,
149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927) (conviction of arson bars action to recover
fire insurance); see generally Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 995 (1953).
12. See Lustik v. RankIla, 269 Minn. 515, 528, 131 N.W.2d 741, 749 (1961)
(Gallagher, J., dissenting opinion); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the BernhardDoctrine, 9 STAw. L. REV. 281, 303 (1957).
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damages, and sympathetic appeals to the jury."3 If a plaintiff's
"strategic use of the initiative"'14 prevents the defendant from
fairly litigating an issue, the defendant should not be estopped
from relitigating the issue as a plaintiff. However, the Lustik
court found that the surviving driver had a fair opportunity in
the first case to litigate the question of her freedom from negligence.'5 Even with a fair opportunity, a defendant may not put
forth his best case in the first suit if, for example, the claim
against him is small. 6 Courts have not excused half-hearted defenses, 17 however, perhaps because the future application of collateral estoppel should be foreseen.' 8
A more specific objection to estoppel of an unsuccessful defendant arises where unusual rules of evidence or procedure favor
the plaintiff in the first action. In Lustik, for example, the defendant's case in the wrongful death action was hampered by the
statutory presumption that the deceased driver was exercising
due care at the time of the accident. 9 Although the presumption
13. These advantages are part of the initiative in any action. Currie,
supra note 12, at 303-04. The majority indicated its awareness of this problem by suggesting a new procedure for wrongful death cases to avoid the
presentation of damage claims to the jury by only one party. 269 Minn. at 517
n.4, 131 N.W.2d at 743 n.4.
14. Currie, supra note 12, at 303.
15. 269 Minn. at 523, 131 N.W.2d at 746.
16. Von Mloschzisker, Res Judicata,38 YALE L.J. 299, 308 (1929); Developmerts in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 864 (1952).
17. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 86 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 134, 172 Atl.
260, 264 (1934); Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 520-21, 181 N.W.2d 741,
745 (1964). See also Currie, supra note 12, at 303. Minnesota and most other
states that have considered the question even apply collateral estoppel to
issues decided by small claims courts. See Gollner v. Cram, 258 Minn. 8, 102
N.W.2d 521, (1960); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 977 (1962), supplementing 147
A.L.R. 196 (1943).
18. In the future no party should fail to realize that collateral estoppel
may be applied against him in a subsequent action involving claims arising
out of the same facts. Two motorists litigating the issue of fault in an accident suit, for instance, can hardly be surprised when a passenger in one of the
cars seeks to apply the verdict against the loser.
19. M mN. STAT. ANN. § 609.04 (Supp. 1964). The presumption of decedent's due care has been the subject of much litigation and comment in Minnesota over the years. The Minnesota court first adopted the Thayer-Wigmore
theory that a presumption operates only to change the burden of going forward with the evidence, disappearing when any competent evidence is introduced to refute it. See Knuth v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 225, 232, 54 N.W.2d 771,
776 (1952); Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 570, 289 N.W.
557, 561 (1939), 24 M]NN. L. REV. 651 (1940); IX WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491
(3d ed. 1940). Accordingly, it was held reversible error to instruct on the presumption when the burden of proving contributory negligence already rests
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is intended to apply exclusively to decedent's freedom from
negligence, it may also affect the jury's evaluation of the survivor's conduct in a suit arising out of a head-on collision.F0 Furthermore, assuming the judgment in the wrongful death action
may be taken as fairly establishing the survivor's contributory
negligence, it may not be taken as fairly establishing the decedent's freedom from negligence. Without the presumption
operating in favor of decedent, a second jury might find both
drivers were negligent. The survivor might then win on the issue
of which driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
The possibility of invoking last clear chance was dismissed by the
Lustik court, apparently on the ground that the first jury had
found that the survivor's negligence proximately caused the accident.2 ' However, if both drivers were found negligent, a different
on the party against whom it operates. TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 493,
53 N.W.2d 468, 474 (1952), 37 MmN. L. REv. 629 (1953). The legislature
responded by making the presumption of decedent's due care statutory and
requiring a jury instruction on it in a wrongful death action. MuN. STAT.
AxN. § 602.04 (Supp. 1964); see Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 524, 131
N.W.2d 741, 747-48 (1964) (concurring opinion); Lambach v. Northwestern
Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125, 111 N.W.2d 345, 352 (1961) (concurring opinion); Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394, 399, 95 N.W.2d 172, 176 (1959), 44

MmN. L. I~v. s52.
Application of the statute is limited to "any action ... for negligently
causing the death of a person ... ." Thus, the instruction is given in a wrongful death action brought by a trustee for the benefit of next of kin, but is not
given in a surviving driver's action against the administrator of the decedents
estate.
20.
If a two-car collision is due to the fault of one or the other or both
of the drivers, the process which eliminates the conduct of one as causative inevitably casts responsibility on the other. An intersection collision, for example, may occur because one driver or the other failed to
yield the right-of-way. If the jury is free to presume that a deceased
driver had the right-of-way regardless of the evidence, it is bound to
find that the other failed to yield. A head-on collision, as another instance, may occur because one driver or the other or both crossed the
centerline. The statutory presumption may result in a jury finding that
the decedent was in his own lane of travel at impact. If so, it must find
the defendant driver to have been in the wrong lane to account for the
accident. Thus, the residual effect of the presumption is to influence
decision as to the negligence of both drivers.
269 Minn. at 529-30, 131 N.W.2d at 750 (Sheran, J., dissenting opinion).
21. 269 Minn. at 517-18, 131 N.W.2d at 743. The doctrine of last clear
chance has not been favored in Minnesota which may account for the court's
reluctance to apply it in LustiL. However, under the name "discovered peril"
the court has recognized the doctrine in a limited sense. Turenne v. Smith,
215 Minn. 64, 69, 9 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1943); Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.,
71 lnn. 488, 451, 74 N.W. 166, 170 (1898). The limitation is that the de-
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22
finding of proximate cause would be possible.
Prejudice to the surviving driver could have been avoided by
permitting consolidation of his suit with the wrongful death
action. However, the Minnesota court foreclosed this possibility
by holding, in Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co.,2 that the two
actions can not be consolidated for trial because of the confusing
jury instructions required.24 In Lustik, the court intimated that
it might adopt a rule which would require that priority be given
to trial of the surviving driver's contributory negligence and the
decedent's negligence in the survivor's action.25 Such a rule would
eliminate the "unseemly race to the courthouse ' 26 fostered by the
Lambach decision. Also, it would permit the survivor to make
"strategic use of the initiative"2 7 in litigating the issue of
negligence.
However, new problems would be created by such a rule. First,
continuation of the wrongful death action until the survivor's
action has been tried and the possibilities of appeal exhausted
would frustrate the trustee's legitimate attempt to secure funds
promptly for the decedent's beneficiaries? 8 Second, if the verdict
in the survivor's action could be asserted as a bar to the wrongful
death action, the trustee would have no opportunity to litigate
the issue of decedent's negligence with the presumption operating
inhis favor?9 Arguably such a result would circumvent the legis-

fendant must actually be aware of the danger in time to avoid it. Gardner v.
Germain, 264 Minn. 61, 64, 117 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1962); Medved v. Doolittle,
220 Minn- 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945).
22. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-10.
23. 261 Minn. 115, 111 N.W.2d 345 (1961), 60 MICH. L. REv. 510 (1962),
47 MruN. L. REv. 285 (1962).
24. It should be noted that the confusion in jury instructions which led
to the requirement of separate actions is not any greater than other jury
instructions on complex issues. See MiNi)5SOTA JuRY IsTRaucTioN GUMEs

307-08, 311-12 (1963).
25. 269 Minn. at 517 n.4, 131 N.W.2d at 743 n.4.
26. Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125, 111 N.W.2d
345, 852 (1961) (concurring opinion). The race results from the fact that the
first action brought will be given priority and its verdict is thus available to
collaterally estop the second suit.
27. Currie, supra note 12, at 303.
28. The trustee usually files the wrongful death action as soon as possible
in order to obtain the money for the widow and children; the surviving driver
usually waits until he kmows the full extent of his injuries.
29. The Lustik opinion did not foreclose the possibility that the trustee's
action would not be barred by an adverse judgment in the survivor's action.
269 Minn. at 519, 131 N.W.2d at 743-44. However, a wrongful death action
can be maintained only if the decedent "might have maintained an action,
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lative intent embodied in the presumption.
In applying collateral estoppel to an unsuccessful defendant,
the Lustik court adopted a three-element test formulated in
Bernhard v. Bank of Amneica,30 where Justice Traynor asked:
"Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with
the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final
judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?" 3' 1 This test allows a stranger to assert a prior verdict on a litigated fact issue defensively against either party to the
first suit.2 It would also appear to encompass offensive
use of a
3
prior verdict by the plaintiff in the second suit
If the Iinnesota court elects to extend Lustik, it might distinguish between offensive use of collateral estoppel against plaintiffs and its use against defendants in the prior action 3 4 For
had he lived.... ." Mnrlu. STAT. ANN.573.02(1) (Supp. 1965). If the survivor
wins against the personal representative, who represents the decedent, then,
arguably, the decedent could not have maintained the action had he lived.
30. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). Several authorities have considered this case within the rule that a judgment in favor of an indemnitor
precludes a later action against an indemnitee. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964); RESTATEMENT, JUDG~MrS § 96(a) (1942); Currie,

supra note 12, at 290; Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons
Neither Parties nor Privies- Two California Cases, 57 HARv. L. REv. 98,
101 (1943). However, in Professor Currie's opinion, the California Supreme
Court did not intend to so limit its holding: "the question whether one was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior action is relevant only with
respect to the person against whom the plea is asserted .... " Currie, supra
note 12, at 284.
The Bernhard decision has twice been cited with approval by the Minnesota court. Lustik v. Ranla, 269 Minn. 515, 520-22, 131 N.W.2d 741, 744,
745 (1964); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 257, 72 N.W.2d 364,
869 (1955).
31. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
32. The result is supported by many writers. See Collins, supra note 2;
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. RNv. 25 (1965); 27
BRooKLYN L. REv. 174 (1961); 35 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1926). Several federal
cases also have followed this approach. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944, 954 (2d ACir. 1964); Riordan v. Ferguson, 80 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
88. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. R v. 818,
865 n.355 (1952).
34. See Currie, supra note 12, at 290; Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata,65 HAuRv. L. REv. 818, 864-65 (1952). California and New York have
refused to permit plaintiffs to avail themselves of prior plaintiffs' judgments
against the same defendant. See Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762,
327 P.2d 111 (1958); Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc.,
284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940). However, two recent federal decisions,
after citing Professor Currie's article, declined to make such a distinction. In
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example, where a railroad sues the driver of an automobile involved in a grade crossing collision and loses on a finding of contributory negligence, injured passengers might be permitted to
assert that judgment in subsequent actions against the railroad 5
If the driver brought the first action against the railroad, however,
and won on a finding of the railroad's negligence, subsequent
plaintiffs might be denied the right to assert collateral estoppel
against the railroad in subsequent suits.s! A preferable solution
would be to permit successive plaintiffs to assert a prior verdict
against the same defendant only if the defendant lost the first
case raising the contested fact issue 7 Of course, if the defendant
won the first case but lost a subsequent one, the inconsistent
results should preclude assertion of collateral estoppel by other
plaintiffs8
B.

TRmi,

CouRT HAs PowER To

AcTioNs INVOLViNG

CoimMN

CONSOLIDATE

SEPARATE

QuEsTioN or DAmAGEs

Plaintiff initiated separate actions seeking recovery for injuries
suffered in two automobile accidents separated by three and onehalf years. Because the second injury was to the same part of the
body and was an aggravation of the first, the trial court ordered
the two actions consolidated. The defendants in both actions
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964),

64 CoLum. L. REv. 1141,
48 MARQ. L. REv. 115, 89 NoThE DAm LAw. 492, 50 VA. L. REv. 777, it was
held that a prior judgment establishing employees' rights under a collective
bargaining agreement barred introduction of further evidence on the employer's
liability in a suit by employees who were not parties to the first suit. The
court pointed out that the plaintiffs were not deliberately harassing the
defendant with successive suits and that there was no likelihood of a sympathy
verdict in the case since both cases involved construction of an identical
contract by a judge. In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
709 (D. Nev. 1962), 1964 DuE L.J. 402, plaintiffs relied upon a prior verdict
awarding damages against an airline whose plane was involved in a mid-air
collision taking forty-nine lives. The prior suit involved twenty-four actions
consolidated for trial. The airline admitted it had no new evidence. After
noting that defendant had spent nearly four years preparing and fifteen weeks
trying the first case, the court concluded that a sufficient "day in court" had
been had to justify application of collateral estoppel. Professor Currie recently
changed his position to approve this result. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews, 53 CAIF. L. REV. 25 (1965).
35. See Note, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 818, 865 (1952).
86. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
37. See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.
1962).
88. See 1964 DuKE L.J. 402, 404.
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petitioned for a writ of prohibition which was subsequently issued
restraining the trial court from proceeding with a consolidated
trial.' The Minnesota Supreme Court, in discharging the writ,
held the consolidation order was not an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. Schacterv. Richter, 135 N.W.2d 66 (Mii. 1965).
The trial court granted the consolidation order under Rule
42.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the two actions; it may order the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

Rule 42.01 was enacted for trial convenience and is intended to
benefit not only the parties involved but also the administration
of the court system.2
The plaintiff moved for consolidation of his claims because of
his apprehension that separate trials could possibly result in each
jury finding that the defendant before it had been negligent, but
also finding that the particular defendant had caused only an
insubstantial portion of the damages sustained by the plaintiff.3
Accordingly, the total sum for his damages recovered by the plaintiff might be unfairly low for the cumulative injury proved to
have been caused by both defendants. The defendants argued that
consolidation was improper because the two actions, involving
two separate torts, did not arise from the "same occurrence." 4
They based this argument on the allegation that Rule 42.01 is
complementary to the joinder rule and is designed to serve similar
purposes. Since the joinder rule requires that any right to relief
must rise out of the same transaction or occurrence, defendants
argued Rule 42.01 should be subject to the limitations explicit in
1. The writ of prohibition procedure was made necessary because there is
no provision for appeal of a consolidation order under MNw. STAT. ANN.
605.09 (Supp. 1963).
2. See 2 YOUNGQUIST & BLACm, MINNESOTA RuLES PacTicE. 375-76

(1953).
3. An order of consolidation was sustained principally on the support of
this argument in Way v. Waterloo C.F.&No. R.R., 239 Iowa 244, 258, 29
N.W.2d 867, 872 (1947).
4. 135 N.W.2d at 68.
5. Under Mnw. R. Civ. P. 20.01 a plaintiff may join several defendants
only if there is:
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
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that rule. Support for defendants' position can be found in the
procedural rules existing before the adoption of the present rules
in which consolidation was in fact limited to cases where joinder
was proper.' Moreover, joinder and consolidation have an identity
of purpose - trial convenience.7 Neither procedure, however, is
intended to alter the rights of the parties.
The court rejected defendants' argument on the basis of a
literal interpretation of the wording of the rules. While joinder is
limited to cases arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
consolidation requires only a "common question of law or fact." s
The effect of joinder is to unify for all purposes the claims of the
parties in a single action.9 Joinder is accomplished in the pleadings
without leave of the court. Through the explicit limitation of the
joinder rule to cases arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, the discretion available to the parties is clearly defined.
Consolidation, on the other hand, may be had only upon order of
the court. It results in a joint hearing or trial, but the two actions
still retain their separate identity."" It may be used to join the
6. See Mlinn. Rev. Laws § 4141 (1905). The authors of a treatise on innesota procedure apparently agree with defendants' position:
The rule is complementary to the rules dealing with joinder of claims
and parties. Liberal provisions have been made for the joinder of claims
and parties in the interest of presenting all the controversies between

the parties. Where those rules could have been complied with, but were
not, and the separate actions present claims or defenses involving a
common question of law or fact, the court has authority, upon its own
initiative or upon motion, to order consolidated the actions or the trial
or hearing of any or all matters in issue in the actions.
2 YOUNGQUIST & BiLciK, MINNEsOTA RuLusPRACTIcE 875 (1953) (authors'
comments to Rule 42.01). (Emphasis added.) But a federal district judge for
the District of Minnesota has stated that it is not necessary that the actions
might have been joined. Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the
New Minnesota Rules, 36 MmNu. L. REv. 672, 675 (1952).
7. See SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1989); 3
MOORE, FEDERAm FRACTICE
20.02 at 2702 (2d ed. 1964).
8. For example, in Stanford v. TVA, 18 F.RI). 152 (MD. Tenn. 1955),
the plaintiff alleged injury to his property caused by fumes emitted from two
factories operated independently by the two defendants. It was held that
joinder was improper because the claims of the plaintiff did not arise from a
single occurrence or series of occurrences. Consolidation was granted, however,
on the basis of common question of fact.
9. This efiect may be altered by the court by dropping a party on grounds
of misjoinder under MINw. R. Civ. P. 21 or by ordering a separate trial of any
issue or claim under MIfn_. R. Civ. P. 20.02.
10. "Consolidation" can refer to a merger of two actions into one (as
under the joinder rule), and also to a joining for purpose of trial with the
actions retaining their separate character. It is to this latter use of the word
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separate actions to any extent, provided it does not prejudice the
rights of any party. Thus one or more phases of different actions
may be consolidated." The wider scope of consolidation 2 seems
justified by the greater ease with which the procedure can be
adapted to the individual cases at bar.
The defendants also contended consolidation was prejudicial
because it seemed to shift the burden of proof from plaintiff to
defendants. They argued consolidation would allow the plaintiff to
prove the extent of his damages and then leave the defendants to
apportion it among themselves- in effect making them adversaries. Even if such a contention has some foundation, in a consolidated trial the plaintiff still must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the extent of the damage caused by each
defendant. The effect of consolidation will make rebuttal of that
evidence by one defendant more difficult since that rebuttal will
be opposed by the other defendant. But by increasing the number of parties directly interested in the disputed question, the
likelihood of a thorough presentation of the evidence and an
ultimately just result is increased rather than decreased.
The plurality opinion concludes the "common question of law
or fact' requirement is the only absolute limitation imposed on
the trial court's discretion to consolidate; and this limitation was
satisfied by the interrelated question of damages. The concurring
opinion, however, would allow consolidation only as to the issue
of damages, arguing that the liability issues in the two actions,
which are completely unrelated, should be tried separately. '
Such a procedure is provided for in the rules.' 4 Certainly the
possibility of inconvenience or prejudice is considerable.
Regarding inconvenience, the determination of the liability of
either defendant may require protracted litigation. In such an
event the other defendant will be subjected to the expense and
that Schacter refers, under MINN. R. Civ. P. 42.01. For an example of the
type of order the trial court might make see Stanford v. TVA, 18 F.R.D. 152
(M.D. Tenn. 1955) (separate pleadings, motions, verdicts, judgments, etc.).
See 2B BAmox & HoLTzorF, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PnocEDu 941 (1961).
11. See 5 MooPE,

FEDmuI

PR cTicE

42.02, at 1209 (2d. ed. 1964).

12. "While the concepts of joinder and consolidation complement each
other and overlap, they are nonetheless distinct. Consolidation is wider in
scope." 135 N.W.2d at 69.
13. The concurring opinion assumed that the order of consolidation provided for separate trials on the question of liability. 135 N.W.2d at 71.
14. Alum. R. Civ. P. 42.02; see generally Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation
of Jury Negligence Trials; An Example of the Questionable Use of the Rule
Making Power, 14 VAN. L. REv. 831 (1961).
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inconvenience of participating in such litigation even though he
will not be able to contribute to a more expedient disposal of the
liability issue. However, the possibility of inconvenience would
seem to be minimal if the liability issues are not complex.
Prejudice may result if, for example, the evidence in a consolidated trial shows the negligence of one defendant to have been
gross in comparison with that of another defendant. An unfair
or unrealistic apportionment of damages between the defendants
could result in such a case because the jury might not be able to
disregard the clear disparity in culpability. In the event prejudice
threatens, the trial judge can safeguard the interests of the parties
by careful jury instruction, close supervision of the trial procedure,
or even ordering a separation of issues that he had consolidated.' 5
However, the concurring opinion would require separation of the
question of liability without requiring a specific allegation of
prejudice or inconvenience that a consolidated trial might produce. Apparently the concurring opinion feels the possibility of
prejudice on the question of liability is always strong enough to
overcome any competing considerations in favor of consolidation
of that issue in a single trial. 16
The dissenting opinion would disallow consolidation in
Schaeter on the ground that Rule 42.01 was not intended to
require a defendant in one tort action to take part in litigation
involving another defendant's independent tort.17 The dissent
argued there was no common question of law or fact even in the
damage issue since each defendant was only liable for the damages
15. While the trial judge may consolidate under Mnuv. R. Civ. P. 42.01,
the court may also order a separate trial of separate issues under -MIN.R.
Civ. P. 42.02.
The plurality opinion was confident that the trial court was capable of
fairly exercising its discretion to protect the rights of the parties and avoid
prejudice. "It is not for an appellate court to anticipate or prohibit errors of
the trial court or to interfere with its discretionary orders as to trial procedure." 135 N.W.2d at 70.
16. "[A] consolidated trial of the liability issue against both sets of defendants would be onerous.... ." 135 N.W.2d at 71.
17. The viewpoint of the dissent is apparently followed in New York. In
actions factually similar to the instant case the New York courts have denied
consolidation, even for the issue of damages. See Abbatepaolo v. Blumberg,
7 App. Div. 2d 847, 182 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1959); Gamble v. Fraleigh, 1 lisc. 2d
347, 146 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1955). "The convenience of one trial does not
overcome the prejudice that may result to appellants and the confusion which
the jury will encounter in trying to determine the extent of injuries attributable to each ...
" Pride v. Perras, 6 App. Div. 2d 842, 176 N.Y.S.2d 573,
574 (1958).
Although the plurality opinion distinguished the New York statute from
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caused by his separate tort. But this argument is not relevant as
to whether there is a common fact question. If the two injuries to
plaintiff were interrelated, as was alleged, the damages from
those injuries could not be determined independently. The plaintiff
could prove damages as to each defendant only by showing which
damages were caused by the other defendant. Accordingly a fact
issue common to both actions does exist. The expediting policy of
Rule 42.01 favors consolidation in Schacter,at least of the damage
issue, if possible without prejudice to the rights of any party. The
jury may be somewhat confused in trying to apportion the
damages between the two defendants. However, this confusion
could not be avoided by separate trials since each jury would
still have to determine the extent of plaintiff's damages caused by
the nonpresent defendant' 8
The result of the unusual split of the court' 9 is to leave
the discretion of Minnesota trial courts to grant consolidation
undetermined. A majority of the court felt that under Rule 42.01
the trial court had the power to consolidate. A different majority
thought that consolidation of the liability issue was improper
since it would be unduly burdensome on the defendants. However,
no majority of justices outlined the extent of consolidation permissible. The plurality opinion did not limit the trial court's discretion to consolidate the issues in Schacter. The concurring
opinion would allow consolidation only of the damage issue after
separate trials to determine the liability of each defendant. And
the dissenting opinion took the position that the trial court was
without power to consolidate any of the issues of the two actions.
Thus the only safe conclusion a trial court can draw from Schacter
is that it does not have discretion to consolidate the issue of
liability when separate, independent torts are involved, but it may
consolidate an issue of interrelated damages.
VMi.

SALES

IMPLIED WARRNTY - LIABILITY OF BLOOD BANx
SUPPLYIG D
ncTmIw BLOOD

Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.,'
Muuw. R. CIv. P. 42.01, it seems clear that the New York decisions rest on the

basis of prejudice and jury confusion rather than on any difference in the
two statutes.
18. See Stanford v. TVA, 18 F.R.D. 152, 155 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
19. Three justices joined in the plurality opinion; two concurred; and two

dissented.
1. 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965).
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held that the implied warranties of fitness for purpose and of merchantability contained in the Uniform Sales Act2 do not apply to
contaminated blood furnished by a nonprofit public service corporation. Plaintiff, after having received a transfusion ordered by
her physician, contracted and died from serum hepatitis. Defendant blood bank was not claimed to be negligent in the processing
or distribution of the blood Plaintiff made payment for the blood
directly to the blood bank rather than to the hospital in which
she was a patient.
The "fitness for purpose" and "merchantability" warranties are
expressed in technical sales language of "buyers" and "sellers."
Accordingly, the general rule has developed that in order for a
claim for recovery to fall within the scope of these statutory warranties, there must first be a "sale" of goods.4 In determining
whether a particular transaction was such a sale, courts have often
denied warranty protection on the basis that the transaction
should be considered merely a "service." Contracts for construction, repairs, and professional services usually fall within this
doctrine.5
The court in the instant case concluded there was no sale of
blood in the technical sense because it felt the furnishing of blood
2. The act provides that:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
MxNN. STAT. § 512.15(1).
Section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a similar warranty,
and is also phrased in terms of "buyer" and "seller":
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
3. Some diseases which can be communicated by blood transfusions are
susceptible to tests whereby their presence may be ascertained. Serum hepatitis, however, is a virus which medical science has been unable to detect in
the blood. See 132 N.W.2d at 807.
4. See 17 EN~. L. Rnv. 210, 211 (1933). For a helpful article on the
general problem of the scope of warranty protection, see Farnsworth, Implied
Warrantiesof Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLum. L. REv. 653 (1957).
5. See VoLD, SALEs § 4 (1931). A number of cases are collected in Note,
Contracts for Services DistinguishedFrom Those to Sell Goods, 15 FoRDnAm

L. Rav. 92 (1946).
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to be "more in the nature of a service than a sale of goods."" The
court relied heavily on the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp.,7 the first decision to invoke the sale-service dichotomy with respect to blood admistered to a hospital patient. In
Perlmutter an action under a theory of implied warranty was
brought against the hospital which provided the blood and administered its transfusion. The New York Court of Appeals denied
recovery, holding that a hospital which administers a transfusion
of blood to a patient is not making a sale, because such a transfusion is merely incidental to the overall contractual obligation of
the hospital to provide "services." In the words of the Perlmutter
court, "when service predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction
is not deemed a sale within the Sales Act.""
Even if it is conceded that furnishing blood to a patient by a
hospital should be considered merely incidental to the general
services to be rendered, 9 it would seem that the instant case is
readily distinguishable from Perlmutter. In the instant case the
furnishing of blood by the blood bank was not incidental to any
other services, since the blood bank did nothing more than supply
the blood. Consequently the service aspect of Perlmutter appears
inapplicable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court avoided this distinction by
stating that the blood bank in the instant case should not be
treated any differently than a hospital, since both are nonprofit
public service organizations. Thus it would seem the court con6. 132 N.W.2d at 810.
7. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 NE.2d 792 (1954). In this 4-3 decision the dissent felt
there was both a contract for services and a separate contract for the sale of
blood. Thus even the dissent stayed within the confines of conventional sales
law. Notably the dissent assumed that the hospital would have a remedy over
against the blood bank which supplied the blood. Id. at 109, 110, 123 N.E.2d
at 797.
8. Id. at 104, 123 NE.2d at 794.
9. The Perlmuttercourt said:
It was not for blood-or iodine or bandages-for which plaintiff
bargained, but the wherewithal of the hospital staff and the availability of hospital facilities to provide whatever medical treatment was
considered advisable. The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of
blood was only an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed by the hospital and, therefore, was not within the provisions of the Sales Act.
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 808 N.Y. 100, 105, 123 NY-2d 792, 795

(1954).
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strues the sale-service dichotomy of Perlmutter as establishing a
distinction in sales warranty law between transactions involving
public service organizations and those involving commercial businesses. Indeed, the court seems to shift from the technical requirements of the Uniform Sales Act to a thinly disguised doctrine of
charitable immunity.10
Some jurisdictions have held that the doctrine of charitable
immunity extends to warranty actions, since such actions sound
in tort." It would have been difficult for the Minnesota court to
apply this doctrine expressly, however, because in Minnesota
charitable organizations are not immune from tort liability.12 Consequently, it would seem anachronistic to invoke such a longdiscarded doctrine of law. However, the mechanical application of
technical sales law allowed the court to avoid rendering a much
needed decision concerning the relationship of strict liability to
charitable organizations. It is obvious the court was strongly
influenced by the fact that serum hepatitis in the blood is neither
detectable nor preventable. 13 Because breach of warranty gives
rise to liability which does not depend upon any negligence or
knowledge of defects on the part of the supplier of goods, the
implied warranties of quality are essentially devices for imposing
liability without fault. The real question that faced the court
10. "We find it difficult to give literal application of principles of law designed to impose strict accountability in commercial transactions to a voluntary and charitable activity which serves a humane and public health purpose."
132 N.W.2d at 811.
In a recent case similar to the instant case, the Texas Supreme Court
denied recovery against a blood bank, citing Perlmutter for the proposition
that the blood bank was performing a "service." Golez v. J. K. and Suzy L.
Wadley Research Institute and Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. of Civ.
App. 1961). This case may be distinguished from the instant case, however,
since the blood bank in Golez, through the negligence of an employee, furnished blood of the wrong type. Notwithstanding negligence, the blood bank
was not liable because under Texas law charitable corporations are immune
from tort liability. Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176
S.W.2d 749 (1943).
11. Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp. Inc., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954); Lovich v.
Salvation Army, 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947).
12. High v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 214
Minn. 164, 7 N.W.2d 675 (1943); Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal
Church, 174 Minn. 889, 219 N.W. 463 (1928). Indeed, one decision even suggests that any application of charitable immunity is a question for the legislature. McInerny v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).
13. The Perlmuttercourt was also influenced by the fact there is no known
method of detecting or preventing the contamination. 308 N.Y. at 106-07, 123
N.E.2d at 795.
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was whether to impose strict liability on a charitable institution.
The court could have rendered a sounder decision by completely
avoiding the Uniform Sales Act and resolving the question of
imposing strict liability on charitable organizations through a
weighing of competing policy considerations.' 4
It can be argued in favor of the result in the instant case that
the purpose of imposing strict liability does not extend beyond
commercial enterprises. It is reasonable to charge such "enterprise
liability" to an entrepreneur who can be expected to purchase
liability insurance or pay damages from his profits. It is not so
clear, however, that nonprofit organizations should be required to
take such a risk. Arguably no more should be expected of a nonprofit organization than that all possible precautions to prevent
or detect injuries have been taken. Moreover, the burden of the
risk to the individual patient can be distributed through the use
of personal health and life insurance plans.
On the other hand, the reasons for imposing liability without
fault on commercial enterprises seem equally persuasive when
applied to nonprofit organizations supplying needed services to
the public. Compensating injured parties regardless of the existence of negligence, distributing the risk of injury throughout society, and ability to bear the loss' 5 are factors which can be as
applicable to charitable organizations as to commercial enterprises. Indeed, in regard to distribution of risk, it seems just as
compelling for nonprofit organizations to make restitution to
those injured by their activities, since such organizations can
spread the risk of injury by increasing their price for whatever
service they supply. Those persons who have benefited from
charitable services and have not suffered injury should be required to pay their small share to compensate others who, by
mere chance, are not as fortunate. Risk distribution can be readily
accomplished through liability insurance premiums or some kind
of a compensation fund. Recipients of charitable aid are still likely
14. Arguably sales law is inapplicable to noncommercial operations such
as the supplying of blood in the instant case. Indeed, mechanical adherence
to the rules of sales law could lead to an incongruous result. For instance,
assume that the instant case distinguished Perlmutter and held there was a
sale of goods because the plaintiff dealt directly with the blood bank. Then the
situation would arise where the hospital would not be liable and the blood
bank would. Such a result would serve neither judicial consistency nor equal
justice.
15. "There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on
either side, to ask in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear
the loss." PouND, THE SpmIr oF THE CoAnioN LAW 189 (1921).
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to pay a considerably lower price for it than for similar services
from a commercial business. Moreover, it has been argued, although perhaps with little persuasiveness, that imposition of strict
liability in this area will possibly provide charitable organizations
with a further impetus to accelerate their attempts to detect or
prevent impurities in the product they supply.'
In particular, it seems that a hospital, blood bank, or any other
supplier of blood should properly bear the loss since such an
organization is well aware of the incidence of serum hepatitis or
other contaminant contained in the blood. On the other hand, the
recipient, as a matter of general medical practice, is not even
informed that the danger exists.'. It seems unfair to expect an individual to be personally insured or otherwise prepared for a
hazard of which he is totally unaware.
The instant case is demonstrative of a phenomenon common in
sales warranty cases - a court struggling to reach a result it
deems equitable and at the same time trying to stay within the
literal language of technical sales law. The court might better
have ignored the technical question of the existence of a sale
and rather resolved the issue on the basis of whether or not to
apply strict liability to a charitable organization. In all of the
blood bank cases since Perlmutter,courts have mechanically applied the rules of sales law.'8 It is hoped that in the future some
court will throw off the shackles of technical sales law and, after
a consideration of the competing social policies, settle this confused area of products liability law.
IX.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

OFEING LETTER SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM WHEN
SUPPORTED BY "RELIABLE EVIDENCE"

In Radke v. Brenon,' defendant sent a written letter to plaintiff
offering to sell certain real estate and, after some negotiating,
plaintiff orally accepted the offer. When defendant refused to convey, plaintiff brought an action for specific performance. Although
16. See Farnsworth, 8upra note 4, at 672.
17. See 132 N.W.2d at 808.
18. See, e.g., Sloenker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo.
1964); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 NE.2d 792 (1954);
Gile v. Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956);
Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50
(1964); cf. Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
aff'd mem. 3 N.Y.2d 756, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985, 143 N.E.2d 528 (1957).
1. 134 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. 1965).
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defendant pleaded a defense under the Statute of Frauds, on
cross-examination during the trial he admitted that plaintiff had
agreed to buy the land. The trial court granted specific performance. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding on the
facts that defendant's initial letter of offer was sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. In concluding that a
completed contract existed, the Court primarily relied on defendant's admission made during the trial.
The linnesota Statute of Frauds' provides that a contract for
the sale of real estate is void in the absence of a written memorandum thereof. The purpose of the Statute is "to prevent men
from being, through fraud or perjury, held liable for engagements
which they never made." 4 It expressly requires the memorandum
to state the consideration and to be subscribed by the vendor. In
addition to these statutory requirements, the Minnesota court
has required the contracting parties to be identified with reasonable certainty, the land to be sufficiently described, and the general terms and conditions of the transaction to be specified 5
2. Mui. STAT. § 513.05 (1958) states in part: "Every contract for the
leasing for a longer period than one year or for the sale of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed by
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made .. ."
8. The Statute has been interpreted as meaning voidable rather than void:
We believe the better rule to be that contracts which fall within the
provisions of ...

the Statute of Frauds .

.

. are not void in the strict

sense that no contract has come into being at all, but are merely unenforceable at the option of the party against whom enforcement is
sought.
Borchardt v. Kulick, 2341Minn. 308, 319, 48 N.W.2d 318, 825 (1951); accord,
Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d 667 (1955).
4. D. M. Osborne &Co. v. Baker, 84 Min. 807,309, 25 N.W. 606, 608 (1885).
The purpose of the original Statute of Frauds was stated in its title and preamble: "An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes" - "for the prevention of
many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by
perjury and subornation of perjury." Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c.8.
For a thorough historical discussion of the original effect of the Statute and the
development of the rule that a party could admit the contract and still plead
the Statute, along with an analysis of this rule and the recent minority rejection of it, see Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 87 ComvI L L.Q. 855
(1952). See generally Degnan, The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of
Evidence Because of Fearof Perjury, 43 TExAs L. REv. 435, 444 (1965).
5. 184 N.W.2d at 890; Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 66 N.W.2d 757
(1954); Scott v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 173 Minn. 225, 217 N.W. 136 (1927);
Swallow v. Strong, 83 M nn. 87, 85 N.W. 942 (1901).
The description of the realty need only provide "an adequate guide to
locate and identify the property in the light of the surrounding circum-
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Application of these requirements has varied somewhat. In
some cases the court has taken a rigid approach, holding memoranda inadequate for slight technical defects, even though it was
apparent that in fact a contract had been made.8 In other cases,
however, the court has been more liberal, i.e., more inclined to
accept memoranda which, though not technically perfect, gave
some assurance that a contract had been completed and that its
terms were sufficiently established.7 In a recent case, the court
indicated a definite trend toward greater willingness to pierce technical defenses in order to reach an equitable result, as evidenced
by its viewpoint that "this court ... will not apply the statute
in a rigid manner whereby it becomes a technical shield behind
which nonperformance may be justified.""
Until the instant case, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had strictly maintained the position that an offer for the sale of
land must be accepted in writing in order to avoid the Statute of
Frauds. 9 In discarding such a mechanical doctrine, the Radke
court stressed that the Statute does not require the entire contract
stances ... ." Doyle v. Wohlrabe, supra at 111, 66 N.W.2d at 761. The general
terms of the contract must appear with reasonable certainty. Id. at 110.
6. See Holliday v. Hubbard, 45 Minn. 333, 47 N.W. 1134 (1891); Taylor v.
Allen, 40 Minn. 483, 42 N.W. 292 (1889); George v. Conhaim, 38 Minn. 38,
37 N.W. 791 (1888).
7. In D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307, 25 N.W. 606 (1885), a
memorandum stating the consideration as "for value received" was considered
adequate. Likewise, "credit given and to be given" was considered adequate in
Midland Natl Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W. 851
(1924). See generally Kingsley, Some Comments on the Section of the Minne-

sota Statute of Frauds Relating to Contracts, 14 MIN. L. Rsv. 746, 759-60
(1930).
In Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276, 30 N.W. 880 (1886), the court defined
the test of adequate "subscription" as whether or not the offeror intended to
authenticate the document, saying, "If signed by the grantee's authority, or
adopted by him as his signature, although written by another, it is a sufficient
signing by the grantor." See also Annot., 171 A.L.R. 334 (1947); RESTATETENT, CONTRACTS § 210 (1932); 34 Mn- . L. REv. 277 (1950); 16 Mnw-i.
L.
Rnv. 325 (1932).
Only the vendor need sign. Krohn v. Dustin, 142 Minn. 304, 172 N.W. 213
(1919); Gregory Co. v. Shapiro, 125 Minn. 81, 145 N.W. 791 (1914); Wilson v.
Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139 N.W. 817 (1913); Western Land Ass'n v. Banks, 80
Minn. 317, 83 N.W. 192 (1900).
8. Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 111, 66 N.W.2d 757, 761 (1954).
9. Lake Co. v. Molan, 269 Minn. 490, 131 N.W.2d 734 (1964); Krohn v.
Dustin, 142 Minn. 804, 172 N.W. 213 (1919); Ferguson v. Trovaten, 94 Minn.
209, 102 N.W. 373 (1905); Newlin v. Hoyt, 91 Minn. 409, 98 N.W. 323 (1904);
Kileen v. Kennedy, 90 Minn. 414, 97 N.W. 126 (1903); Lanz v. McLaughlin,
14 Minn. 72 (Gil. 55) (1869).

1966]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

to be in writing, but only that there must be a memorandum as
evidence thereof. Consequently it is the task of the courts to determine the sufficiency of such a memorandum. The technical requirements of the Statute, reasoned the court, are only aids to discern
the truth, and thus should not be blindly adhered to "if they lead
to a conclusion repugnant to commonsense."' 0 Accordingly, the
court examined the letter of offer with its enclosed sketch map of
the land involved and determined it substantially satisfied the
requirements. 1 The court recognized the technical requirements
of the Statute were perhaps not literally complied with. Such
literal compliance, however, will be overlooked "if proof of the
oral contract is clear and uncontradicted."'1
In finding the necessary "clear and uncontradicted" evidence
of an oral contract, the court deemed defendant's admission of
the contract at trial "most persuasive."'13 Then the court mentioned, but did not expressly abolish or distinguish, the rule which
provides a party is not, by admitting the contract, precluded from
asserting the Statute of Frauds. 4 This rule, which has been fol10. 134 N.W.2d at 891. The court quoted from 4 WnIaISO,
§ 567A, at 20 (Sd ed. 1961):

CONTRACTS

In brief, the Statute "was intended to guard against the perils of
perjury and error in the spoken word." Therefore, if after a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the pertinent facts and all the
evidence in a particular case, the court concludes that enforcement of
the agreement will not subject the defendant to fraudulent claims, the
purpose of the Statute will best be served by holding the note or
memorandum sufficient even though it be ambiguous or incomplete.
11. The offering letter included several deficiencies from which a technically inclined court could possibly have held it inadequate: the consideration
was stated incorrectly; the land involved was vaguely described; and only a
typewritten name rather than a signature appeared.
The court's willingness to allow the oral acceptance must have surprised
both parties, since they both argued that a written acceptance was necessary.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 9-11; Brief for Respondent, pp. 10-11. In addition to
arguing he had tendered a written acceptance, plaintiff also contended that he
had done sufficient work on the land (filling low spots, planting trees, etc.) to
take the contract out of the Statute under the doctrine of part performance.
Moreover, he argued that there was an oral modification of the contract in
order to explain the discrepancy concerning the amount of consideration. Brief
for Respondent, pp. 5-12. Defendant in turn rebutted all of these arguments.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-8. The court, relying on plaintiff's admission, ignored
these issues and treated the contract as being effective as of the date plaintiff
orally accepted. The small discrepancy in consideration was not considered
significant, 134 N.W.2d at 890-91.
12. 184 N.W.2d at 891.
13. Ibid.
14. See ibid. Apparently this rule originated from a fear that defendants
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lowed in Minnesota,'5 as well as in a majority of states,"' has too
often furthered fraud by permitting a defendant to repudiate an
agreement which has been fairly entered into and is supported by
a reasonable certainty of proof.17 As a result, the rule has been
severely criticized,' 8 and some courts have entirely abolished it.' 9
Notably Minnesota's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
constitutes an express legislative directive to abandon this rule
in the area of sales of goods.20 And it would seem Radke has emasculated this rule in the area of real estate transactions almost to
the point of abandonment. It is difficult to imagine a situation
where reliance upon a party's admission could constitute a greater
element of proof of an oral contract than it did in the instant case.
Indeed it seems to be the only uncontradicted evidence of the
contract besides the information contained in defendant's written
offer.2
Although Radke involved only the situation of an uncontramight otherwise be tempted to perjure themselves by denying the contract in
order to invoke the Statute. See Stevens, supranote 4, at 360.
15. Holste v. Baker, 223 Minn. 321, 26 N.W.2d 473 (1947); Taylor v. Allen,
40 Minn. 433, 42 N.W. 992 (1889). But see Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107,
66 N.W.2d 757 (1954).
16. See Annot., 22 AL.R. 723 (1922).
17. See, e.g., Holste v. Baker, 223 Minn. 321, 26 N.W.2d 478 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Stevens, upra note 4, at 361; Rabel, The Statute of Frauds
and Comparative Legal History, 63 L.Q. RFv. 174 (1947). "[T]he true issue is
whether the oral contract was made, not whether a writing had been
executed.... [C]ourts have quite consistently held that when the first can be
decided without danger of perjury . . . they will dispense with the second."
Degnan, supra note 4, at 450. See also 2 CoRBiN, CoNRAcTs § 498 (1950);
WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 567A (3d ed. 1961).
It has been noted that the Statute is widely ignored by businessmen and
resorted to by honest parties only as an auxiliary defense to unjust actions.
Rabel, upra at 187.
19. See Trossbach v. Trossbach, 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945); Degheri
v. Carobine, 100 N.J. Eq. 493, 185 Ati. 518 (1926); Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 355
Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946).
20. Under Mrmi. STAT. § 336.2-201(8)(b), Conn. § 2-201(8)(b), a contract
which does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds is enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in
court, that a contract for sale was made. CODE § 2-201, comment 7 notes that
such an admission does not establish the contract conclusively, but is merely
evidential against the admitting party of the facts so admitted.
21. Plaintiff's testimony was also supported by evidence of a "stub abstract" which defendant furnished him, and by an acceptance letter from the
plaintiff. The stub abstract, however, would seem to be of little value as evidence to support a finding that a contract was in fact entered into. And as for
the acceptance letter, it was not uncontradicted evidence, since defendant
denied receiving it.
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dicted admission made during trial, its rationale is much broader2 2
Arguably it stands not only for the proposition that an offering
letter supported by an uncontradicted admission is a sufficient
memorandum, but also for the proposition that a similar offering
letter satisfies the Statute of Frauds whenever it clearly appears
from the available evidence that an oral contract has in fact been
completed, and thus can be enforced in accordance with its terms
without fear of fraud. The court did not speak of the admission
as essential to the sufficiency of the memorandum, but rather as
evidence which was clear and uncontradicted. Thus the instant
case would seem to be authority for upholding offering letters as
sufficient memoranda when supported by reliable evidence, even
though such evidence includes no admission.
The instant case is further evidence of the court's shift in emphasis from literal technicality to a practical determination of
whether a contract can be established without fear of fraud. As
such, Radke is a welcome decision and represents an interpretive
evolution entirely consistent with the policy underlying the
Statute of Frauds. It remains for future decisions to delineate how
far the court intends to extend its more liberal attitude.
X. STATUTES
SAFETY RE SPONSlBILITY AcT - SUBPERmITTE'S DRIVING CONSTRUED To BE WITH OWNER'S "CONSENT"

In Lange v. Potter,' plaintiffs were injured when their auto
collided with defendant's auto which was being negligently driven
by a boy friend of defendant's daughter. Although the daughter
had permission to drive her father's car, she had been expressly
22. Although the instant case involved an admission in open court, probably any judicial admission would have the same effect. Cf. Phelps v. Benson,
252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958) (admission in the pleadings). For instance, the rationale of the instant case would appear to extend to pretrial
discovery proceedings, since under MIuqN. R. Cirv. P. 26.04(2) the deponent is
protected by basically the same procedural safeguards as he would enjoy in
court.
Extrajudicial admissions pose a more serious question. Although they are
exceptions to the hearsay rule, Hierl v. McClure, 238 Minn. 335, 56 N.W.2d
721 (1953), they come closer to the fundamental policies of the Statute of
Frauds, since the witness who testifies to the admissions may be committing
perjury. The credibility of such a witness must be carefully scrutinized, and
the court must exercise considerable judicial caution in relying on such admissions. Indeed, such caution is dictated -by Radke under its standard of "clear
and uncontradicted proof."
1. 270 Milnn. 173, 132 N.W.2d 734 (1965).
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instructed on numerous occasions not to let anyone else drive the
car. Contrary to these instructions, the daughter, upon her boy
friend's insistence, relinquished the operation of the car to him.
At trial, the jury found, by special verdict, that the boy friend
was driving defendant's car without the implied consent of the
owner. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and
held, as a matter of law, that the boy friend was "operating the
vehicle with the owner's consent" within the meaning of the
Safety Responsibility Act, Minnesota Statutes section 170.54
(1961).
Prior to the passage of the Safety Responsibility Act of 1933,
the liability of an automobile owner who allowed someone else to
drive his car was limited to common law principles based upon
either a principal-agent relationship,2 or the family car doctrine.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal was held
liable for the negligence of an agent who was acting within the
scope of his employment. When applied to automobile accidents,
this theory was expanded to make the principal liable whenever a
third person negligently operated the vehicle with the acquiescence or at the direction of the agent The family car doctrine
provided that the head of a family was liable for the negligence of
any other member of the family operating the "family car" with
consent. This doctrine of liability was also expanded to make the
owner liable whenever the family car was operated negligently by
a third party, and (1) the third party had permission from a family
member, (2) that family member had permission from the owner
to drive, and (3) that family member was present.4 Neither of
2. See Kruutari v. Hageny, 75 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Mich. 1948); Thompson v. Curry, 36 Ala. App. 334, 56 So. 2d 359 (1951); Field v. Evans, 262
Mass. 315, 159 N.E. 751 (1928); Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E. 78
(1917); 5 BLASHFIELD, CYcioPFwA OF AUTOMOBmE LAw AND PRACTICm § 2911
(Perm. ed. 1954).
3. See Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab Co., 120 Minn. 868, 189 N.W. 611
(1913); Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932); Grant v.
Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927).
4. The family car doctrine is limited to the case where the automobile is
used by members of the family for the purpose intended by the head of the
household. Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N.W. 1091 (1914); King
v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (191S); Lattin, Vicarious Liability
and the Family Automobile, 26 2&mu. L. REv. 846, 851-68 (1928).
A third theory of liability is that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality; therefore, the owner is charged with responsibility for any damages caused. E.g., Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832
(Fla. 1959).
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these theories, however, was expansive enough to make the owner
liable for the negligence of a mere "borrower." 5
The Safety Responsibility Act incorporates the respondeat
superior and family car doctrines. 6 Moreover, it goes beyond the
common law to make the owner liable if anyone operates the
vehicle with his consent, including a mere borrower.7 The act provides "whenever any motor vehicle . . . shall be operated upon
any public street or highway of this state, by any person other
than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied,
the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent
of the owner of such vehicle in the operation thereof." Although
this statute expressly indicates an agency relationship, the test for
liability is not the traditional "scope of employment" or "scope
of authority," but rather "scope of consent."' Accordingly the
court in the instant case was faced with the question of whether
implied consent was given to a subpermittee, the boy friend, notwithstanding the fact that the owner had expressly instructed the
permittee, the daughter, not to let anyone else drive the car.
In finding the necessary implied consent, the court concluded
that the statutory phrase "shall be operated... with the consent
of the owner" encompasses a situation such as the instant case
where the car was "being used for a purpose intended by both
. .. [owner and his daughter.]" 9 Notwithstanding the father's restrictions, reasoned the court, the car was still being used for the
intended purpose to allow the daughter use of a car to celebrate
her birthday. Moreover, the court felt if a car owner could escape
liability by placing "secret restrictions" on the permittee, such
possible avoidance of liability would invite unwanted collusion. 10
In finding that "operation of the car" includes "use of the car
5. See Cornish v. Krever, 179 Iinn. 60, 228 N.W. 445 (1929); Mogel v.
A. W. Scott Co., 144 linn. 173, 174 N.W. 832 (1919).
6. For examples of similar statutes in other jurisdictions see R.I. Pub.
Laws 1927, ch. 1040 § 3 (now RI. STAT. § 31-33-6 (Supp. 1964); CALJ. VEHICLE
CODE, § 17150; MICH. Comp. LAws

§ 257.401

(Supp. 1956); N.Y.

VEHICLE AND

TRAfFIC LAW § 388; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-33-6 (Supp. 1964).
7. Ellingboe v. Guerin, 228 linn. 211, 36 N.W.2d 598 (1949); Anderson
v. Standard Oil Co., 204 Minn. 337, 283 N.W. 571 (1939); Flaugh v. Egan
Chevrolet, Inc., 202 Mlinn. 615, 279 N.W. 582 (1938); 21 MINN. L. REV. 823
(1937). The term "borrower" is used to mean a person using another's auto for
his own purposes, thereby excluding "uses" related to some purposes of the
owner.
IN-NESOTA DIGEST § 6515j (1954).
8. See 12 DuNNxn,
9. 270 Alinn. at 178, 132 N.W.2d at 738.
10. 270 Minn. at 178, 132 NW.2d at 737.
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for the intended purpose," the court placed considerable reliance
on certain New York and California decisions construing statutes
which base liability on consented use or operation of the owner's
car." These cases held that even if the person operating the car
does not have the consent of the owner, the owner is nonetheless
liable since the permittee is still "using" the car regardless of who
is the actual driver. 2 In relying exclusively on the statutory word
"using,"'3 the New York and California courts, in situations
similar to the instant case, imply that an owner can limit his
consent to the actual operation of his car in the technical sense of
who is the driver. Nonetheless consent to the "use" of the car
imposes no such restrictions on its mechanical operation. 4 In
contrast to the New York and California statutes, the Minnesota
statute only states that liability arises when the car is "operated"
with the consent of the owner; the words "use" or "using" do not
appear. It seems obvious that the court has construed "operation"
in the linnesota statute to be broader in scope than the technical
definition found in the New York and California cases. Indeed,
by relying on these decisions, the court apparently equates their
interpretation of the phrase "use or operation" with the term
"operation" as found in the Minnesota statute. In giving this
term such a liberal construction, the court effectuates the statute's
general purpose, which is the protection of the public.'5
11. N.Y. VEHICLE A TRAFFIC LAW § 388 (1):
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable
and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting
from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business
of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same
with the permission, express or implied, of such owner..... (Emphasis
added.)
CAL.VEHICLE CODE § 17150:
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death
of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of the owner, and the negligence of such person shall
be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages.
12. See Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal. App. 2d 892, 44 P.2d 447 (Dist. Ct. App.
1935); Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
13. E.g., Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645 (1943).
14. Withersine v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., of London, Eng.,
285 N.Y. 168, 139 N.E. 229 (1923); Wallace v. Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265
N.Y. Supp. 253 (1933); Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Misc. 595, 208 N.Y. Supp.
786 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1925) ("operate," as distinguished from "use," refers
to a personal act in working the mechanism of the car); Brown v. Kennedy,
141 Ohio St. 457, 48 N.E-2d 857 (1943), affirming 49 N.E.2d 417 (1942).
15. 270 Minn. at 178, 132 N.W.2d at 737; see also Foster v. Bock, 229
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The defendant in the instant case relied on the Minnesota case
of Foster v. Bock,"" where an owner was held liable for the negligent driving of a subpermittee. The Foster court emphasized the
fact that the permittee had been given unlimited consent as to
the operation of the car. Foster seems to suggest that had there
been terms of qualification or limitation placed on the consent
given to the permittee, a different result might have been
reached. 17 The court in the instant case avoids this suggestion by
merely stating that the statute should be liberally construed."8
The court limited its holding to the situation where the permittee, although not driving, is actually present in the car at the
time of the accident.' 9 If the permittee is not present, arguably
the owner would escape liability because the permittee would not
be "operating" the car.2 ° It seems as persuasive to argue, however,
that if the car is still being used for the consented purpose, then
the permittee is "operating" the car even though not actually
present.2 ' Granted the permittee would not directly control the
mechanical operation of the car; but he would still have control
over who would drive and for what purpose.
Although the court held that the owner may not restrict the
manner of operation of his car when he relinquishes it to another,
it is still open for him to restrict his consent to use for some
specific purpose. Thus when the intended purpose of the owner
is deviated from, he is not liable because the permittee has gone
beyond the scope of consent.2 2 But even in this situation perhaps
Minn. 428, 89 N.W.2d 862 (1949); Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215
linn. 394, 10 N.W.Rd 406 (1943); Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., 201 Minn.
44, 275 N.W. 416 (1937); Steinle v. Beckwith, 198 Minn. 424, 270 N.W. 189

(1986).
16. 229 Minn. 428, 89 N.W.2d 862 (1949).
17. "The word 'use' is a term which, in the absence of qualifying words
or circumstances, involves a broad consent as to the manner in which a car
is to be operated on the highway." Foster v. Bock, 229 Minn. 428, 433, 89
N.W.2d 862, 866 (1949). (Emphasis added.) From this language, the Foster
court infers by negative implication that an automobile owner can limit
consent given as to the operation of his car.
18. 270 Minn. at 178, 132 N.W.2d at 737.
19. Id. at 178, 132 N.W.2d at 788.
20. See 21 MIN. L. REv. 823, 832 (1937).
21. See Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861
(1943), in which the owner was held liable when a friend of his son was driving
the car and the son was not present in the car.
22. See Carlson v. Fredsall, 228 Minn. 461, 37 N.W.2d 744 (1949), where
the owner loaned his car to his brother who allowed a third party to use it
for his own purposes. The owner was held not liable because the permittee
was not in the car, and the use by the subpermittee was foreign to the purpose
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a car owner should be liable for injuries due to negligent operation
of his car. Just as in the instant case the father could have known,
or should have known, that his daughter might let another person drive, an owner should expect that one who has his consent
to operate his car for some specific purpose might deviate from
that purpose. The owner is certainly in a better position to provide adequate insurance protection than is the innocent injured
party. And since it is the owner who relinquished his car in the
first place, perhaps he should be held to an absolute duty to select
24
only competent and responsible parties to drive or use his car.
It would seem, however, that imposing strict liability or absolute
financial responsibility2 5 on car owners for any negligent operation
of their cars,2 6 even if outside the scope of consent, would go beyond the language of the present Safety Responsibility Act. Thus,
legislative action might well be merited so as to create absolute
financial responsibility of auto owners for the protection of the
general public.
of the owner. It is not clear which of these -twojustifications was primary, but
the court held that when both were present, the owner was not liable.
2.. See generally BATY, VcAmous LTABmrrY 146-54 (1916); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YArn L.J. 584 (1929);
Lasld, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YA E L.J. 105 (1916).
24. Arguably, the car owner should not be held liable for the negligence
of commercial garages to which he entrusts his car for service or repair.
However, cases under a statute similar to Minnesota's have held him liable.
Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d s44 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Jones v. King, 113 F.2d
522 (D.C. iCir. 1940). See also Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112
So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959) (something resembling conversion or theft needed to
relieve owner).
25. Although liability insurance is readily available, Minnesota does not
require financial responsibility until after a person has had an accident.

Drivers' licenses are automatically revoked if the driver does not have
liability coverage or cannot prove his financial responsibility by other means

after an accident. Liability insurance acquired after the accident does not
affect the driver's prior responsibility, of course, but it does serve as one
type of proof of future financial responsibility -one

of the prerequisites to

reissuance of a driver's license. See Munw. STAT. §§ 170.21, .25, .33, .37, .40, .45

(1961).
Notably, most car owners are insured with policies containing an omnibus
clause which covers a situation such as the instant case. Although omnibus
clauses are given effect, they are not required in policies written in the state.
E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 164 F. Supp. 393 (D.
Minn. 1958); Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 232 N.W. 790 (1930).

26. See generally Bergan, A Thesis on Motor Vehicle Liability Without
Fault,28 ALB-rr L. REv. 199 (1964).
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XI. TAXATION
A.

CounT ATTEMPTS To CLARIFY UNIFORMATY REQUIREM MNTS
FOR PROPERTY ASSESSmNTS

Minnesota's statutory system of real estate taxation provides
that all taxable real property should be assessed on the basis of
its market value.' Notwithstanding this seemingly simple requirement of tax assessment, and contrary to the law, tax assessors
from the various subdivisions of local government have generally
determined the basis for real property taxation by assessing at a
fraction of market value. Although subject to the discretion and
well-intentioned idiosyncracies of multitudinous local assessing
officials, this method has long been condoned by all three
branches of state government. Consequently unequal and discriminatory assessment valuations have been established throughout
the state. A private remedy is available to correct such inequalities between the taxpayers who must share the cost of government. This remedy, contained in chapter 278 of the Minnesota
Statutes, enables individual taxpayers to obtain an equitable
adjustment of any unfair valuation by court action and a concomitant recovery of any excess which has been paidY
Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State4 involved a chapter 278 proceeding in which certain owners of real property in the city of Duluth
petitioned for property tax refunds. They alleged the existence
of discriminatory assessments on their property upon which city,
school district, county, and state mill rates had been applied. The
city assessing officials had assigned valuations to their properties
varying from 68 to 90 per cent of market value. The standard
1. lmN. STAT. A-Nw. § 273.08 (Supp. 1964) requires the assessors to assess
all real property at its "true and full value." This value is defined by Mum.
STAT. § 273.11 (1961) to be the value attributable to the property if sold on
the open market.
2. According to a study made in 1956, there were approximately 2,700
assessing officials in Mfinnesota. 270 Mfinn. at 20, 132 N.W.2d at 407, citing
GOVERNOR'S MINNESOTA TAX STUDY CoAnMITTEE, 1956 REPORT 156.
3. M x. STAT. § 278.01 (1961) provides: "Any person having any estate
...
who claims that such property has been partially, unfairly, or unequally
assessed... may have the validity of his claim.., determined by the district
court of the county in which the tax is levied. .. ." And MmN. STAT. § 278.12
(1961) further provides: "If upon final determination the petitioner has paid
more than the amount so determined to be due, judgment shall be entered
in favor of the petitioner for such excess .... "
4. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 294 (1964).
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ratio of valuation generally applied by the city assessor was 30
per cent for residential and 40 per cent for commercial property
In comparison, the prevailing standard ratio in other communities of the county was as low as 20 per cent. The trial court
held the assessment valuations placed on petitioners' properties
discriminatory and ordered a refund of taxes paid on the portion
of any assessment valuations in excess of the 20 per cent countywide standard. On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed
that the assessment valuations were discriminatory, but held
that the standard ratio for determining the amount of refund
should have been 30 per cent. The court determined this to be
the lowest percentage of market value applied to other property
within the city of Duluth.
Prior to 1959 under Minnesota law a taxpayer had no standing to seek judicial relief for discriminatory assessments unless his
property had been assigned an assessment valuation greater than
its market value, even though other property in the area had been
assigned valuations which were considerably less than market
value.6 In the 1959 decision of Hamm v. State,7 however, the Minnesota court overruled this principle. It held that unconstitutional
discrimination exists, for which judicial relief may be granted,
whenever properties within a taxing district have been assigned
valuations at substantially different rates, regardless of whether
any valuations were in excess of market value." However, Hamm
did not determine what constitutes the "taxing district" throughout which valuation rates must be uniform, nor did it resolve the
issue of the measure of relief to be granted in a chapter 278 pro5. In fact, most Duluth property has not been assessed on the basis of a
standard ratio of market value. This method was introduced in 1956 and has
since been applied only to newly assessed properties. Before 1956 properties
were assessed by a comparison with similar properties in the same area
already having an assessment valuation. This method of assessment was
mainly reponsible for the unequal treatment of properties in Duluth, including that in the instant case. See Record, pp. 29-32, 104-05, 110-11, 157-60.
6. See State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 103 Minn. 419, 115 N.W. 645 (1908).
7. 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
8. In overruling the Cudahy decision, the Hamm court reasoned that such
a rule violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and Min. CONST. art. 9, § 1, which provides that taxes "shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects .

. . ."

In Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota

County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), the United States Supreme Court held that
where plaintiff's property was assessed at 100% of its market value while
other property in the county was assessed at 55%, the plaintiff was being
unconstitutionally discriminated against.
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ceeding. Dultan is the first case in which the court expressly considered these issues.'
In holding that the appropriate taxing distrct throughout
which assessment valuations must be uniform is the local governmental unit, i.e., the city, town, etc., the court differed with the
trial court's determination specifying the county as the appropriate unit. The trial court reasoned that neither the legislature
nor the supreme court expressly established the proper unit. The
facts that the counties are responsible for coordinating assessments, for compiling the composite mill rate from the component
mill rates of the local units, and for collecting taxes suggest them
as the appropriate taxing districts. 10 In rejecting this reasoning
the court argued, in the absence of statutory authority designating
the county as the proper unit, the local municipal unit is more
appropriate since county coordination of assessments does not
extend to cities of the first class." Further, while cities, villages,
and towns are referred to as taxing districts in various statutes,
nowhere is the county referred to as such. Accordingly the court
ordered a refund of taxes based on the amount of assessment
exceeding the "lowest percentage . . .applied to other property
within .. .Duluth .. .which the record indicates was 30 per-

cent." 12
The court's use of 30 per cent as the lowest percentage of valuation applied to Duluth property is somewhat confusing, since the
record apparently indicates that during the two years in question
some properties within the city were valued as low as roughly 3
per cent of their market value.' 3 The 30 per cent figure is thus
apparently the lowest percentage Tegularly applied to an appraised value, rather than the lowest percentage of market value
at which any property in the city had in fact been assessed.'
9. The court also considered the question whether assessors have the
authority to create classifications of property to which they can apply different

percentages of market value. The court held that such classifications could
not be undertaken in the absence of legislative authority. 270 linn. at 22,

132 N.W.2d at 409.
10. Record, pp. 231-33.
11. See 270 Mlinn. at 17-18, 132 N.W.2d at 406.
12. 270 -inn.at 21, 182 N.W.2d at 408.
13. During a 1960 reassessment conducted in a certain area of Duluth, it
was necessary to raise the assessment of some property as much as 1400%
in order to reach the standard rate. Record, p. 152. Consequently during
1958-59 this property must have been assessed at approximately 3% of
market value.
14. See Record, pp. 115-16.
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Assuming the court was aware of these facts," it would seem
there is only one way to interpret its measure of relief. That is,
when the court granted relief measured by the "lowest percentage
...applied to other property,"' 6 it meant only a percentage applied by assessors to an appraised value, and not the lowest percentage of market value at which property had been assessed
under the prior method. 17 Indeed, this interpretation would be
consistant wth the court's concern about the threat of financial
chaos to various governmental units.' s Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the measure of relief granted by other
courts which have been confronted by similar situations. 9
It would seem reasonable to infer, however, that the court was
unaware of any valuation lower than 30 per cent since it considered 30 per cent to be the lowest valuation at which any Duluth
property actually had been assessed. 0 Moreover, use of the lowest percentage regularly applied would be directly contrary to
the court's analysis in the Hamm decision. In Hamm the court
concluded that discriminatory and unconstitutional taxation
exists whenever property other than the petitioner's has been
valued at a substantially lower percentage, even though petitioner's property has not been valued above the average. 2'
15. The fact that 80% was not the lowest percentage at which property
had been assessed can be found in Brief for Respondent, pp. 10-11.
16. 270 Minn. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408. (Emphasis added.)
17. See note 5 supra, for a brief discussion of two different methods of
assessing property.
18. In favoring the city over the county as the taxing district, the court
cautioned,
to now adopt the lowest percentage of market value used by any
assessor in St. Louis County as the basis for equalization of the taxes
levied on property within the city of Duluth... most certainly would
result in a chaotic situation as to revenues required for the operation of
various units of our state government.
270 Minn. at 21, 182 N.W.2d at 408.
The court also cited Southern Pac. Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 377
P.2d 770 (1963), in which a railroad, whose property was assessed at a greater
percentage than average, was denied a refund for the sole reason that to
grant such a refund would cause financial ruin to certain governmental units.
See 270 Tfim. at 21 n.20, 132 N.W.2d at 408 n.20.
19. E.g., In re Kents, 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763
(1961); Baken Park, Inc. v. County of Pennington, 79 S.D. 156, 109 N.W.2d
898 (1961).
20. Nowhere in Dulton does the court mention that some property in
Duluth had been assessed at less than 30%. Indeed, the court stated that
within the city of Duluth "assessors arbitrarily based their appraisals on
percentages of market value ranging between 30 per cent and 90.3875 percent
thereof .... ."270 Minn. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
21. Notably, no other courts have been as generous in granting relief as
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Where wide differences exist in the valuation rates of a taxing
district, perhaps Dutton will provide the necessary impetus for
local assessors to raise valuations which are substantially lower
than the regularly applied rate. If local assessing officials fail to
act, however, the resulting flood of refund petitions could result
in a significant loss of tax revenue and a corresponding period of
financial uncertainty. 22 For example, adoption of the 3 per cent
valuation indicated by the record in the instant case would probably entitle nearly every Duluth taxpayer to a tax refund.
i in a future case the court is confronted with the problem of
whether to grant complete relief to a petitioner who alleges that
other property in his taxing district is valued much lower than
the ratio generally applied, the following solution is suggested.
The court can require relief to be based on such a low valuation
unless within a certain time period the assessing officials raise the
valuation of the substantially undervalued properties to the
percentage level regularly appliedPa If the local assessors were to
respond by conducting such a revaluation, relief could justifiably
be based upon the usual percentage of valuation. This solution
would tend to eliminate the discriminatory effect of very low valuations without precipitating a flood of petitions for tax refunds.
Because school districts in many areas of the state overlap
county lines, and municipalities often lie within more than one
county, the court pointed out that designating the county as the
taxing district would lead to inequality between residents of the
same local district who live in different counties. The court recognized, however, that its decision to use the municipality as the
in the instant case. See, e.g., Robinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 216 Ore. 532,
339 P.2d 432 (1959) (no lowering, assessment comparable to similar, but not
all, properties); In re Kents, 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d
763 (1961), (relief should be based on average percentage of market value

used).
22. By the middle of 1965 almost 300 petitions had already been filed in
Hennepin County alone, many by large taxpayers. Minneapolis Star, June 2,
1965, p. 1A, col. 8. In Duluth alone the cases awaiting disposition could mean
refunds of more than $1,000,000. Minneapolis Star, Jan. 26, 1965, p. 3A, col. 3.
23. Support for this solution can be found in the dicta of Township of
Hilisborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946), where the Court stated:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the
same class. The right is the right to equal treatment. He may not complain if equality is achieved by increasing the same taxes of other members of the class to the level of his own. The constitutional requirement,
however, is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the discrimination.
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taxing district may also be somewhat inequitable 4 Perhaps the
method employed by the supreme court is better than that of the
trial court since normally municipal and school district mill rates
are a substantially larger percentage of the composite mill rate
than is the county mill rate 5 But the court's method of equalizing
valuations inherently remains inequitable in reference to the portion of tax assessment which applies to county taxes. Thus, neither
the arguments for the city nor for the county as taxing district
are entirely convincing.
Nevertheless, the court rejected an amicus curiae proposal
which it conceded to be a sound recommendation that "would
lessen many of the difficulties and much of the confusion now
present in the matter of tax equalization . ..*.
"26 This proposal
would treat each taxing district as a separate unit for purposes of
applying an assessment valuation, and correspondingly would
compute the amount of tax for each unit separately. Thus, if the
total tax consists of levies by more than one taxing district, the
mill rate of each district would be applied to the lowest assessment valuation prevailing in that district. 7 The court rejected
24. See 270 Minn. at 17, 21-22, 132 N.W.2d at 406, 408.
25. In Duiton the boundaries of the city and school district coincided, and
the assessments for these two units constituted approximately three-fourths of
the tax levy. In a case involving the assessment of rural property, however,
using the township rather than the county as the taxing district might result
in equal assessments for only a small percentage of the entire levy.
26. 270 Minn. at 23, 132 N.W.2d at 409.
27. A detailed explanation of this proposal can be found in Brief for
Harry C. Hamm as Amicus Curiae, pp. 12-17, Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State,
270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964). It is summarized by the court as follows:
In a proceeding brought under Minnesota Statutes c. 278 where the
total tax imposed upon the property subject to the petition consists of
a levy by more than one taxing district the levy by each such taxing
district for the purposes of the proceeding shall be treated as a separate tax and the amount of each computed separately. If it is found that
there has been discrimination against petitioner with respect to any
such tax the amount of such tax to be imposed upon petitioner's property with respect to such taxing district shall be determined in the following manner regardless of whether such taxing district includes property in one or more assessor's districts: The amount of the tax to be
imposed upon petitioner's property for each such taxing district shall be
ascertained by applying the mill rate used by the county auditor with
respect to the taxes levied by such taxing district for the year in question to an assessed value of petitioner's property determined by first
applying the lowest standard of assessment (regardless of kind or class
of property to which applicable) prevailing in the taxing district, or,
if there is no standard of assessment prevailing in such district, then
the lowest ratio of assessment applied to property of any kind or class
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this apparently sound remedial solution because it felt such a
solution could not be adopted without specific legislative authority. Since it would seem that the court has the power to formulate whatever remedy is appropriate to afford the most equitable
relief, perhaps this rejection was unnecessary. Indeed, this is
the traditional role of an equitable proceeding. Since, as the
court expressly stated, statewide uniformity is contemplated by
constitutional law, s the use of either the city or the county as the
taxing district will not provide as high a degree of tax equalization as can be effected by the proposal of the amicus curiae.
Furthermore, such designation of the city, county, or any other
local governmental unit is without express legislative authority.
It would seem that if the court could designate the city or county
as the proper taxing district, it could properly have adopted the
proposal of the amicus curiae. The court did not have to legislate
to accept this proposal. Rather, it only had to define a case by
case method for computing relief which would most effectively
eliminate discriminatory valuations 9 In fact, the proposed
in said district to the market value of petitioner's property, and by then
applying thereto the class rate required by § 272.13, Minnesota Statutes.
The judgment entered shall show the total tax to be imposed upon
petitioner's property and if the total tax consists of levies by more than
one taxing district, it shall show the tax to be imposed upon petitioner's
property as determined by the court separately for the levy of each such
taxing district.
270 Nfnn. at 22-23 n.21, 132 N.W.2d at 409 n.21.
For purposes of illustrating this formula, assume that it is being applied to
a piece of Duluth property worth $10,000 which is being assessed at 40% of
full and true value.
Full and true value by school and city district standards:
equals $3,000
i.e., 30% of market value (.30 x $10,000)
Assessed value for city and school levies:
i.e., 40% of full and true (.40 x $3,000)
equals $1,200
Full and true value by county district standards:
i.e., 20% of market value (.20 x $10,000)
equals $2,000
Assessed value for county and state levies:
equals $800
i.e., 40% of full and true (.40 x $2,000)
A literal interpretation of this formula would require the state levy to be
applied to a statewide ratio rather than to the countywide ratio. The state
mill rate, however, is such a small part of the whole levy in the instant case
that it can be considered de minimus. See Brief for Harry C. Hamm as
Amicus Curiae, supra p. 16.
28. 270 Minn. at 17, 182 N.W.2d at 406.
29. Ops. Alum. ATT'Y GEN. 4 (Feb. 25, 1965) states the courts should only
grant relief to taxpayers on a case by case basis. The amicus curiae proposal
was precisely such a method. The court was asked only to use the proposed
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method is arguably already supported by judicial authority3
The court's plea for legislative action 3 ' seems to indicate an
awareness that its remedy in the instant case will not entirely
eliminate the "confusion and inequality now present. 32 Since the
legislature has failed to respond to the court's plea for action, it is
hoped that when a similar case arises in the future, the court will
grant a more complete remedy such as that proposed by the
amicus curiae.
B.

DETERmNATION

oF UNiTARY, MuLTISTATE Bvsmss FoR

PuRPosEs oF NET INcomE TAx ALLOCATmON
Minnesota, like other states, has encountered inherent difficulties in attempting to tax business profits on the basis of income
producing activities carried on or conducted by a taxpayer within
the state.' If a trade or business is conducted wholly within the
formula as a means of computing relief for the individual petitioners, not to
establish it as a basis for levying taxes.

so.
Generally the nature of the case will itself conclusively fix the tax
district. For example, if the tax is to pay general state expenses, the
whole state will be the taxing district. If it be to pay the general
expenses of a county or city, the whole county or city, respectively,
will be the taxing district .... Taxing districts may be as numerous
as the purposes for which the taxes are levied; and it is not essential
that the political divisions of the state shall be the same as the taxing
districts, but special districts may be established for special purposes,
wholly ignoring the lines of the political subdivisions of the state. It is
compulsory that these political subdivisions shall be regarded in taxation only where the tax itself is for a purpose specially pertaining to
one of them in its political capacity.
Maltby v. Tautges, 50 Minn. 248, 252--53, 52 N.W. 858, 859-60 (1892); cf.
Village of Robbinsdale v. County of Hennepin, 199 Minn. 203, 271 N.W. 491
(1937).
31. The Dulton court suggested that the legislature could enact a statute
specifying a definite number of years during which assessing officials would
be required to use a fixed percentage of market value and after which they
would be required to use 100% of market value. 270 Minn. at 21-22, 132
N.W.2d at 408. Bills were introduced in the legislature in response to the
court's urging, but none of them passed. See Minnesota Taxpayer's Ass'n
Legis. Bull., April 26, 1965, at H5-H7 & S7.
32. 270 Minn. at 21-22, 132 N.W.2d at 408.
1. See generally Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S.
113, 121 (1920); ALTMAN & KEESLwG, ALLOCATION OF INCOmE n STATE
TAxAmoN 89-127 (1946); Note, Developments in the Law-FederalLimitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HAtv. L. REV. 953, 1010-18
(1962).
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state, income derived from it is assigned to Minnesota under
:Minnesota Statutes section 290.17(3) (1961). If the business is
wholly without the state, income is assigned to other states. If,
however, a trade or business is carried on partly within and partly
without the state, income taxable to Minnesota is determined by
subtracting allowable deductions from the gross income of the
business, wherever derived, and apportioning the remaining net
income on the basis of statutory formulas prescribed in section
290.19(1).2 These formulas are based upon three factors- the
ratios of property, payroll, and sales within Minnesota to total
property, payroll, and sales. It is further provided that an improper reflection of income assignable to Minnesota under the
three-factor formulas may be corrected by use of a single factor
formula based on gross receipts or the separate accounting
method.' The prescribed methods shall apply "wherever and in
so far as the business carried on within this state is an integral
part of a business carried on both within and without this state.! 4
With respect to multistate businesses, problems arise in determining whether the Minnesota taxpayer is conducting separate
and distinct businesses wholly within and wholly without the
state, or whether he is conducting a single business partly within
and partly without the state. The potential impact of this determination upon a taxpayer is readily apparent. If the profitability
of his Minnesota business activities varies substantially from the
profitability of his operations as a whole, income taxable determined by use of the three-factor apportionment formula will vary
accordingly from taxable income determined by use of separate
accounting.
Application of these statutory provisions has turned on the
question of whether the taxpayer is conducting a "unitary business," in the sense that "operations conducted in one state benefit
and are in turn benefited by the operations conducted in another
state or states."5 This question was considered by the Minnesota
2. Mxxw. STiT. .§ 290.17(4) (1061).
3. Mi r. STAT. § 290.19(1)(2)(b) (1961).
4. AIVNW. STAT. § 290.19(2) (1961).

5. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 245 Minn. 346,
355, 71 N.W.2d 797, 804 (1955). See generally ALTmAN & KE sLnG, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 100.
Historically, the unitary business concept developed in response to assertions that states, by apportioning the net income of multistate businesses, were
attempting to tax extraterritorial values in violation of the due process clause.
It was first applied to railroads on the basis of the physical unity evidenced by
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court in two recent decisions involving multistate businesses.
In MauriceL. Rothschild & Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation,'
taxpayer operated three department stores in Illinois and three in
Minnesota. The Minnesota stores had their own purchasing
office and merchandise managers and buyers, and each store
handled its own merchandising, accounting and personnel problems. However, the management of the Illinois and Minnesota
stores frequently consulted on overall policy and the movement
of items of merchandise. Slow moving items occasionally were
shipped to other stores for faster disposition. All stores carried
the same basic lines of men's and women's clothing and men's
shoes, and no brand name was changed without approval of all
the officers. The Minnesota Board of Tax Appeals found that
volume purchasing benefited each store through price concessions, faster service on reorders and greater advertising allowances by the manufacturer. These factors, plus unity of ownership, were held sufficient to sustain the Board's finding that taxpayers operated a unitary business subject to income apportionment.
The Rothschild decision extends the unitary business concept
beyond its previous reach in Minnesota. In prior cases relied upon
by the court, benefits from centralized organization were more
apparent. For example, in Walgreen Co. v. Commissioner of
continuous track. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S.
682 (1936); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894);
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875). Express and steamship cornpanies were 'brought within the unitary business rationale on the theory that
there was a unit of use. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor,
165 U.S. 194 (1897). Later, under the theory that there is a "going concern
value attributable to the high rate of return earned by reason of central ownership and management," Watson, Allocation of Business Income for State
Income Tax Purposes, 25 Mxmw. L. REv. .851, 863 (1941), the net income of
firms engaged in manufacturing and selling was apportioned on the basis of
factors such as property, sales, and payroll, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920). Finally, centralized wholesale and retail
sales activities were considered unitary businesses subject to income apportionment. This result was justified on the ground that sales in each state contributed to the firm's net income through price concessions attributable to
volume purchasing. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. MeColgan, 815 U.S. 501 (1942);
Walgreen Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 258 Minm 522, 104 N.W.2d 714
(1960). Thus, even where sales in a single state are made at a loss, the
propriety of apportioning net income may not 'be impeached by reference to
separate accounting principles. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, ,upra.
6. 270 Minn. 245, 18 N.W.2d 524 (1965).
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Taxation,7 the taxpayer operated a nine-state retail drugstore
business with a central office in Chicago. It also had centralized
facilities for warehousing, personnel training and accounting. In
Western Auto Supply Co.v. Commissioner of Taxation," taxpayer
operated 257 retail stores in thirty states and the District of
Columbia, with centralized management offices, purchasing and
personnel departments, and warehouse facilities. These cases,
unlike Rothschild, can be considered within the rationale of Butler
Bros. v. McColgan.9 There the United States Supreme Court
stated, with respect to a corporation operating wholesale merchandise stores in several states: "the operation of a central buying division alone demonstrates that functionally the various
branches are closely integrated."'
Whether the functional integration cited in Butler Bros. was
keyed to centralized organization of the firm, it seems clear that
the :Nfinnesota court correctly read the case for a broader proposition. The significant point is, absent proof to the contrary, a
state is justified in assuming that sales at each branch store contribute to cost savings, and hence to total income since more
favorable prices are likely to be obtained by purchasing for all
stores in the chain than by purchasing separately for the account
of any one branch." Since this saving may be effected with or
without centralized facilities, a state need not key its test of
unitariness to the firm's physical organization. It may look instead
for economic evidence of mutual interdependence and benefit.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation,'2 taxpayer was
7. 258 Myinn. 522, 104 N.W.2d 714 (1960).
8. 245 Ainn.346, 71 N.W.2d 797 (1955).
9. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
10. Id. at 508. In Butler Bros., taxpayer attacked the constitutionality of
California's allocation of income on the ground that it "attributed to California income derived wholly from business done without that State." Id. at
504. The Court responded by stating that "unity of use and management of
a business which is scattered through several States may be considered when a
State attempts to impose a tax on an apportionment basis." Id. at 508. The
facts supporting the finding of unitariness in Butler Bros. are relevant to the
question of statutory interpretation raised in Rothschild because the same
issue of unitariness is posed by the Minnesota statute. The MYinnesota court
has not taken the position that the taxing statute is coextensive with the
limits of state power to tax under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351,
131 N.W.2d 632 (1964).
11. 315 U.S. at 508-09.
12. 269 Minn. 351, 131 N.W.2d 632 (1964).
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engaged in two activities- the production, which included the
gathering and sale of crude oil and natural gas, and manufacturing, which included the refining of crude oil and the marketing of
resulting refined products and related accessories. Only refining
and marketing activities took place in Minnesota. Taxpayer's
production and manufacturing departments were operated independently, although both were serviced by its administrative departments. Most of the production department's crude oil was
sold to other refiners, and most of the manufacturing department's
crude oil came from other producers; less than ten per cent of the
crude oil produced by the taxpayer found its way into pipelines
servicing taxpayer's refineries. Transfers of crude oil from the
production department to the manufacturing department were
recorded by the taxpayer at posted field prices, which were found
to be bona fide competitive prices not subject to manipulation.
The Board of Tax Appeals found that taxpayer's business of producing was separate from that of manufacturing, but determined
that the businesses were integrated "to the extent that production goes into marketing activities .... ."" Accordingly, the
Board's order included in income subject to apportionment by
Minnesota that portion of production income represented by the
ratio of crude oil transfered to taxpayer's refineries to total sales
of crude oil. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Board's finding that the two businesses were separate precluded apportionment of any production income to Minnesota.
The Skelly decision proceeded from a more mechanical inquiry
than that required by the mutual benefit test. A unitary business,
the court reasoned, could only be understood to mean a single
business, and this could not be the case in light of the finding4
that production and manufacturing were separate businesses.2
The court emphasized taxpayer's assertions that "production income was 'fully earned' at the point where the crude oil was available for sale or transfer at a posted field price"1 5 and that this
income was "neither more nor less than what it would be if Skelly
had no refineries ...."16
The same assertions might be made with respect to a firm
which transferred all crude oil produced by it to its own refineries,
yet the customary practice would be to consider such a firm
13. Quoted id. at 362, 131 N.W.2d at 640.
14. Id. at 370, 131 N.W.2d at 644.
15. Id. at 370-71, 131 N.W.2d at 645.
16. Id. at 878, 11 N.W.2d at 646.
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unitary for purposes of allocating income. 17 The Board's order,
therefore, appears to recognize this practice and the statutory
language applying apportionment "wherever and in so far as the
business carried on within this state is an integral part of a business carried on both within and without this state."' 8
In defense of the Skelly decision it may be argued that the need
for income apportionment is lacking where the price of products
sold by the manufacturing department can be allocated between
production and manufacturing by reference to a posted competitive price for the crude oil. In other words, the competitive price
structure for crude oil in Skelly facilitates separate treatment of
production and manufacturing income, although it does not compel such treatment. Further, by excluding production income from
income apportionable to Minnesota, the court may have avoided
problems of multiple taxation. 9 Its decision also may have the
salutary effect of simplifying tax reports, thereby alleviating another of the major burdens upon businesses subject to taxation by
several states.2 0
Reading the Skelly and Rothschild decisions together, it would
appear that the court has placed itself in the somewhat anomolous
position of demanding stronger proof of vertical business integra17. See Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Bass,
Ratclifi & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); United States
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
18. M NN. STAT. § 290.19(2) (1961). (Emphasis added.)
19. Producing states imposed taxes on Skelly's entire production income
earned within their borders as measured by the posted field prices. 269 Mlnmn.
at 358, 131 N.W.2d at 637. Although overlapping measures of net income may
not invalidate state taxes, see Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-63 (1959); Note, 75 HARv. L. REV.953, 1013-15
(1962), Minnesota's failure to tax production income takes into account the
reality of taxpayer's situation.
20. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra
note 19, at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Skelly, for example, evidence
indicated that the posted field prices were determinative of taxable income in
production states, of fair market value for purposes of state severance or
production taxes, of allowable depletion deductions under the Internal Revenue Code, and of production shares for royalty owners. 269 Minn. at 858, 131
N.W.2d at 637. Thus the taxpayer's books and records necessarily divided
production and manufacturing operations on the basis of the posted field
prices. While results of a taxpayer's accounting system may not be used to
impeach the validity or propriety of a state's apportionment formula, Butler
Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1942), the burden to a taxpayer of
preparing additional records for tax returns may be considered by a court in
deciding whether to impose a different accounting system upon the taxpayer.
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tion than of horizontal business integration. In the former case
unitariness may be based upon some minimal benefit flowing from
size, whereas in the latter case physical separation of operations
and a well defined standard for determining the profit of each
operation likely will preclude a finding of unitariness. This distinction appears to be without merit -particularly if the Skelly
rationale is extended beyond the facts of that case to include the
more typical forms of vertical integration. First, separate accounting is no more suitable for allocating the income and expenses
of a vertically integrated firm whose various activities culminate
in the sale of products than it is for allocating the income and
expenses of a horizontally integrated firm selling products through
several branches. 1 In neither case does separate accounting reflect
the value which may be added to each operation or unit by property, payroll, and sales in other areas of the business. Moreover,
although the operating experience of various branches of a horizontally integrated firm may fluctuate from year to year, the tax
revenues of each state involved are likely to balance over a period
of years regardless of the method of apportioning income. 22
Branches of a vertically integrated firm, however, are likely to
have permanently different operating experiences. For example,
sales operations may be consistently credited with a greater profit
than manufacturing operations despite a greater proportionate
investment of property and payroll in the latter. Thus, separate
accounting will not strike a proper revenue balance between industrial states and market states. To remedy this situation, states
should recognize the unitary nature of vertically integrated businesses at least as readily as they recognize the unitary nature of
horizontally integrated businesses.
21. See AL m"x & KaSLiNG, op. cit. supra note 1, at ch. V; Note, 75 HAnv.
L. R v. 953 (1962).
22. In Rothschild the taxpayer contended the Minnesota apportionment
formula did not properly reflect income attributable to Minnesota for that
year due to an abnormal insurance recovery for a fire in one of the Chicago
stores. This abnormal recovery of some $300,000 represented the difference
between the actual cost basis used by the negotiators in effecting a settlement with the insurance company for goods damaged and destroyed and the
depreciated inventory basis used in taxpayer's accounting system. The court
properly held, however, that the test of unitariness is not whether the operating experience of the parts of a business is the same in all places, but whether
the parts are of mutual benefit to one another. 270 Minn. at 252-53, 133
N.W.2d at 529. It was further held that the Commissioner did not abuse his
discretion in disallowing taxpayer's petition filed pursuant to Al.um. STAT.
§ 290.19(1)(2)(b) (1961) -a relief provision which permits the Commissioner
to determine net income by another method if the three-factor formula is
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It may be argued that the Skelly decision could be limited in
such a way as to minimize the force of the preceding analysis.
The more typical forms of vertical integration, such as manufacture, distribution and sale of a line of products bearing the
firm's identifying mark at all stages, would be considered evidence
of a unitary business, while the Skelly treatment would remain
available for firms dealing in succession stages with a completely
fungible product bearing no brand identification until final sale,
provided the firm's products were used interchangeably with those
of competing firms at each stage.
This argument, however, goes only to the issue of administrative convenience. The competitive exchange of products at
each stage of operations establishes a convenient standard for
determining the profit attributable to each operation, but it does
not preclude the possibility that each operation is dependent
upon or contributes to the success of other operations. Where a
substantial amount of internal dealing takes place between the
branches of a firm, the benefits resulting from vertical integration
should be considered in determining whether the entire business
is unitary.
XII. TORT
A.

DEFEWDANT's NoTICE

TO MUNICIPALITY

SUFFcIMNT

To

PREsmvEl HIS TmnD PARTY CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY OR
CONTRMUTION

Two automobiles, each driven by one of the plaintiffs, collided
with a truck driven by the defendant. When plaintiffs brought
personal injury actions against the defendant, he brought a third
party claim for indemnity or contribution against the city of
St. Paul. Defendant alleged the city caused the accident by negligently maintaining the highway. Pursuant to a statute governing
claims against a municipality, defendant gave the city a written
notice of his claim. However, none of the plaintiffs served notice of
any claims against the city within the required thirty day period.'
unjust as applied to a unitary taxpayer. This result may be justified on the
ground that operating experiences in various states will balance out over a
period of years. Hence there is no injustice in consistently applying the same
apportionment formula. Taxpayer in Rothschild had, in fact, used the threefactor formula without protest for reporting its Minnesota income in every
other year.
1. MNN. STAT. § 465.09 (1961), provides that a plaintiff suing a municipality must give the municipality notice of his claim within thirty days of the
alleged loss when claiming damages due to a defect in certain publicly main-
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At trial the city was granted summary judgment on the ground
that the relevant statutory notice requirement had not been satisfied. On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding
defendant's notice was sufficient to preserve his third party claim
for indemnity or contribution against the city. White v. Johnson,
137 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 1965).
The majority did not squarely face the initial question of
whether the contents and form of the notice given by the defendant was legally sufficient. The dissent argued that this notice,
since it expressly claimed damages only to the defendant, failed to
notify the city of the plaintiffs' damages. Because the plaintiffs'
claims were the only ones relevant to the issues of contribution
and indemnity, the dissent argued, the notice was insufficient as a
matter of law.2 The purpose of the statute was not fulfilled if the
form of this notice in fact deprived the city of the knowledge and
opportunity to adequately investigate the accident within a short
time after its occurrence 3 In such a case, the position of the dissent is quite persuasive. Without specifically answering the dissenting argument, the majority assumed that defendant's notice
to the city was sufficient as a matter of fact.4 The court drew the
inference that defendant had complied with the statute since the
case was an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the
city.
The city argued it was not liable in contribution or indemnity
because it was not "jointly liable" to plaintiffs. Absence of joint
liability was alleged to be due to plaintiffs' noncompliance with
the notice statute. This statutory defense, reasoned the city, precluded defendant from maintaining his claim for indemnity or
contribution. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the city's
contention for two reasons. First, the court held that any negligence by the city created immediate liability toward the plaintiffs at the time of the accident. Thus plaintiffs' failure to notify
the city would not bar defendant's claim, if defendant had in fact
tained property, including highways. Failure to give such notice defeats the
claim. This statute was superseded by MmN. STAT. ANN. § 466.05 (1968),
but the notice provision remained substantially unchanged. In White it does
not appear that anyone suggested defendant's notice may have even preserved plaintiffs' claims against the city.
2. 187 N.W2d at 681 (dissenting opinion).
3. "The purpose of the statute is to enable the municipality to promptly
investigate, while witnesses are available and before conditions have changed,
to ascertain the existence and extent of any liability in order to prevent needless litigation by settlement of meritorious claims." 137 N.W.2d at 680.
4. 187 N.W.2d at 678.
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given timely notice. Second, the court held the city owed the
defendant an independent duty to keep its highways safe, if on the
the facts of the case an indemnity situation existed Further, if
defendant suffered a loss from a breach of this duty, he would
have an actionable indemnity claim against the city, regardless
of the nonexistence of joint liability to the plaintiffs in the main
action.
The roots of contribution and indemnity lie in the equitable
principle that no tortfeasor should pay more than his just share
of a liability." That principle should control White, provided the
city received the protection of adequate statutory notice. If the
alleged negligence of the city concurred with that of the defendant to cause plaintiffs' injuries, contribution seems appropriate.
The major significance of White lies in the holding that even
though the plaintiffs failed to notify the city, the city could still
be liable to the defendant for a claim of contribution. Notwithstanding the fact that the city had a defense against a direct
action by the plaintiffs, the court felt there was still joint liability
at the time of the accident. The court distinguished American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Minneapolis7 where neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant notified the third party municipality of a claim against
it and, therefore, the defendant could not maintain a third party
claim for indemnity. If it is assumed, as the court did, that the
notice in White was sufficient, that case is clearly distinguishable.
In American Auto. Ins. Co.the concerned municipality received
no timely notice whatsoever, whereas in White the city actually
received notice from the defendant within the statutory limit. If
the defendant gave the city adequate notice under the statute,
the city received all the protection it was entitled to. Thus the
purpose of the statute was fulfilled.8
Although from a policy standpoint the distinction between
White and American Auto. Ins. Co. gave substantial support for
a different result in the two cases, a conceptual problem posed
greater difficulties. The court was understandably reluctant to
abandon the long-established requirement that joint liability is a
prerequisite to contribution. On initial reaction, it seems there is
no joint liability in White because the plaintiffs lost their claims
5. Drawing inferences in favor of the defendant, the court found that a
possible claim for indemnity existed. 137 N.W.2d at 678.
6. See id. at 677; Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors
in.
Minnesota, 37 Mhw. L. RPEv. 470 (1953).

7. 259 Minn. 294, 107 N.W.2d 320 (1961).
8. See 137 N.W.52d at 679-80, where the court discusses the nature and
purposes of this notice statute.
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against the city by failing to give notice. The court solved this
dilemma by broadly defining the concept of joint liability While
the dissenting opinion stressed that joint liability means a plaintiff must have an enforceable cause of action against both tortfeasors, ° the majority distinguished "cause of action" from "liability." They indicated the former includes that which is necessary to enforce a claim through the courts; the latter, in contrast,
"arises the moment the tort is committed ... :"I' Thus, procedural

and mechanical requirements necessary to prevail in court, such
as the notice requirement in the White case, are not necessary for
the existence of liability - at least as this term is used in the context of contribution litigation. ' Under such a standard, American
Auto. Ins. Co. and White are not conceptually inconsistent. In
American Auto. Ins. Co. joint liability may have existed. However, both the defendant and the plaintiff had lost their causes
of action against the third party municipality since both had
failed to notify the municipality of their claims. In White, only
the plaintiffs' causes of action were lost.
The court refused to accept the city's contention that its defense against a claim by the plaintiffs barred defendant's contribution claim in a manner analogous to the bars on contribution
stemming from personal defenses such as family immunities or
employers' immunity under Workmen's Compensation Acts. The
court simply stated that such immunities are based on "special
relationships" which must be protected.'3 The court thought that
protection for such relationships is necessary because they are
"based upon well-established public policies, none of which is
possessed by the city in this case."' 4 Certainly no special relation9. See 187 N.W.2d at 679.
10. See id. at 681-82.
11. Id. at 679.
12. For an application of this principle to covenants not to sue, see Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Afinn. 304, 50
N.W.2d 689 (1951).
13. 137 N.W.d at 678-79. To illustrate some of these special relationships,
the court cited London Guar. &Ace. Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d
781 (1954) (father-son immunity); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63
N.W.2d 355 (1954) (employer's immunity under Workmen's Compensation
Act); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1958)
(husband-wife immunity).
14. 187 N.W.2d at 678. The dissent felt the case should be controlled by
Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956). In Koenigs the
defendant claimed contribution from a third party defendant who married
the plaintiff after the accident. In refusing the claim for contribution, the
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ship existed between the city and the plaintiffs which should preclude defendant's contribution claim. While there may be an important policy behind requiring notice to municipalities, the
majority assumed this policy was met in the instant case by
defendant's notice, at least for purposes of testing a summary
judgment.
In reaching its alternative holding that the defendant might
have an indemnity claim against the city, the court looked to
established doctrines of indemnity. One of the several factual situations giving rise to indemnity occurs when the indemnitee's only
negligence consists of the failure to discover the indemnitor's
negligence.'6 The court felt such a situation might have existed in
the instant case. Moreover, the concept of joint liability presented
little difficulty with respect to the issue of indemnity. Even in
the absence of joint liability, the city could have breached a duty
owed to the defendant which was "independent of any duty owed
to plaintiffs.' 6 Lunderberg v. Bierman 7 illustrates this independent duty principle in indemnity cases. There the defendant had
entrusted her automobile to a garage owner for a mechanical
checkup. While conducting a road test, an employee of the garage
owner negligently operated the automobile, causing personal injuries to the plaintiff, another employee of the garage owner.
Plaintiff sued defendant, the owner of the automobile who was
liable under the safety responsibility act. Defendant in turn
brought a third party complaint against the garage owner. There
was no joint liability because the garage owner was immune from
suit by the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Notwithstanding the absence of joint liability, the court held
defendant was entitled to indemnity because the garage owner
owed her an independent contractual duty to exercise due care
while having custody of her car. The garage owner breached this
duty when his employee negligently operated defendant's car and
Koenigs court indicated family harmony and affection were to be preserved
even though the parties were not married until after the accident. In relying
on Koenigs, the White dissent apparently rejects the majority's distinction
between the White situation and the situation where a "special relationship"
immunity exists.
15. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104
N.W.2d 843 (1960), for a recent and comprehensive list of factual situations
where indemnity is appropriate.
16. 137 N.W.2d at 680.
17. 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
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caused the defendant to be liable for damages to the plaintiff.
Although in most cases the "independent duty" refers to a duty
imposed by contract or statute,'8 there is no apparent reason to
distinguish
those duties from a tort duty such as existed in
White.' 9
The net result of White appears to be a broadening of both
contribution and indemnity. The court's view of "joint liability"
as the immediate wrongful acts giving rise to a claim, without the
necessary procedural trappings to complete the technical cause
of action, will probably save some worthy contribution claims
which might otherwise be lost by failure of the plaintiff to technically perfect his cause of action against the third party tortfeasor. Additionally, the application of the independent duty
principle to indemnity situations can be based on a tort duty
between the indemnitor and the indemnitee.
B.

PRoTEcTION OF LEGAL INTEREST Is DEFUSF, TO SUIT FOR
INTERFERENcE WITH PROSPpECTIVE ADVANTAGE

Plaintiff, a radio disc jockey, had been an employee of the
defendant station owner. The employment contract contained a
restrictive covenant providing that plaintiff, Bennett, could not,
for a period of eighteen months after termination of the contract,
seek employment with any radio station within a thirty-five mile
radius of any city in which defendant, Storz Company owned or
operated a broadcasting station. After Bennett's original contract
had expired, the defendant offered to rehire him at a reduced
salary. Bennett refused the offer and began employment negotiations with a competitor of defendant. Storz Company threatened
18. See, e.g., Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944); Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843
(1960); see also Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S.
124 (1956).

19. Even though the city owed defendant a duty to maintain its streets
with due care, indemnity does not necessarily follow. Defendant's negligence
must have been "passive," i.e., very slight, in comparison to the "active"
negligence of the city. Unless the facts of a given case fall within this "activepassive negligence" dichotomy, indemnity will not be granted.
If the relative culpability between tortfeasors is such that indemnity is
inappropriate, the independent duty principle does not apply to a claim for
contribution; joint liability is always a necessary requirement. See Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955);
Hendrickson v. Mimnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d
843 (1960); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954);
Annot., 53 AL.R.2d 977 (1957).
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to sue the competitor if they hired Bennett. KSTP withdrew from
employment negotiations with the plaintiff. Bennett then brought
suit alleging tortious interference with contractual relations. The
trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the presence of the restrictive covenant justified the
defendant's conduct as a matter of law. On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of a prima
facie valid restrictive covenant in an employment contract could
not, as a matter of law, justify interference with prospective advantageous relations. The court found that defendant's interference could be justified only if, in the opinion of the jury, the
covenant was legally enforceable; and if the defendant had acted
in good faith to protect its interest. The court indicated that the
test of validity was the striking of a reasonable balance between
the interests of the employer and the employee, with due regard
being given to the nature of the employment and to the time and
territorial extent of the restriction. Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting
Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965).
A person has a right to be secure in his contractual relations
and to be free from unjustified outside interference.1 A similar
right exists when the interference is with some prospective advantage other than that created in an existing contract. A defendant
claiming justified interference has the burden of proving that he
acted to protect some legal right equal or superior to the one he
invaded." Even when such a right exists, the defendant must act
in good faith -there can be no justification if the interference is
motivated primarily by a desire to injure a competitor.4 Thus,
when the court in Bennett speaks of "lawful justification" as being
a jury question, the factual issue to be decided is whether the
defendant's actions were justifiable if the restrictive covenant
were valid.
1. See, e.g., Bacon v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 161 Mim. 522, 201
N.W. 326 (1924); Joyce v. Great No. fly., 100 Minn. 225, 110 N.W. 875

(1907).
2. See Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205

N.W. 630 (1925).
3. See, e.g., R an W Hat Shop, Ine. v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55
(1922); Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491 (1929); Sorenson v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927).
4. Twitchell v. Glenwood-Inglewood Co., 131 Minn. 375, 155 N.W. 621
(1915); Heffernan v. Whittlsey, 126 Minn. 163, 148 N.W. 63 (1914); Faunce
v. Searles, 122 Minn. 843, 142 N.W. 816 (1913).
If the defendant's purpose is not legally justifiable, any manner of intentional interference with the plaintiff's interests will be sufficient to impose
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The Minnesota court has never decided whether one person
has a legal right to interfere with another's contractual relations
merely on the basis of a good faith belief in a previous contract
which is later found invalid. However, the weight of authority
indicates that a good faith belief in the validity of a contract does
not justify such interference. 5 While this has been stated as a
general rule in the past, the reasons for it are illustrated best
where, as in Bennett, the contract deals with an area in which
contractual validity is very carefully scrutinized.' Restrictive
covenants ancillary to employment contracts7 have been viewed
liability. See Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). Even when
the defendant has acted for a justifiable purpose, he must limit himself to
legal means. See Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W.
754 (1927).
5. See, e.g., Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 258 Fed. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1919),
rev'd on otkeT grounds, 269 Fed. 928 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 259 U.S.
569 (1921); McLennan v. Church, 163 Wis. 411, 158 N.W. 73 (1916); cf.
Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. F. W. Spencer & Son, Inc., 28 Cal.
Rptr. 425 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see generally Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43, 82-85
(1933).
6. See Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 421,

360 P.2d 1018 (1961).
7. Covenants restricting trade ancillary to a contract of employment are
usually distinguished from those accompanying a contract for the sale of a
business. Compare Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N.W. 415 (1913),
where an established business was sold with its good will and there was a
valid covenant not to compete in a certain territory, "violation of a negative
covenant such as this is deemed a sufficient ground for interference and injunctions are freely granted almost as a matter of course .. . ." 124 Minn.
at 52, 144 N.W. at 416, with Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 201 Minn. 300,
305, 283 N.W. 561, 565 (1939), "[I]rreparable injury, actual or threatened,
must be shown before the employe [sic], who has covenanted not to compete
after his term of employment will be enjoined."
The reason usually given for this difference in the treatment of the two
types of contracts is that unless the vendor is prohibited from competing, the
vendee will not be able to obtain the full value of the good will he purchased.
The good will accruing to an employee is considered merely incidental to his
work which is thought to be the thing that the employer has purchased. The
courts have also noted the relatively unequal bargaining power of the employer-employee as compared to the vendor-vendee relationship. In addition,
an employee usually has no other means of support and thus may become a
charge upon the state. See Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377
(1945); Swiggert & Howard v. Tilden, 121 Iowa 650, 97 N.W. 82 (1903);
Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932); Arthur
Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 NE.2d 685 (C.P.
1952); of. Queenan, Taxation of Covenants Not to Compete in the Sale of a
Business, 4 BOSTON COwxGE Iw'usTRiAr & ColvrmmicAI. L. Ruv. 267 (1962).
There remains, however, a strong minority of courts who refuse to distinguish between the two types of covenants. See, e.g., Eureka Laundry Co. v.
Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412, (1911).
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with disfavor by the courts.8 Such contracts are ordinarily considered contrary to public policy9 for it is thought desirable that
citizens be free to pursue their choice of occupation.'0 To permit a
good faith belief in the validity of a restrictive covenant to constitute a defense may effectuate covenants that might otherwise be
void. If the threat of suit may be based on a mere good faith
belief in the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, a former
employer is provided with a means of harassing an employee
almost as effective as actual enforcement of the covenant.
Arguably, interference with contractual relations requires a
8. See DiAngeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934); Boone
v. Krieg, 156 MNinn. 83, 194 N.W. 92 (1923); 35 A.m. Jun. Master & Servant
§ 99 (1941). However, equity will protect the employer against certain forms
of unfair competition- the former employee may not use trade secrets or
confidential information to his own advantage and, in general, may not use
good will gained for the employer's business to his own advantage. New
Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 Pac. 990 (1916); see
Equipment Advertiser, Inc. v. Harris, 136 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 1965); cf.
Meyer v. Wineburgh, 110 F. Supp. 957 (D.D.C. 1953), "It is not the purpose
of injunctive relief to prevent competition of the defendant with the plaintiff.
Its purpose is to preserve to the plaintiffs the fruits of the defendant's services,
for which he was paid as an employee of the plaintiffs." Id. at 959.
Gibbons v. Hansch, 185 Minn. 290, 240 N.W. 901 (1932), suggests that
after a sale of business, the vendor may not "specially" solicit the trade of
those who were his old customers. In Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf,
261 Minn. 166, 112 N.W.2d 42 (1961), the court stated that in the so-called
"route cases," the chief factor in determining to what extent an employee
should be allowed to compete is whether his efforts substantially aided in the
acquisition of new customers.
9. Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, South Dakota,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma currently have legislation which prohibits such
covenants to some degree. Co ipare OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1961) (blanket
prohibition), with MrcH. CoA'. LAws §§ 445.761-.766 (1948) (allowing
covenants when employee had access to route lists).
10. See National Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W.
806 (1891). The origin of this policy can be traced to the master-apprentice
system that flourished in England and on the Continent from the 13th to the
16th centuries. A wise master usually tried to protect himself from the competition of an apprentice he had trained and who was familiar with his customers. But when a shortage of skilled workers resulted from the plagues of
the 14th century, many masters tried to use covenants not to compete to
assure themselves of skilled help by making it virtually impossible for the
apprentice to work elsewhere. Suits to enforce such covenants arose in equity
since an injunction was the most satisfactory method of enforcement. The
courts of equity took a dim view of such procedures, however, expressing the
fear that employees so restricted might become a charge upon the state- or
be forced to leave the country in search of employment. See Davies v. Davies,
[1887] 36 Ch. D. 359 (C.A.); Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete,
73 HARv. L. 1Ev. 625, 629-37 (1960).
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balancing of interests similar to that in an action for malicious
prosecution. In the latter case society's interest in promoting
justice allows a party to actually bring suit merely on the basis of
a good faith belief."1 This social interest outweighs the expense
and inconvenience incurred by the opposing party. One might
argue by analogy that there is a strong social interest in allowing
a person to notify others of what he reasonably believes to be his
rights, and to threaten suit if those rights appear in danger. Allowing the threat of suit to be based on a good faith belief may even
obviate the needless expense and inconvenience of actual litigation. An analogy to malicious prosecution in the present context,
however, would be improper primarily because an actual suit to
enforce the restrictive covenant results in a final decision as to the
covenant's validity, eliminating the danger of continued harassment. Although a former employer may be permitted to sue on the
basis of such a mistaken belief, his own expenses and inconvenience incurred in the suit will cause him to evaluate carefully the
necessity and practical value of enforcing the restrictive covenant.
This deterrent is not present if the employer is allowed merely to
threaten suit on the basis of a good faith belief. An employer's
mistaken assertion of his contract "rights" may be tolerated when
he pursues a final and binding determination, but it need not be
tolerated when he used his "right" to the injury of both the employee and third parties without risk to himself.
The possible unfairness to employees of permitting a good
faith belief to justify threat of suit is apparent from Bennett.
By the terms of the restrictive covenant, plaintiff was prohibited
from competing with defendant regardless of the reason for
leaving defendant's employ. The evidence established that defendant had relegated plaintiff to an inferior position during the
period near the contract's expiration and had refused to exercise
the options available under the original employment agreement.
The employee did not choose to leave his employment and, practically, employment was no longer open to him. Thus, enforcement of the covenant would have denied plaintiff not only the
right to improve his professional status, but also the right to
preserve the status he had enjoyed.
If interference will be allowed only if the restrictive covenant is
valid, the question then arises as to the standards to be used by
the trier of fact to determine the validity of the covenant. Spe11. See Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 NJ. Super. 189, 88A.2d 246
(Ch. 1951). But of. Meyer v. Washington Times Co., 76 F2d 988 (D.C. Cir.
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cifically, the issue is whether the standards of validity of the covenant as a defense to a suit for tortious interference ought to be the
same as the standards used when the employer seeks an injunction
to enforce the covenant. 2 It may be asking a great deal of a defendant to require him to second guess a jury on a factual question about which reasonable men may differ.'3 In Bennett the
court admitted that the defendant had a contract which on its
face provided a ground for interference.14 The validity of the
covenant could only be determined by making a reasonable balance between the interests of the employer and employee.' 5
It must be remembered, however, that the reason for requiring
12. The standard for issuing an injunction in Minnesota appears to depend
largely upon the existence of damages to the employer. Damages can usually
be shown by proof of a close customer-employee relationship upon which the
business of the employer depends. See Thermorama Inc. v. Buckwold, 267
Minn. 551, 125 N.W.2d 844 (1964); Shaleen v. Stratte, 188 Minn. 219, 246
N.W. 744 (1933); Andrews v. Cosgriff, 175 Minn. 431, 221 N.W. 642 (1928);
Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924). At least two Minnesota cases, however, have required that the employee be "unique" before injunctive relief will be granted. Several courts in other jurisdictions have criticized the use of such a requirement. See Wark v. Ervin Press Corp., 48 F.2d
152, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1931); accord, e.g., Sarco Co. v. Gulliver, 3 NJ. Misc.
641, 129 At]. 399 (Ch. 1925), aff'd inem., 99 N.J. Eq. 432, 131 At. 923 (CT.
Err. & App. 1926); Foster v. White, 248 App. Div. 451, 290 N.Y. Supp. 394
(1936); Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942); Eureka
Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (1911); Annot., 9 AL.R.
1456, 1460-63 (1920); cf. McCluer v. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp., 62 F.2d
426, 429 (loth Cir. 1982); Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336, 238 N.W. 641
(1931).
An injunction is generally considered a very harsh remedy. See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932): it appears
to be the only satisfactory remedy, although equity jurisdiction would permit
the court to grant compensatory damages if necessary. See Wright v. Scotton,
13 Del. Ch. 402, 121 AUt. 69 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co.,
209 Minn. 470, 477, 297 N.W. 178, 182 (1941); Stoffiet v. Stoffiet, 160 Pa. 529,
28 At. 857 (1894). But see Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d
950 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1960). Thus it might be concluded that where damages are
available the standard for justification might be less stringent.
13. The defendant's belief in the validity of the covenant was probably
supported by his earlier successful suit to enforce the same covenant against
a Kansas City disc jockey in Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Radio Station KBKC,
Inc., No. 26910, D. Johnson County, Kansas, Div. No. 1, 1960.
14. 270 WMnn. at 536, 134 N.W.2d at 900.
15. Where the restraint contracted for appears to have been for a just and
honest purpose, for the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in
whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between the parties, and not specifically injurious to the public, the restraint is reasonable and valid. Williams
v. Thompson, 143 Minn. 451, 456, 174 N.W. 307, 308 (1919).
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the covenant to be valid is to assure that the employee does not
suffer and the employer does not profit unless the employer has
an equal or superior protectible interest. If a jury is given standards less than those of enforceability, it is in effect being told that
a good faith belief in the enforceability of the restrictive covenant
is an adequate defense for interference with other contractual
relations. Any standard short of enforceability allows the defense
of reliance on an unenforceable contract. It would be anomalous
to require a lesser burden of proof to justify interference than to
enforce the covenant. Thus, the jury should be asked to decide
whether the covenant would be valid and enforceable against the
plaintiff. However, the covenant need not be enforceable in toto,
but may be restricted in time and space' 6 to the extent necessary
to protect the defendant's interests without placing an undue
burden upon plaintiff or societyY1
The court in Bennett also required the defendant to act in good
faith to protect his own interest and not to destroy plaintiff's employment opportunity.' 8 A small right or interest of the defendant
increases the likelihood of a jury finding that the Storz Company
did not act to protect its rights, while a large interest or right of
defendant would have the opposite effect. Yet if any portion of
the covenant can be found valid, and the Storz Company is found
to have acted to protect its interest, the interference with plaintiff's contractual relations should be justified.
16. See Annot., 43 A.LR .2d 94 (1955); Annot., 41 AL.R.2d 15 (1955).
17. When an otherwise valid covenant contains unreasonably extensive
restrictions, most courts will enforce a portion of the covenant if the restrictions are severable and some of them are reasonable. See, e.g., Edgecomb v.
Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926); Indianhead Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Hvidsten Transport, Inc., 268 Mnn. 176, 128 N.W.2d 334 (1964); Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 NJ.L. 618, 71 At]. 265 (Sup. Ct. 1908);
Spinks v. Riebold, 310 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); cf. Larx Co. v.
Nicol, 224 Minn. 1, 28 N.W.2d 705 (1946). But see WAKE Broadcasters, Inc.
v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862, 114 SXE.2d 26 (1960); Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v.
Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
It is generally held, however, that when restrictions are not subject to
division by the wording of the covenant, the courts will not take it upon
themselves to enforce any part of the indivisible unreasonable restrictions.
Compare Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. ed 265, 120
N.W.2d 126 (1963), with Extine v. Williamson M1idwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St.
403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964). See generally 19 U. MAmi L. Rzv. 318 (1965).
18. 270 Minn. at 532, 134 N.W.2d at 897.

